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AN APPLICATION OF DYNAMIC MICROECONOMIC THEORY TO BOVINE 
TUBERCULOSIS CONTROL IN NEW ZEALAND CATTLE 
by N. Ross Lambie 
Capital theory has been used in a wide range of economic applications to provide 
valuable insights into intertemporal trade-offs. This research uses an optimal control 
framework to model a livestock disease control problem in which there are movements 
of livestock into ami out of a herd. Movement control regulations are important in 
reducing the transmission of bovine tuberculosis (Tb) between cattle herds and farming 
areas in New Zealand. The analysis focuses on a representative breeding-store beef 
cattle production system in a Tb vector risk area under mandatory movement control 
. testing. The hypothetical producer has the objective of maximising net revenue from 
the cattle enterprise while being faced with control decisions concerning marketing. 
cattle to store sale or slaughter, purchasing replacement cattle, and harvesting a wildlife -
Tb vector popUlation. Non-linear programming is used to find the steady state values 
for the control variables. Numerical results disclose that economic incentives may exist 
for risk neutral producers to purchase cattle from infected herds. A major policy 
implication is that some form of regulatory response may be required to assist the 
market in transforming the price discount for cattle from infected herds from an 
incentive into a disincentive. 
KEYWORDS: Dynamic optimisation, optimal control theory, bioeconomics, animal 
health economics, livestock disease control. 
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Chapter 1: Bovine Tuberculosis Control in New Zealand Cattle 
1.1 Introduction 
Bovine tuberculosis is a bacterial disease caused by the bacillus Mycobacterium 
bovis (M bovis). The disease can affect all animal species and age groups, and is 
present in every country of the world (Radostits et al., 1994). The bacteria is 
responsible for the majority of tuberculosis found in cattle and is of particular concern 
worldwide with respect to dairy cattle (Blood and Radostits,' 1989). In New Zealand M 
bovis is listed as a notifiable organism under the Biosecurity (Notifiable Organisms) 
Order (1993). Recent statistics show that Tb levels in New Zealand are the highest in 
beef cattle herds (MAF, 1996). 
Epidemiological research suggests that airborne transmission of M bovis is the 
most important route for bovine tuberculosis infections in cattle (Pritchard, 1988; 
Morris et al., 1994). While in many countries the disease is primarily transmitted to 
cattle from other infected cattle (Radostits et aI., 1994), in New Zealand wildlife 
vectors such as the brush tailed possum (Trichosurus vulpecula) are identified as a 
major source of infection in some areas (Boland and Livingstone, 1986; Tweedle and 
Livingstone, 1994).1 
The development of bovine tuberculosis III cattle depends on the route of 
infection and the animal's immune response (Pritchard, 1988). In a generalised account 
of the disease's pathology Radostits et al. (1994) state that bovine tuberculosis is a 
progressive cattle disease which spreads in two stages known as the primary complex 
and post-primary dissemination. During these two stages the characteristic tubercles 
1 
which develop in the lymph nodes and organs give rise to toxemia which causes 
increasing morbidity and eventually the death of the animal. 
Bovine tuberculosis is a significant disease of cattle for several reasons. Firstly, 
it is claimed that of all cattle diseases tuberculosis has been the most destructive in 
terms of cattle deaths (Myers and Steele, 1969). Secondly, the impact of the disease on 
cattle is not solely restricted to high levels of mortality, the productive efficiency of 
infected animals is estimated to decline by 10-25% (Radostits et aT., 1994). Thirdly, if 
herd. Tb infection levels are relatively high compared to other countries then exports of 
beef and veal products may be adversely affected by the establishment of trade barriers 
or reduced demand from foreign consumers in response to either perceived risk or 
inferior quality (Animal Health Board, 1995). Fourthly, bovine tuberculosis is an 
important zoonosis that can be transmitted to humans in unpasteurised milk and 
through infection arising from close contact with infected animals (Radostits et at., 
1994). 
Bovine Tb control in New Zealand has developed into an integrated approach 
involving different tactics and methods. To appreciate the role and significance of 
movement control in current policy the economics and evolution of Tb control need to 
be understood. This chapter provides an economic interpretation of Tb control and 
overviews past approaches towards control to provide a context for a discussion of the 
current Tb control strategy. The details and economic issues relating to movement 
control regulations are then highlighted and the objectives of the study outlined. 
1 Other significant wildlife and feral vectors include deer, pigs, cats and ferrets (Allen, 1991; Hickling, 1995). 
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1.2 The Economic Rationale for Government Involvement in Tb Control 
. ',:..~ '.~ , .. ,; ,--
~:~:-~;.:.::~-~:. 
The well known market failures associated with controlling an infectious 
disease in livestock suggest an active role for government (Umail et al., 1994). 
Economic theory supports such an approach. When goods or services are non-exclusive 
andlor non-rival in consumption private markets may fail to provide an efficient 
allocation of resources (Randall, 1983). Non-exclusiveness gives rise to external costs 
or benefits being incurred by agents third party to a transaction, and non-rivalry 
produces inefficient pricing due to the marginal cost of supplying another consumer 
being zero. Private market solutions to market failure are often impeded by high 
transaction costs required to internalise externalities, inefficient property rights, and 
agents free riding by not disclosing their true willingness to pay for the good or service 
(Stiglitz, 1988). As a consequence, public sector involvement may be required to 
achieve a more efficient allocation of resources. 
There are several negative impacts associated with cattle herds being infected 
with bovine Tb. Firstly, producers with infected herds may incur reduced productivity 
as a result of the disease. Secondly, other producers with uninfected herds are subject to 
an increased risk of disease being spread into their herds, either through natural spread 
or management practices, and associated reductions in productivity. Thirdly, the cattle 
industry as a whole may face an increased risk of export market closure due to the level 
of Tb being unacceptable to trading partners. Finally, there is an increased risk that the 
general public will become exposed and infected with Tb. 
Economic theory suggests that individual producers will respond to infection in 
their herds by undertaking efforts to control Tb to a level where the marginal benefits of 
control, in the form of increased productivity, equal the marginal costs of control. As 
highlighted above, some of the benefits of control are not exclusive to the producer 
3 
undertaking the control activity. Neighbouring properties, those purchasing or grazing 
cattle, the cattle industry, and the general public all benefit to some degree from the 
reduced level of disease. Because there are no payments for these benefits the 
producer's decision regarding the level of control to undertake relates solely to the 
private benefit of control. Government involvement may therefore be necessary to 
achieve a more socially optimal level of control. 
Several approaches are available to Government for correcting market failures. 
The government could intervene to modify producer behaviour by establishing systems 
of taxes, charges, fines, or subsidies (Randall, 1972; Stiglitz, 1988). Tb control 
programmes in New Zealand have used subsidies to a limited extent in the form of 
subsidised testing and compensation for reactor cattle. More recently, fines have also 
been used to ensure producers present accurate Tb declaration cards when moving 
cattle off their properties. Although economic instruments are generally favoured by 
economists, factors such as distributional implications, implementation costs, 
information requirements, uncertainty and variance of costs and benefits, and political 
manipulation may constrain their application (Stiglitz, 1988). 
An alternative approach that does not rely on direct government intervention is 
the use of market solutions following the creation of well defined property rights. 
However, internalising the benefits of control by reducing transaction costs and/or 
establishing more efficient property rights in order to arrive at a market solution to Tb 
control is problematic due to the non-exclusive and non-rival characteristics of the 
external benefits. 
Government involvement in New Zealand Tb control has mainly relied on a 
third approach to market failure: interventions in the form of regulations. Regulations 
..•. ->, .. 
such as compulsory Tb testing, slaughtering of reactors, and movement control 
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restrictions attempt to ensure coordination of control activities and producer 
compliance with required standards. Using regulations and standards could be regarded 
as a pragmatic approach to achieving a suitable level of control given some of the 
difficulties associated with economic instruments and market solutions. 
In the most recent Tb control programme the Animal Health Board has 
disclosed an interest in moving away from regulations towards a greater reliance on 
market mechanisms to achieve more socially optimal levels of control. As a 
consequence, the latest Tb control programme introduces some market incentives to 
modify producer behaviour but still uses regulations to a large extent to meet its 
objectives. To appreciate the evolving role of the public sector in New Zealand Tb 
control and the move towards placing more responsibility for control in the domain of 
the private sector the history of Tb control in New Zealand cattle needs to be 
appreciated. 
1.3 A Brief History ofTb Control in New Zealand Cattle 
In most countries motivation for bovine tuberculosis control was initially based 
on public health concerns, however, over time adverse economic implications 
associated with the disease became increasingly dominant (Myers and Steele, 1969). In 
New Zealand bovine tuberculosis control has largely been motivated by possible 
reductions in livestock production, reduced access to export markets, and negative 
implications for public health that would arise if the disease was uncontrolled (Tweedle 
and Livingstone, 1994). 
Following McFadyean's identification in 1888 that tuberculosis was a 
significant disease for humans and animals, various methods of controlling the disease L.·.· ....... ; .. 
in cattle such as, the removal of clinical cases, tuberculin testing and separation of 
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reactors from non-reactors, testing and slaughtering reactors, and vaccination, have 
been used in different countries (Pritchard, 1988). Of these methods, testing and 
slaughtering is acknowledged as a necessary component of any effective control policy 
(Myers and Steele, 1969; Pritchard, 1988; Radostits et al., 1994). 
Bovine tuberculosis control in New Zealand cattle originated with voluntary 
testing of town supply dairy herds in 1945 in response to public health concerns 
(Jackson, 1993). The voluntary scheme was expanded to include factory supply dairy 
farmers in 1958 and became compulsory in 1961 with the introduction of area testing 
for all dairy cattle (Boland and Livingstone, 1986). The move to compulsory 
participation was primarily undertaken to meet expectations regarding Tb control from 
importers of New Zealand's daity products (Janson, 1990). Although surveillance was .. ;;.-.-.' .';.--
extended to all dairy cattle in 1970 the control of tuberculosis in beef cattle had only 
begun two years earlier, in 1968, with the introduction of voluntary testing (Boland and 
Livingstone, 1986). The voluntary scheme was soon replaced by compulsory area 
testing in 1971 (Boland and Livingstone, 1986). The move to a compulsory scheme was 
undertaken to address concerns that beef cattle may be responsible for reinfection of 
dairy herds (Tweedle and Livingstone, 1994). By 1977 all cattle were subject to 
compulsory testing or surveillance (Boland and Livingstone, 1986). This brought to a 
culmination the progressive recognition that the public good aspects of Tb control, and 
the expectations from New Zealand's trading partners regarding control efforts, 
required a collective approach between Government and the cattle sector to ensure 
effective control. The evolution of Tb control from a voluntary to compulsory 
programme motivated by trade implications parallels the history of Tb control in many 
other developed countries (Neill, 1995). 
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Tb control programmes were initially very successful at reducing apparent .. " . - ,,- . ~ 
z~~:.~~;-~:: 
infection levels in cattle. Comparisons between national reactor rates at the 
commencement of testing and those for the 1979/80 season show declines from 8.6% to 
0.05% and 0.8% to 0.1 % for dairy and beef cattle, respectively (Boland and 
Livingstone, 1986). These figures do, however, disguise two important epidemiological 
findings relating to the failure of the test and slaughter policy in progressively 
containing and eliminating infection from some areas. The first was in the early 1970's 
when the brush tailed possum (Trichosurus vulpecula) was identified as a wildlife 
vector of bovine tuberculosis (Tweedle and Livingstone, 1994). The second finding 
concerns movements of infected stock being implicated in cases of infection in areas 
where M bovis was not present in wild animal populations. (Boland and Livingstone, 
1986). In response to these findings Tb related possum control operations were 
undertaken in the 1970's and in 1977 movement control restrictions were established 
(Batcheler and Cowan, 1988). Favourable results were initially obtained through the 
adoption of these additional control tactics with the number of herds on movement 
control falling from 1275 in 1977 to a low of 504 at the beginning of 1981 (Boland and 
Livingstone, 1986). This trend towards lower numbers of herds on movement control 
was soon reversed in the early 1980's after reductions in Government funding of 
possum control. (Boland and Livingstone, 1986). 
Wildlife vector control and livestock movement control have remained 
prominent components of Tb control strategies and have been successively modified in 
accordance with increased insight gained into the epidemiology of the disease (Morris 
et al., 1994). The general trend in these changes has been towards an expansion of 
wildlife vector control and a tightening of livestock movement control (Animal Health 
Board, 1996). While concern was expressed in recent years at the lack of progress in 
7 
reducing annual reactor rates in cattle from levels experienced in the mid 1980's . " .. . 
~:~~:~~:~:tt:, 
(Jackson, 1993), recent reporting on the status of the bovine Tb eradication programme 
is optimistic that favourable results are beginning to be achieved (Animal Health Board, 
1996). 
1.4 The National Pest Management Strategy for Bovine Tuberculosis 
New Zealand bovine Tb control policy makers recognise the need for a 
collective approach and continue to rely on regulations and an associated national level 
focus. This is reflected in the proposed National Pest Management Strategy for bovine 
tuberculosis (NPMS) developed under Part V of the Biosecurity Act (1993).2 
The purpose of the strategy remains consistent with previous motivations for Tb 
control and focuses on reducing Tb transmission to and within domestic livestock herds 
over a five year period. Section 5.4 of the proposed strategy specifically seeks the 
following objectives: 
• A reduction in the percentage of infected herds from 0.7% to 0.2% of the 
total herds in Tb Vector-Free Areas. 
• Prevent the establishment of new andlor existing Tb Vector Risk Areas. 
• A reduction in the percentage of infected herds from 17% to 11 % of the 
total herds in Tb Vector Risk Areas. . -.' .;:-
~. . -. -. - - '.-
• Create an environment whereby individuals are encouraged to take 
responsibility for the Tb status of their area and herds. 
.'.->.", 
2 Most of the strategy was implemented on 1 November 1996 under existing legislation. 
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In the process of developing the strategy the Animal Health Board took the 
opportunity to review current control policies and, as a consequence of consultation 
with affected groups, identified risk management "as an overarching theme" 
(Livingstone, 1996: p.IO). This is reflected in the principle focus of control 
programmes which is the management and elimination of disease risk. The strategy 
acknowledges that areas currently clear of Tb must be kept clear and infection must be 
reduced in infected areas in order to achieve its objectives. Figure 1.1 illustrates how Tb 
control is approached under the NPMS using both disease control and vector control. 
Disease control is directed at reducing infection levels within herds and 
preventing the spread of Tb between herds. Vector control focuses on restricting the 
transmission of infection from wild vectors. Herd Tb status and the area Tb 
classifications serve to convey information as to the risk of disease. Herd Tb status is 
determined by the current and past incidence of herd infection, and area Tb 
classification is determined by the local Tb risk from Tb vectors together with the 
recent history of herd infection. These classifications jointly determine the appropriate 
surveillance programme for a particular herd, whether and to what extent movement 
control is applied, and the vector control strategy. 
Animal disease control authorities are aware that an increased Tb control effort 
is required to prevent greater risk of infection for livestock (Animal Health Board, 
1995). The NPMS addresses this need by bringing about several changes to both the 
philosophy and current policies used in Tb control. Although the public good aspect of 
Tb control is still acknowledged, and a collective approach to management and funding 
is maintained to ensure control coordination and compliance, the NPMS moves 
towards imposing greater individual responsibility for control. 
9 
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Figure 1.1 NPMS Tb Control Methods & Tactics 
Movement 
Control 
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inspection at 
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& slaughter of 
infected animals 
Applied to individual 
farms on the basis of 
infection risk 
classifications 
Vector Control 
Strategies 
Area Tb Classification 
Herd Tb Status Herd Type Tb Vector Risk Areas Tb Vector Free Areas 
• Clear (1...n) • Beef Breeding • Control zones • Fringe testing zone 
• Infected (1...n) • Dairy • Eradication zones • Surveillance zone 
• Works Monitored • Small Breeding • Endemic zones • Official Tb free zone 
• Suspended • Dry Stock 
• High Risk Infected • Miscellaneous 
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The management approach under the proposed strategy reinforces the use of 
economic instruments to promote desirable producer behaviour by encouraging the link 
between herd Tb status, and both market prices for cattle and associated disease control 
costs. Funding responsibilities are based on the identification of beneficiaries of the 
strategy and exacerbators of the Tb problem and the extent to which they benefit or 
contribute. The management and funding framework maintains a general trend evident 
in control approaches over recent years towards more market based approaches to 
market failure. It facilitates this by fostering an environment in which individual 
producers face the economic consequences arising from their decisions. 
The change in philosophy provides the foundation for changes to the policies 
and tactics employed in the strategy's disease and vector control programmes. With 
respect to disease control, the changes are aimed at increasing the detection of Tb and 
increasing the efficiency of control. Detection is increased through more intensive herd 
testing. Previously testing frequency was determined by the Tb area classification, type 
of herd and movement control status of a herd. Under the new system Tb area 
classification and herd type are still used to determine testing frequency, however, a 
more refined system for classifying herd Tb status is also used. The new herd Tb status 
classification permits testing frequency to depend on factors such as the period a herd 
has retained a "Clear" or "Infected" status and whether an infected herd is considered to 
be "High Risk". 
To increase the efficiency of control, changes are directed at making the 
producer bear more of the costs associated with an infected herd. This is brought about 
through the limited introduction of direct payment for discretionary testing, reduced 
reactor compensation, the new herd Tb status classification, and tighter movement 
control regulations. Efficiency gains are expected to come from increased incentives for 
11 
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farmers to reduce disease risk and improve testing facilities as they become confronted 
with the costs of not adequately controlling the disease (Livingstone, 1995). Although-
direct payment for testing only relates to discretionary testing, there is the provision for 
direct payment for all testing if it is considered at some future time to be in the best 
interests of the scheme. Compensation for reactor cattle identified at surveillance and 
movement control testing, and subsequently slaughtered, is reduced from 85% to 65% 
of fair market value. The new classification for herd Tb status together with the Tb 
management area classification are intended to provide producers with better 
information as to the risk of Tb and an incentive to improve their risk status. The 
Animal Health Board expects that the improved information on Tb risk will assist 
producers in incorporating Tb risk into their livestock purchasing and grazing decisions 
and consequently lead to lower market prices for stock from "Infected" herds relative to 
stock from "Clear" herds. Movement control requirements are also tightened to lower 
the risk of infection being spread through livestock movement. 
Economic analysis of the costs and benefits of the proposed NPMS has been 
undertaken to satisfy the requirements of Schedule One of the Biosecurity Act (1993) 
(Nimmo-Bell, 1995). Cost benefit analysis was used to compare the NPMS with the 
strategies of doing nothing and the current control programme which has existed since 
1992/93 (Animal Health Board, 1995). The results of the analysis supported the NPMS 
on the basis that benefits significantly outweighed costs when the potential for loss in 
trade was included. 
The above cost benefit analysis was concerned with identifying whether the 
NPMS was more efficient than the two selected alternatives using a fairly restricted set 
of relevant costs and benefits. It does not, however, provide a detailed analysis of the 
tradeoffs encompassed within the NPMS and therefore ignores other important issues 
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such as the likely behavioural responses of individual producers to the strategy and the 
equity implications. As a consequence many questions remain regarding the economic 
tradeoffs surrounding the methods and tactics employed in the proposed strategy. 
1.5 Economic Issues Surrounding the NPMS 
It is acknowledged by Tb control experts that the effectiveness of control 
programmes depends on individual producer's decisions being consistent with control 
objectives (Livingstone, 1996; Morris et al., 1994). While the NPMS seeks to achieve 
.', ,_. 
compliant producer behaviour by positively associating control costs with herd Tb ;".). 
status, uncertainty exists as to whether control costs are an incentive or disincentive for 
producers to behave desirably (Livingstone, 1995). 
Concern has been expressed that moves toward increased individual 
responsibility for control may result in greater non-compliance (Livingstone, 1995). 
This concern is borne out in a recent study by Bicknell (1995), who highlighted the 
possibility that increasing the financial burden of Tb control may elicit either non-
compliant producer behaviour with respect to regulated Tb testing or less than socially 
optimal levels of testing when testing is unregulated. Two of the policy changes 
considered by the study were the removal of reactor compensation and a requirement 
that producers pay for their Tb testing. Exploratory analysis indicated that there may be -.... ----.<.-.-
a trade-off between accurate market signals and testing compliance. The study inferred 
that although reactor compensation gives a false price signal to producers through the 
positive value it places on diseased animals, if market signals result in the cost of 
diseased animals becoming too high then producers may be encouraged to take non-
compliant action such as "hiding" infected animals from authorities. 
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Other potentially negative economic impacts associated with the NPMS have 
been identified by animal health officials. Some producers, especially in vector risk 
(endemic) areas, may incur substantial increases in costs which could require the 
adoption of alternative farming systems, and there may also be a general increase in 
transaction costs associated with producers adjusting cattle production under a regime 
emphasising greater individual responsibility for control (Livingstone, 1995). The 
relevant transaction costs include testing as well as related costs such as reduced 
compensation for reactor cattle and direct payment for discretionary testing, and greater 
discounting of cattle from infected herds. 
With the recent implementation of most of the control tactics and methods 
under the NPMS, knowledge regarding the effects of significant components of the 
strategy on producer behaviour and their associated costs is warranted. Such a focus is 
consistent with recent calls by epidemiologists for increased examination of livestock 
producer behaviour in order to achieve effective tuberculosis control (Morris et al., 
1994). A component of the strategy which will give rise to an increased incidence of 
control costs for some producers and for which producer behavioural responses remain 
uncertain are the methods and tactics associated with movement control. 
1.6 Movement Control Regulations 
1.6.1 The Importance of Movement Control 
The tightening of movement control requirements is identified as a major 
change to disease control tactics and a key feature of the National Pest Management 
Strategy (Animal Health Board, 1995; Livingstone, 1996). Results from recent studies I, ...
suggest that the movement of infected cattle is a cause of many herd breakdowns \ 
(Pfeiffer et aI., 1991; Ryan et al., 1995; Ryan et al., 1996). Movement control has 
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therefore been recognised as a necessary instrument in reducing Tb breakdowns in 
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cattle herds and limiting the possible contribution by infected cattle to the establishment 
of new Tb endemic areas (MAF, 1977; Allison, 1992; Morris et ai., 1992). 
Movement control regulations were originally introduced under the Animals 
Amendment Act 1976 on 1 April 1977 (MAF, 1977). Several key components of the 
initial regulations have remained integral in movement control regulations over the last 
two decades: 
(1) A minimum age of cattle to which the regulations apply; 
(2) Testing requirements for the movement of cattle; 
(3) The spatial focus of the regulations; 
(4 )The form of identification required to accompany cattle moved; and 
(5) The necessary requirements for a herd to be removed from movement 
control. 
Since the early 1990's changes to movement control regulations have generally related 
to one or more of these components. 
1.6.2 Movement Control Under the NPMS 
Under the NPMS once Tb infection is suspected or identified in a herd it is 
classified as 'Infected'. During the period a herd has the 'Infected Herd' status it is 
subject to movement control regulations. The focus of movement control is on the herd, 
although a provision is retained for area movement control where the aggregate 
percentage of reactors exceed 0.1 % in a declared vector risk area. Any movement of 
livestock from a herd subject to movement control must be supported by a permit to 
move. If cattle from an infected herd, aged one month and older, are being moved other 
than to slaughter then there is a requirement for movement control ear tags to be 
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inserted prior to movement, and pre- and post-movement Tb tests performed. The 
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testing interval for pre-movement testing is reduced to within 60 days of being moved 
for cattle from both infected herds and area controlled herds. Cattle from infected herds 
are required to undergo a post-movement test no sooner than 90 days after the pre-
movement test and within 60 and 120 days following the arrival of cattle onto the new 
property. For a herd to be removed from movement control, excluding area movement 
control, its Tb status must change from infected to clear. This requires the herd passing 
2 whole herd tests administered at a minimum of 6 months apart. 
Movement restrictions have been tightened for cattle from 'infected' herds. If 
reactors are found at a pre-movement test then the balance of the tested cattle may only 
. . 
be permitted to go either to slaughter or to another. infected herd in a vector risk area. 
These restrictions can be avoided if the reactor rate is no greater than 1 % with 100 
cattle or more being tested or infection is removed from the cattle to be moved through 
more testing and slaughtering. A new category o'f 'high risk infected' herd is established 
for herds with an annual incidence of Tb of 5% or more. Depending on the outcome of 
an epidemiological investigation into the risk of infection presented by the herd, or 
groups of cattle within the herd, high risk herds will be placed into one of three sub-
categories which will determine the pre-movement testing requirements and options for 
movement. 
1.6.3 Justification for Tighter Controls 
The tighter movement control restrictions in the NPMS have been justified 
along two distinct lines. Firstly, they move towards addressing farmers' concerns 
regarding previous policy deficiencies in protecting herds clear of Tb infection in clear 
areas, and secondly, they are consistent with the Animal Health Board's philosophy of 
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responses from individuals (Livingstone, 1995). 
Previous attempts to tighten movement control, such as the introduction of area 
movement control in 1992 and the compulsory requirement in 1994 for Tb status 
declaration cards to accompany all cattle being moved, were motivated by farmers' 
concerns over the ease at which bovine Tb could spread from infected herds (NZ 
Farmer, 1992; Animal Health Board, 1993). Epidemiological research identified two 
possible contributors to herd breakdowns. "'Some farm management practices were 
found to be inconsistent with efforts to control the disease (Pfeiffer et al., 1991). The 
lack of sensitivity of the skin tests also posed problems for containing the spread of 
disease because infected animals could return false negative reactions and be moved to 
other properties as infection free (Ryan et al., 1991). The compulsory requirements for 
pre-movement testing of all cattle from areas assessed to present a high risk of infection 
from wildlife vectors, and provision of information as to the Tb status of cattle being 
moved were policy responses aimed at reducing the spread of infection into clear areas. 
Notwithstanding these tougher movement controls, recent research into Tb 
breakdowns in non-endemic areas highlights that the movement of cattle from endemic 
to non-endemic areas, as a result of purchasing or grazing decisions, as a significant 
factor in the spread of infection (Ryan et al., 1995). The role of management decisions 
in the spread of Tb is reinforced in a recent study into livestock movements in the . . .. 
Waikato veterinary district (Ryan et al., 1996). The study suggests that there is still 
"much opportunity for spread of infectious diseases" due to the high proportion of 
herds open to introductions, the amount of movement between herds, and inadequacies 
inherent in the current confirmatory testing programmes which are prescribed according 
to wildlife vector risk (p.19). 
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To encourage cattle management practices which reduce the spread of Tb 
infection, the NPMS creates incentives for producers to take the risks of Tb seriously. 
The new classification systems and tighter movement control regulations are intended 
to provide producers with infected herds with increased costs arising from lower market 
valuations of cattle and increased Tb control compliance costs. This reflects the 
strategy's philosophy that better disease control can be achieved if producers are 
confronted with the economic consequences of their decisions. 
1.7 Objectives of the Study 
Despite a significant investment of time and effort, only minor progress has 
been made inrecenf years to' reduce bovine tuberculosis levels in cattle herds. 
Movement control policies playa prominent role in influencing cattle producer 
behaviour in order to achieve the objectives of the NPMS. However, very little is 
known about likely effects of movement control regulations on individual producer 
behaviour. 
Economic analysis of movement control regulations at the producer level 
achieves two broad objectives. Firstly, it provides insight into whether behavioural 
responses by cattle producers are likely to be consistent with the objectives of the 
NPMS. Secondly, it provides an indication of the costs of movement control for 
affected cattle producers and thus facilitates a deeper understanding of the distributional 
implications of the legislation. 
This study attempts to answer three specific research questions concerning the 
effect of movement control regulations on cattle producers . 
• What are the likely producer behavioural responses to movement control under 
the NPMS at various levels of store cattle price discount, in terms of decisions 
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regarding the purchase and sale of cattle, and vector control, for a 
representative cattle production system? 
e What is the economic impact of movement control under the NPMS, in terms 
of the difference in discounted net revenue, for a representative cattle 
production system? 
eGiven the tighter movement control restrictions and use of market signals 
employed under the NPMS, what is the likely impact on Tb infection levels for 
a representative cattle herd? 
In addition to answering these specific questions, exploratory analysis sheds light on the 
role of price signals in meeting the objectives of the Animal Health Board. 
1.8 Outline of the Study 
Chapter 2 reviews the literature on animal health economics to gain direction on 
how the study will be approached. Given the dynamic nature of the research problem 
the literature on dynamic optimisation, particularly its application to production and 
policy problems, is evaluated to identify an appropriate methodology. A theoretical 
model of a representative breeding-store beef cattle production system in a Tb vector 
risk area is developed using an optimal control framework in Chapter 3. The necessary 
conditions of the model are also presented and interpreted. The theoretical model is 
transformed into a discrete time optimal control model in Chapter 4. Store cattle 
production and Tb control parameters relevant to the ClarencelWaiau area of the South 
Island of New Zealand are then presented and explained, along with preliminary results 
for the empirical model. The results of the model under various policy and market 
scenarios, and a sensitivity analysis are reported in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 concludes the 
"--",-",.,.-,:, 
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study by presenting answers to the research questions and highlighting limitations of 
the study and areas for further research. 
..-.-:..-:-.... _---=-. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Before undertaking an analysis of bovine tuberculosis movement control 
restrictions at the producer level it is necessary to gain an appreciation of how the 
economic analysis of producer behaviour has been approached in the past. Animal 
health economics and in particular the economic analysis of livestock disease control 
provide specific direction for the proposed research. Additional guidance is found in the 
economic literature on dynamic optimisation applied at the producer level. 
' .. " 
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2.2 Economic Analysis of Livestock Disease Control 
2.2.1 Cost Benefit Analysis 
Economic theory is acknowledged as providing quantitative insights into 
livestock health issues (Dijkhuizen et al., 1991). With respect to livestock disease 
control, these insights are often obtained from economic evaluations in the form of cost 
benefit analyses undertaken at the national or regional level. Economic evaluations at 
these levels tend to either narrowly focus on a current control program, or adopt a wider 
approach and analyse a number of alternative control programs. An example of the later 
approach is the cost benefit analysis by Habtemariam and Ruppaner (1982) in which 
various disease control methods were evaluated for trypanosomiasis in Ethiopian 
livestock and human populations. Their analysis identified insecticide application as the 
most efficient form of disease control. 
Cost benefit analyses have been used not only to evaluate alternative disease ',. ,',' 
control programs but also to highlight the economic trade-offs arising from particular 
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programs. Bech-Nielsen et al. (1982) applied cost benefit analysis to four programs for 
the control of the cattle nematode Parajilaria bovicola in Sweden. Their evaluation 
resulted in the recommendation that although individual producers would prefer to treat 
only young livestock destined for slaughter, from a social perspective control should be 
directed at treating cows serving as a disease reservoir in order to eradicate the disease 
and thereby remove impediments to Sweden's livestock exports. 
Export markets often impose an important constraint on animal health 
programs. Johnston and Matuska (1981) emphasised the substantial benefits associated 
with bovine brucellosis and tuberculosis eradication in terms of averting potential 
export market restrictions. In a recent cost benefit analysis of the proposed National 
Pest .Management Strategy for Bovine Tuberculosis in New Zealand it was concluded 
that when trade was excluded from the analysis the costs of the strategy exceeded the 
benefits (Nimmo-Bell, 1995). However, when the potential trade implications were) 
included, the benefits of the strategy not only outweighed the costs but net benefits 
t 
exceeded both doing nothing and the control program that was operational at the time. I 
Cost benefit analysis has also been used as a general framework from which to 
analyse the distributional consequences of selected animal health programs. Liu's 
(1979) analysis of brucellosis control programs in the United States provided an 
estimate of the welfare changes resulting from disease control programs. The 
distributional impacts arising from disease eradication were identified by estimating 
changes to consumer and producer surplus. Liu concluded that the increased benefit to 
consumers from greater production of beef and milk, and lower prices when brucellosis 
was eradicated outweighed the increased costs of eradication to producers. The finding 
that consumers benefited from disease control programs through a positive supply 
response, while producers were adversely affected by increased costs of control, was 
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supported in a later cost benefit analysis of bovine brucellosis control in the United 
States by Dietrich et al. (1987). However, a recent study into pseudorabies eradication 
in the United States found that while eradication increased consumer surplus, its impact 
on producer surplus depended on a number of factors such as whether hog herds were 
infected, the level of prevalence, price elasticity, and the overall scale of hog production 
in the state (Ebel et al., 1992). 
The importance of considering the impacts of disease control programs on 
different groups of livestock producers was specifically acknowledged by Andrews and 
Johnston (1985). They applied cost benefit analysis to the eradication of bovine 
tuberculosis from northern Australia. Their analysis estimated and compared the costs 
and benefits for cattle producers whose cattle management and production systems 
differed by geographical region. Results showed that although many producers 
benefited from the disease eradication program, net costs were incurred by producers in 
two ofthe three areas. 
Cost benefit analyses at the regional and nation levels have contributed to 
disease control and eradication decisions by permitting economic evaluations of control 
methods and entire programs. The literature suggests, however, that treating all 
livestock producers as a homogenous group can mask the distributional implications 
arising from disease control programs. Furthermore, the broad focused analysis, 
whether at a national or regional level, has been undertaken using a static framework 
and thereby precludes any detailed insight into how producers are likely to respond to 
the economic incentives or disincentives arising from the implementation of control or 
eradication programs over time. 
, 
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2.2.2 Producer Level Analysis 
Although most of the economIC analyses of livestock disease control are 
undertaken at the national level, the importance of identifying tradeoffs at the producer 
level has also been emphasised. As McInerney (1996) suggests, livestock disease 
control is very similar to any other input problem confronted by the producer and 
therefore raises questions about efficiency and the optimal allocation of resources. 
The objective of most of the producer level economic analyses of animal health 
issues have been to gain insight into the economic consequences for producers of either 
control programmes or diseases. An example is Miller et al.'s (1982) farm budgeting 
analysis of the economic impact of transmissible gastroenteritis (TGE) on swine 
producers. Another example is found in Walker et al.'s (1985) use of simulation 
modeling to analyse Johne's disease control strategies. Neither of these studies took 
into account feedback between disease control decisions, the state of livestock 
production and other production decisions. Treating disease control as unrelated to 
livestock production decisions is surprising, given the acknowledgment within the 
animal health economics literature that animal health outcomes are influenced by 
producers making decisions which are fundamentally economic in nature (Morris, 
1969; Morris and Blood, 1969; McInerney, 1996). 
Including disease control as part of the production process has an important 
implication with respect to the economic analysis of disease control policy. By 
modelling disease control as another input into the livestock production system the 
analyst is permitted to highlight trade-offs between disease control and other inputs. 
Thisinformation can be used to refine disease control policy. 
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There have only been a few studies which have taken into consideration the 
likely behavioural responses of producers to disease control policies. Rubinstein's 
(1977) study of foot-and-mouth disease in Columbia provides an early example of how 
ex-ante economic analysis at the producer level could be used in the evaluation of 
alternative disease control strategies. The analysis used epidemiological and farm 
simulation sub-models to represent the interaction between the disease's progression, 
cattle production, and either vaccination or eradication control strategies. Stoneham and 
Johnston's (1986) economic evaluation of Australia's brucellosis and tuberculosis 
eradication campaigns also used producer level simulation models in conjunction with a 
model of disease transmIssion to predict how pastoralists would respond to different 
policy requirements. In a more recent study, Bicknell (1995) used a bioeconomic model 
of livestock disease control to capture important production and disease 
interrelationships. Bicknell's analysis provided insight into the effect of New Zealand 
bovine tuberculosis control policies on individual cattle producer behaviour and the 
implications of this behaviour for policy outcomes. The interaction between the 
production and disease environments is also present in Hall et al.'s (1996) analysis of 
treatment options for controlling East Coast fever in Zebu cattle in Malawi. Their 
model permitted producer responses in the form of culling and selling decisions relating 
to each treatment option to be obtained. 
These studies demonstrate that economic analysis can provide policy relevant 
insight into disease control by including the producer's behavioural response to control 
in the modelling. It is important now to identify how movement control has been 
incorporated into the economic analysis of disease control. 
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2.2.4 Analysing Livestock Movement Control 
Two important insights into analysing movement control at the producer level 
are provided in the literature. In an overview of cost benefit analysis applied to 
quarantine Hinchy and Fisher (1991) emphasise that the economic impact of disease on 
the producer arises from production losses brought about by deaths and reduced 
conversion efficiencies. Mitigation against impaired production requires an increased 
level of inputs which will increase total variable cost and marginal cost. They suggest 
the economic impact of disease can be analysed by comparing the level of net revenue 
when disease is present to the level when disease is absent. 
Stoneham and Johnston's (1986) study included an estimation of the benefits of 
removing cattle" movement restrictions in Australia. Their study highlights that the cost 
of movement control includes components such as the preparation of livestock for 
testing rather than just the direct testing costs. They also highlighted that when 
movement control is enforced a welfare loss results from producers having to fatten 
cattle on marginal pastures. 
The literature provides only limited guidance on how movement control can be 
analysed. More general directives are sought for how research into the economics of 
disease control at the producer level should be undertaken. 
2.2.5 Research Issues Relating to Producer Analysis 
A review of the literature suggests several research issues relevant to the 
economic analysis of livestock disease control at the producer level. The main issues 
concern the focus and method of analysis. 
The economic analysis of disease control at the producer level should focus on 
determining optimal strategies for 'hypothetical representative farms' to avoid any 
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idiosyncratic problems associated with actual individual farms (Morris and Blood, 
1969; Barros, 1982). Where data limitations are a problem, the research should initially 
be approached from a general context focusing on key behavioural variables and then 
expanded upon as more data becomes available (Barros, 1982). Data availability is 
often a problem in economic analyses of livestock disease control as a result of cost, 
time constraints, and collection difficulties (Dijkhuizen et al., 1991). Consequently, 
analyses frequently rely on highly stylised models to predict how producers will react to 
livestock disease and its control, and the epidemiological and economic implications of 
those reactions (Dijkhuizen et al., 1991). 
Mathematical modelling is acknowledged as necessary to provide the relevant 
abstractions of the relationships between the epidemiological and economic systems 
being studied (Carpenter and Howitt, 1980; Beal and McCallon, 1982; Howitt, 1982). 
Practitioners have also been aware that economic analysis of livestock disease control 
should make explicit the optimal tradeoffs involved in decision making. Carpenter and 
Howitt (1980) demonstrated how dynamic optimisation using linear programming 
could produce dynamically efficient solutions to disease control problems and also 
allow the evaluation of non-optimal control programmes. Linear programming was 
adopted by Habtemariam et al., (1984) in their analysis of the optimal allocation of 
resources in trypanosomiasis control in Ethiopia. However, as Howitt (1982) has 
highlighted, the underlying dynamic relationships in disease control are nonlinear and 
therefore economic analysis of animal disease policy requires a theoretically consistent 
optimisation method capable of capturing nonlinear features. 
The above literature suggests that to adequately analyse a livestock disease 
control problem that is inherently dynamic, the method chosen should be capable of 
highlighting the optimal trade-offs being made by a producer who is making choices in 
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a temporally dynamic environment. This requires the identification of an appropriate 
dynamic optimisation technique. 
2.3 Dynamic Optimisation 
2.3.1 Decision Making in a Dynamic Context 
In dynamic settings the decision making being analysed is sequential and 
influenced by feedback in the form of past decisions impacting on future decisions 
(Rausser and Hochman, 1979). For these problems a dynamic framework is required to 
obtain meaningful results. The application of static analysis to dynamic problems is 
inadequate because it is incapable of yielding the time path of the variables and thereby 
forces the· analyst to ignore important components of the problem (Silberberg, 1990; 
Chiang, 1992). 
As outlined above very few analyses of livestock disease control have 
considered the influence of temporal dynamics on producer responses and fewer have 
applied the techniques of dynamic optimisation. However, the application of dynamic 
optimisation has been well developed in other areas of economics where it is 
considered relevant and necessary in order to gain insight into intertemporal tradeoffs 
when production response efficiency is a function of time. 
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis in Capital Theory 
Dorfman (1969) demonstrated how the mathematics of optimal control theory 
could yield interesting results when applied to economic problems involving capital use 
and accumulation. His economic interpretation of the necessary conditions and costate 
variables resulted in control theory becoming recognised as a theoretically consistent 
method for undertaking dynamic analysis of problems in capital theory. The application 
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of dynamic optimisation spread to other areas of economics where problems could be 
characterised in terms of use and accumulation (Clark and Munro, 1975). 
The conceptualisation of problems in terms of capital theory is evident in 
economic analyses involving livestock management. In a seminal paper by Jarvis 
(1974) producer price response, with respect to cattle management decisions, was 
formulated as a problem in which cattle were considered capital goods and producers 
portfolio managers. Jarvis recognised that the empirically observed backward bending 
supply response could not be adequately modeled within a static framework, therefore 
the problem needed to be expressed dynamically. A recent econometric study into cattle 
cycles by Rosen et al. (1994) demonstrated that this approach is still relevant. 
The economic literature on livestock management provides studies such as 
Chavas et al. (1985), Chavas and Klemme (1986), and Rosen (1987) which 
demonstrated that a more realistic understanding of agricultural production response 
was obtained by incorporating underlying dynamic processes into analysis, and 
focusing on dynamic efficiency rather than static efficiency. It is clear that capital 
theory has played a significant role in the conceptualisation of economic problems 
which are characterised by growth and/or depletion. As a consequence, dynamic 
optimisation is available as a theoretically consistent approach to analysing these 
problems. 
2.3.3 Applications of Dynamic Optimisation at the Producer Level 
Although three techniques are available for dynamic optimisation, the calculus 
of variations, optimal control theory, and dynamic programming, only the later two are 
prominent in the applied literature. Many applications of dynamic optimisation at the 
producer level are aimed at identifying the producer behaviour necessary to achieve an 
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optimal allocation of resources. Extensive surveys of dynamic programming 
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applications in agriculture, forestry and fisheries which seek to identify the optimal 
sequencing of inputs and outputs are provided by Kennedy (1981, 1986, 1988). There 
have also been a wide range of applications in which problems are formulated as 
optimal control problems and solved using gradient based solution algorithms in order 
to identify optimal resource allocations through time. Examples relating to the optimal 
management of biological resources include applications to. broiler production (Talpaz 
et ai., 1988), aquaculture management (Talpaz and Tsur, 1982; Cacho et ai., 1991), 
shrimp fishery management (Onal et ai., 1991), and swine production (Chavas et ai., 
1985). 
Optimal control has also been used to analyse a wide range of bioeconomic 
problems at the producer level. Problems to which optimal control has been applied to 
identify the optimal management of resources include crop production and soil 
conservation (Burt, 1981; Segarra and Taylor, 1987), pest management (Huffaker et ai., 
1992; Bhat et ai., 1993), rangeland management (Torrel et ai., 1991; Standiford and 
Howitt, 1992), and wetland protection and restoration (Stavins, 1990; Parks and 
Kramer, 1995). 
Another area where dynamic optimisation has provided useful insight, and is of 
particular relevance to this research, is the analysis of feedback between the producer 
and his or her policy environment. Several recent applications have explored the effects 
of policy interventions on producer behaviour. In a theoretical study, Xepapadeas 
(1992) compared the impact of taxes and standards on a firm's behaviour and found 
that behaviour differed significantly under each regime. Empirical analysis has also 
been undertaken. Bicknell's (1995) study into the economic issues of bovine 
tuberculosis control highlighted a possible tradeoff between the payment of reactor 
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compensation and subsidised testing policies in terms of reducing herd Tb prevalence if 
testing was not mandatory. Fleming and Adams (1995) identified that if transport time 
lags were not considered in economic studies of groundwater pollution policy, then the 
pollution taxes suggested by analysis may lead onion producers to generate pollution 
levels in excess of those socially desired. In an analysis of the impact of pricing policy 
on producer behaviour Gao et al. (1992) suggested that the supply of milk by dairy 
producers in Florida was highly sensitive to the pricing policy adopted. Van Kooten's 
(1993) analysis into wetland conversion identified government agricultural support 
programmes as being responsible for the relatively high depletion of Canadian 
wetlands. Jin and Grigalunas' (1993) study into the different environmental regulations 
placed on an oil and gas producer confirmed that more stringent regulations resulted in !.. '-""--. ~-.- . 
substantially less revenue to the producer. 
The above applications of dynamic optimisation demonstrate that it is an 
appropriate method for gaining insight into producer responses and will permit the 
analysis of important feedback between the producer and relevant policy interventions. 
I·. , 
2.4 Modelling the Cattle Herd 
As previously highlighted, capital theory has been used successfully in 
applications relating to herd management. However, approaches to herd modelling are 
varied in terms of complexity. Jarvis (1974) used a relatively comprehensive age and 
sex structured model in his study of Argentinean cattle production. His justification for 
using six categories of cattle was that the problem required a model that permitted 
producer behaviour to differ depending on the age and sex of cattle. Chavas and 
Klemme's (1986) analysis of aggregate milk supply response and investment behaviour 
on US dairy farms focused only on the age structure and herd size of female cattle. 
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Their model was considered to be detailed enough to ensure the main determinants of 
milk production were captured. Rosen (1987) abstracted from both age and sex 
composition by assuming the herd was composed of homogeneous females in his study 
of market dynamics. This approach was taken to highlight the unusual consequences for 
market equilibrium dynamics of rational livestock management while avoiding the 
increased analytical complexity associated with a more detailed model. A cow-calf 
production system involving annual replacement decisions was used in Standiford and 
Howitt's (1992) study of rangeland management in a multiple use setting. Their herd 
model consisted of breeding females which were either raised as replacements or 
purchased off-farm and whose surplus calves were sold each period. Although their 
model was highly stylised, it captured the principle activities of the predominant type of 
livestock enterprise in the study area. In Bicknell's (1995) study, a closed herd was 
represented as a biomass of susceptible and infected cattle which grew in accordance 
with a logistic growth function. The simplified representation of the herd allowed 
producer responses to be identified and provided general results for the class of farm 
analysed. 
The literature suggests that the complexity of the model is dependent on the 
requirements of the research question. The application of dynamic optimisation 
techniques to many problems has required conceptually simple models. An important 
issue arising from the literature is to insure the herd model is simple enough for the 
-~:.. - -'-.- _.'. 
solution technique to solve while still allowing the analyst to capture the important 
characteristics of the problem under consideration. 
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2.5 Discussion and Implications for Modelling 
The literature provides direction as to the requirements for producer level 
analysis. The problem should be based around a representative production system. 
Analysis should be consistent with economic theory and thereby identify optimal 
producer tradeoffs. Because the problem is likely to contain nonlinear dynamic 
relationships between the economic and epidemiological systems, the solution method 
will require the use of dynamic optimisation techniques capable of handling nonlinear 
equations. A complex model of the underlying economic and epidemiological system is 
not necessarily required to enhance understanding of producer responses, providing the 
model captures the key characteristics of interest. Only two empirical analyses of 
disease control, Bicknell (1995) and Hall et al. (1996), have conformed to these 
requirements. 
Only recently have theoretically consistent attempts been made to gain insight 
into the economics of disease control at the producer level. While Bicknell's (1995) 
study provides a theoretically consistent empirical analysis of bovine Tb control it is 
based on a model of a closed herd. Consequently, it is unable to capture the two way 
movement of cattle and thereby identify the relevant behavioural responses of a 
producer to movement control regulations. 
This study contributes to the empirical problem of bovine Tb control by 
analysing the impact of livestock movement control regulations on producers. It also 
contributes to the economic literature by providing an empirical extension of dynamic 
optimisation to livestock disease control problems involving regulations on stock 
movements. 
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Chapter 3: The Theoretical Model 
3.1 Introduction 
The review of the literature suggested important direction for the analysis of 
movement control policy. The analysis should: 1) be of a representative production 
system; 2) produce results consistent with economic theory; 3) be able to handle 
nonlinear dynamic relationships; and 4) permit disclosure of the important feedback 
between the production and policy environments. The literature also demonstrated that 
dynamic optimisation is a method of analysis that provides insight into a variety of 
production and policy problems exhibiting the above characteristics. As a consequence, 
producer level analysis using dynamic optimisation in an optimal control framework 
was selected as the method of analysis. 
3.2 Beef Cattle Production in a Tb Vector Risk Area 
In contrast to many other countries throughout the world bovine Tb levels in 
New Zealand are higher in beef than in dairy herds (MAF, 1996). New Zealand also has 
a relatively high incidence of newly infected herds compared to many of its trading 
partners largely as a result of wildlife Tb vectors (Animal Health Board, 1995). It is 
acknowledged that changes to Tb control under the NPMS are likely to place significant 
economic costs on beef cattle producers in areas where there is a high risk of Tb 
transmission from wildlife vectors (Livingstone, 1995). The epidemiological and 
economic implications of bovine Tb and its control in New Zealand therefore suggest 
"-,.!.--,.~ •• -.,' 
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that the analysis of movement control focus on beef cattle production in a Tb vector . ,.'" . 
risk area. 
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Beef cattle production in New Zealand can be loosely divided into beef breeding 
systems and finishing cattle enterprises which differ in objectives and management 
(Nicol and Nicoll, 1987). The primary role of the breeding herds is to produce calves 
for breeding replacements and sale as weaners. Cattle requiril!g further growing and 
finishing are maintained in finishing herds. Depending on the physical attributes of the 
farm, cattle are either retained and sold directly to slaughter or sold as "stores" to other 
producers who in turn "finish" the cattle off for sale to slaughter. Store cattle are 
distinguished from finished cattle in so far as the former have greater value to the 
producer in being kept alive and sold to other producers than being sent directly to 
slaughter. The difference in value is due to the potential for producers who can finish 
the cattle to achieve higher slaughter returns with additional feeding. Beef cattle 
production systems may be either comprised of a breeding herd, a finishing herd or 
both. It is also common for cattle production systems to be operated in conjunction with 
sheep production (Coop, 1987). 
Previous economic analysis indicated that movement control had the largest 
impact on producers of store cattle (Dunham, 1995). Movement control regulations 
stipulate that all cattle from infected herds, or from non-infected herds in a Tb vector 
risk area, must be submitted to movement control Tb testing if cattle are moved to a 
destination other than to slaughter. Costs incurred by the producer include mustering 
the cattle for testing and test interpretation, as well as the cost arising from the slaughter 
and/or re-testing of any non-diseased cattle which test positive. Net revenue may also 
be adversely affected when movement controlled cattle are sent to sale as stores. Some 
store cattle buyers have discounted the price of movement controlled cattle in response 
to a perceived risk of spreading infection onto their properties (Kelly, 1992; Rawlings, 
1996). The Animal Health Board anticipates that under the NPMS price discounting 
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with respect to the risk of Tb infection will become a common feature of livestock 
markets. 
Sending cattle to sale as stores is not necessarily the only marketing option 
available to store cattle producers. Cattle may be marketed to slaughter if they satisfy 
the minimum carcass weight requirements. Fattening stock destined for slaughter 
imposes extra costs on the producer in the form of feeding costs. Consequently, the 
producer, when considering the marketing options, compares the average revenue 
expected from cattle sold as stores with the average revenue expected from cattle sold 
to slaughter at a later date net of the cost of fattening the cattle. Society also incurs 
additional costs if cattle are marketed to slaughter because store cattle producers do not 
have a comparative advantage in fattening cattle. 
The relationships between the net revenue of cattle, risk of infection, and \ 
marketing options are illustrated in Figure 3.1. The downward sloping net slaughter 
revenue line reflects an association between Tb risk and actual infection levels in a mob 
of cattle sold. Infected animals detected at slaughter only return to the producer a 
salvage value and therefore decrease the average price receive<V The slope of the net 
store revenue line illustrates that as the perceived risk of infection increases the average 
price declines. Unlike the slaughter situation where only infected cattle incur the 
reduced price, when cattle are sold as stores the price received for all animals is 
affected by the perceived risk of infection. Depending on the slopes of the two net 
revenue lines the relative difference between store and slaughter revenue is reduced as 
the risk ofTb infection increases. It is possible that beyond a certain level ofTb risk the 
producer may obtain a higher average net revenue if the cattle are marketed directly to 
slaughter. 
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Figure 3.1 Herd Infection Level-Average Net Revenue Relationships 
Average 
Net 
Revenue 
From Sales 
o 
Net Store Cattle Revenue 
Net Slaughter Revenue ........ . 
Apparent Herd Infection Level 
The producer's decision to market cattle as stores or directly to slaughter 
therefore depends on the impact of each marketing alternative on net revenue. The 
factors influencing the marketing decision are the difference between the store and 
slaughter market prices for the class of cattle being marketed, the magnitude of the 
discount in the store market, the risk of Tb infection, the actual level of Tb in the herd, 
and the impact on revenue of the movement control testing requirements. 
The potentially large impact of movement control on the production and 
marketing of store cattle further suggested that the analysis of movement control 
regulations should focus on a beef cattle breeding-store system. Given the variation in 
beef cattle production throughout New Zealand, and the complexity of undertaking 
analysis of a complete farming system, the analysis was based on a generic beef cattle 
breeding-store system and abstracts from all other production activities (Figure 3.2). 
The production system was separated into breeding and marketing cattle components 
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reflecting the different herd objectives and management requirements. Age and sex 
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structures in the herd were abstracted from to avoid unnecessary complexity. The 
breeding component comprises mature cows and replacement cattle obtained through 
the retention of weaner heifers. A proportion of mature cows are culled each period to 
improve the breeding herd's performance. Cattle entering the marketing component 
comprise weaners and cattle purchased as stores which are not required as replacements 
in the breeding herd. The marketing options available for cattle in the marketing 
component consist of selling store cattle requiring further finishing, or selling cattle 
directly to slaughter. 
I , 
Figure 3.2 The Beef Cattle Production System 
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Tb and its control have an important impact on beef cattle production in Tb 
vector risk areas. The relationships between Tb control activities, disease transmission, 
and the production system are illustrated in Figure 3.3. Bovine Tb may be transmitted 
into a herd through susceptible cattle coming into contact with infectious animals from 
a wildlife vector population and infected cattle being moved into the herd from other 
properties. Susceptible cattle are defined as cattle that are not currently infected with 
Tb, but may become infected if they come in contact with infectious animals. Infected 
cattle are defined as cattle that are currently infected with Tb and are infectious. Once 
Tb infection is within the herd the disease may be transmitted from infectious cattle to 
susceptible cattle. 
Figure 3.3 Tb Transmission Routes and Control Activities 
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Transmission Transmission Transmission 
Post-
Wildlife Cattle Herd movement / , 
Vector (Breeding & Marketing Testing Store Control Components) 
+ Purchases l I' "" "- ~ Susceptible Cattle J;.' 
Wildlife ........... ~ 
Vector ~ , 
"" ~ Whole-herd ~ ..-Testing -.. , Store 'J;. . t Sales Infected Cattle " ~ Pre-
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Testing 
Key: & 
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Regulatory and voluntary control activities reduce the probability that Tb will 
';'.,.'.'.';'.' ... ' 
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spread throughout the herd. Vector control reduces wildlife vector transmission, 
movement control Tb testing which comprises pre-movement, "in-contact", and post-
movement Tb testing events, and purchases of cattle from infection free herds, reduces 
the spread of Tb between properties. Periodic whole-herd Tb surveillance testing 
reduces transmission within the herd. , 
3.3 The Theoretical Optimal Control Model 
The beef production system in a Tb vector risk area was formulated as an 
optimal control problem in which a representative beef cattle producer is faced with 
decisions regarding the purchase and sale of cattle. The producer was assumed to be 
risk neutral, and have the objective of maximising discounted net revenue from the 
cattle enterprise over time. The model specifies the relevant relationships associated 
with a breeding-store beef cattle production system in an environment where Tb 
infection is endemic in a possum population. To achieve the required objective, the 
producer chooses ,the optimal activity level for four control variables which impact on 
three state variables. Two state variables relate to the susceptible CSt) and infected (ID 
cattle populations. The third state variable is for the possum population CPt). Table 3.1 
displays the variables and parameters contained in the model. 
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Table 3.1 Variable and Parameter Definitions 
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Variable/ Definition Units 
Parameter 
SI Density of susceptible cattle (state variable) hd/ha 
1, Density of infected cattle (state variable) hd/ha 
PI Density of possums (state variable) hd/ha 
FI Cattle sold to other producers (control variable) % 
APPI Average price paid for cattle purchased (control variable) $/hd 
MCI Movement control testing (control variable) # 
H, Possums harvested (control variable) hd/ha 
SRI Revenue from cattle marketed as stores $/ha 
SLI Revenue from cattle marketed to slaughter $/ha 1"-:-
r 
WlI1't Net proceeds from whole herd Tb surveillance testing $/ha , 
MTll Net proceeds from pre-movement & in-contact Tb testing $/ha 
MT21 Net proceeds from post-movement Tb testing $/ha 
PCI Weaner cattle purchase cost $/ha 
VCI Variable cost of maintaining the herd $/ha 
B Proportion of the herd that are breeding cattle % 
slSt,IJ Within herd infection transmission function hd/ha 
S2(St,PJ Possum infection transmission function hd/ha I , -
wlAPPJ Proportion of susceptible cattle purchased % 
w2(APPJ Proportion of infected cattle purchased % 
0 Annual discount rate % 
PI Average price for clear herd weaners $/hd 
P2 Average price for clear herd store R2 cattle $/hd 
P3 Average price for non-infected R2 cattle slaughtered $/hd 
P4 Average price for non-infected cull cows $/hd 
r(DJ Average price function for store R2 cattle $/hd 
I Slaughter levy $/hd 
It Average proportion of infected cattle salvaged % 
p Proportion of cows culled % 
If Annual whole herd testing frequency # 
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Table 3. 1 (Continued) '-~ -'.. ~'.':-. -, it~;~:!::~-::~:':j 
z(FJ "In-contact" testing function % 
'l) False positive reactor cattle % 
'[2 True positive reactor cattle % 
a Cost of testing cattle $/hd 
Yl Compensation non-Iesioned cattle % 
Y2 Compensation lesioned cattle % 
Kl Profit maximising stocking rate hdlha 
g}(SJ Susceptible breeding herd calves hd/ha 
gdIJ Infected breeding herd calves hd/ha 
v} Variable cost of cattle $/hd 
V2 Variable cost of fattening slaughter cattle $/hd 
PH(P"HJ POSsum control cost function $/ha 
g3(PJ Possum population growth function hd/ha 
3.3.1 Objective Function 
The cattle producer's objective is represented mathematically in Equation 3.1. 
Revenue each period arises from the sale proceeds of cattle marketed as stores (SRt) or 
to slaughter (SLt), and the net proceeds obtained from whole herd Tb surveillance 
(WHTt) and movement control Tb testing (MTlt and MT2t) when total reactor 
compensation payments exceed total testing costs. Costs are comprised of weaner cattle 
purchases (PCt), the variable costs of maintaining the herd (VCt), and possum control 
costs (PHt). To achieve the optimal net revenue the producer has control over decisions 
regarding the percentage of marketing herd cattle selected for sale as stores each period 
(Ft), the market price paid for cattle purchased (APPt) and consequently the Tb 
infection status of the herd from which cattle are purchased, whether movement control 
,', ,J .',., ~ .:' .-
testing is undertaken (MCt), and the number of possums harvested (Ht). 
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T 
Maximise 1t = J e-6, (WHT, (SI,11 ) + MTll (SI,1" F; , MCI) + 
F, ,APP, ,Me, ,H, 
1=0 
S~ (SI,1" F;, MC, ) + SL, (S,,1,, F; , MCI) -
PCI (APP, ,SI,II' F;, MCI) + MT21 (APP, ,SI,I, ,F;, MCI) - (3.1) 
VC,(SI,II,MCI) - PH, (P,,H,»dt 
The model assumes that the proportion and implied composition of breeding 
and marketing components of the herd remain constant over time through biological 
reproduction and cattle purchased each period. This assumption permitted the breeding 
and marketing sub herds to be distinguished by the relationships B(St+It) and (1-
B)(St+lt), respectively. Where B is the proportion of the total herd that are breeding 
I"C.--
cattle, St is the number of susceptible cattle in the herd, and It is the number of infected 
1--- -
, , . 
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cattle. 
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Surveillance testing of cattle herds for tuberculosis is mandatory. Cattle 
producers are required to present all cattle in a herd for a compulsory whole herd Tb 
test which is administered at a frequency specified in regional Tb plans. Whole herd 
testing was assumed to occur at a frequency \If prior to all marketing activities and cattle 
purchases. As a result, all cattle in the breeding and marketing herds at the beginning of 
each period are exposed to whole herd Tb testing. 
The tuberculin test used in surveillance and movement control Tb testing of 
cattle is the caudal fold test (CFT). The accuracy of any diagnostic test is influenced by 
its sensitivity and specificity which describe the test's power to discriminate between 
diseased and non-diseased animals, respectively (Martin et al., 1987). The percentage 
of infected cattle at a testing event that test positive, termed true positives, is 
determined by the test's sensitivity (L2)' Correspondingly, false positives, the percentage 
of susceptible cattle testing positive at a testing event, is determined by one minus the 
test's specificity (LI)' Consequently, L2It cattle are removed as true positives from a Tb 
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testing event while 1'ISt are removed as false positives. With respect to M bovis 
infections the sensitivity and specificity of the caudal fold test changes as infection 
progresses (Neill et al., 1995). The sensitivity of the Tb test also changes depending on 
the interval between re-testing (Ryan and Cameron, 1995). In response to the possibility 
of a decline in the sensitivity of the Tb test through increased frequency of testing, 
ancillary testing has not been permitted in most Tb vector risk areas (O'Neil and Pharo, 
1995). The model assumes that the frequency of whole herd Tb testing ensures 
infection is at the same stage of development each period and that ancillary Tb testing is 
assumed to remain constant over time. 
. Testing cost (a) was assumed to be the average cost of presenting an animal for 
Tb testing and the subsequent test interpretation. If cattle return a positive reaction at 
testing then compensation, as a percentage of fair market value, is paid to producers. 
The percentage of fair market value paid as compensation is currently the same for false 
positive reactors (Yl) and true positive reactors (Y2) due to difficulties in distinguishing 
between them. The parameters Yl and Y2 were distinguished in the model to permit 
analysis of the impact of compensation on the producer's decisions. It was assumed that 
fair market value corresponds to the relevant sale price for cattle of a particular class. 
I , 
I , , , 
, -
The surveillance testing revenue associated with breeding and finishing herd cattle is --, 
given by Equation 3.2. 
wm; = 'V(B(S,«P4 -1)YI1' I -a)+I,«p4 -1)Y21'2 -0,))+ 
(1-B)(S,«p2 -1)YI1'I-a)+I,«p2 -I)Y21'2 -a))) 
(3.2) 
The number of cattle remaining in the herd after whole herd Tb testing was 
represented by the relationships (1-",1'I)St and (1-",1'2)lt. Movement control regulations 
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require cattle to have a pre-movement Tb test prior to being sent to sale as stores. 
Testing in accordance with movement control regulations enters the model as a control 
variable (MCt). Producers can be forced to Tb test prior to moving cattle by setting MCt 
equal to 1. Alternatively, MCt can be treated as a decision variable by specifying upper 
and lower bounds, and letting the model choose the optimal level. Any cattle which 
have been in contact with a group of sale animals testing positive at a pre-movement 
test must also be submitted to an "in-contact" test. Cattle required to be in-contact Tb 
tested are those not involved in the pre-movement Tb test and not removed as reactors 
at the whole herd Tb test. The proportion of cattle in the breeding and marketing sub 
herds requiring "in-contact" testing was assumed to be dependent on the proportion of 
the marketing herd being selected for sale as stores (z(Ft». The net Tb testing revenue 
attributable to pre-movement and "in-contact" testing is expressed as, 
MIl, = MC,((1- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F;»(((P2 -1)y)'t) - a)S,(l- \jJ't\) + 
((P2 -!)Y 2't2 -a)I,(1-\jJ't2» + Bz(F;)(((P4 -1)y\'t\ -a)S,(1-\jJ't) 
+ ((P4 -1)Y 2't2 -a)I,(1-\jJ't2») 
(3.3) 
Cattle can only be marketed for sale as stores providing the risk of Tb infection 
is acceptable to animal health authorities. The price received for store cattle is also 
dependent on the risk of Tb infection. The NPMS uses both the incidence and duration 
of Tb infection as measures of herd Tb risk (Animal Health Board, 1995). Animal 
health authorities determine whether herds are classified as "infected" or "high risk 
infected" by their annual Tb incidence. With respect to how producers evaluate Tb risk, 
it is envisaged by the Animal Health Board that risk will be related to the number of 
years a herd has been infected with Tb. These two approaches to measuring Tb risk 
focus on the level and persistence of disease, respectively. Epidemiologists suggest that 
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in situations where the disease does not result in high mortality, or animals do not make 
speedy and frequent recoveries, prevalence information may be used as a substitute for 
the incidence of disease (Martin et al., 1987). The proxy for disease risk adopted in the 
model was the level of Tb in the herd as indicated by its annual true prevalence. The 
relationship between price and disease risk was included in the model by assuming that 
buyers discount the price of store cattle based on the cattle herd's annual Tb prevalence 
The percentage of marketing cattle selected for sale (Ft) each period is reduced 
by the percentage of true positive (MC(C2) and false positive (MC(Cl) cattle reacting to 
the pre-movement Tb test. Consequently, sale revenue is dependent on how much the 
average sale price (r(DD) is discounted due to the risk of Tb infection and the number of 
cattle actually sent to sale (Equation 3.4). 
The producer also has the option of marketing cattle directly to slaughter. 
Because the cattle production system was assumed to have a comparative advantage in 
breeding and the production of store cattle, it was assumed that marketable cattle will 
only reach the minimum carcass weight category necessary for slaughter. Slaughter 
revenue is expressed mathematically in Equation 3.5. Cattle slaughtered each period 
comprise a fixed percentage of the breeding herd which are culled (p) and marketing 
herd cattle which have not been removed as positive reactors at prior tuberculosis 
testing events and/or not sold to other producers as stores. The average price received 
for breeding cattle culled is P4 and the average price for marketable cattle slaughtered is 
given by P3. The price parameters reflect the assumptions that cattle producers face 
perfectly competitive prices and that for both groups of cattle the attributes of the 
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average of all cattle selected for slaughter remain constant over time. The price of all 
adult cattle sent directly to slaughter is reduced by a slaughter levy (1) which funds the 
cattle industry's share of costs associated with running the tuberculosis control 
programme. 
SL, = (P3 -/)(1- B)(S,(l- \jJ't I )(1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)1: I » + 
J.ll,(1- \111: 2 )(1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)1:J» + (P4 -/)pB(S/(1- \111: 1) + 
J.ll/(1- \111: 2» 
(3.5) 
It was assumed that Tb infection can only be detected in cattle as a result of Tb 
testing or surveillance at slaughter facilities and that all infected cattle sent to slaughter 
were identified. The revenue received by producers for an infected animal identified at 
slaughter depends on the extent to which the carcass can be salvaged for further 
processing. The price received for infected cattle slaughtered was therefore represented 
in the model as a proportion (~) of the price for susceptible cattle. 
The cost of cattle purchased (Equation 3.6) is expressed as product of the 
average price paid by the producer for weaner cattle (APPt) and the number purchased. 
In each time period the producer was assumed to purchase the number of cattle that 
would ensure the herd was maintained at its profit maximising stocking rate (Kl). 
Surplus stocking rate was formulated as the difference between the profit maximising 
stocking rate less the net flow of cattle out of the herd during the period. The relevant 
flows include marketing cattle sold and breeding cattle culled, positive reactors at Tb 
testing events, and new calves entering from the breeding herd. 
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PCI = APP,(K1- ((SI + II) - (1- B)((F,(1- MC,"CJ + 
(1- (F, + MC/(l- F,)z(F,)"C\»)S/(1- \jf"C\) + (F,(1- MC,"C\) + 
(1- (F, + MC/(1- F,)z(F,)"C2»)I,(1- \jf"C2» - pB(S, + 1,)-
MC/((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»("C\S/(1- \jf"C\) + "C2I ,(l- \jf"C2»-
\jf("C\SI + "C2I , ) + g\(S,) + g2(11») 
(3.6) 
The net revenue from post-movement Tb testing is comprised of compensation 
received from test positive cattle (Equation 3.7). Under movement control regulations a 
post-movement Tb test must be administered to cattle arriving on the property if the 
cattle are from a herd with an "infected" herd Tb status or from a herd in a Tb vector 
risk area. The model assumes that all cattle purchased are from herds in Tb vector risk 
areas thereby avoiding the need to include a relationship for discounting due to area 
status. The proportion of each group of cattle purchased that is susceptible (wl(APPt)) 
andlor infected (w2(APPt)) was assumed to be a function of the purchase price. 
MT21 = (K1- ((SI + II) - (1- B)((F,(l- MC,"C\) + 
(1- (F, + MC/(1- F,)z(F,)"C\»)S/(1- \jf"C\) + (F,(1- MC,"Cz} + 
(1-(F, + MC/(1-F,)z(F,)"Cz}»I,(1-\jf"C2»-pB(S, +11)- (3.7) 
MC/((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»("C\S/(l- \jf"C\) + "Cl,(l- \jf"C 2» 
- \jf("C\SI + "C2I , ) + g\(S/) + g2(1/»)(w\(APP,)"C\((p\ -l)y \ - a) + 
w2(APP,)"C2((p\ -l)y 2 - a» 
Equations 3.3 to 3.7 highlight the marketing and purchase tradeoffs faced by the 
producer. With respect to marketing cattle, the producer's marketing decision was 
presented as choosing the percentage of marketing cattle to be sold as stores, for which 
the average price received for all cattle sold is negatively correlated to the apparent 
infection status of the herd. Once the producer had chosen the proportion of marketing 
cattle to be sold as stores the remaining proportion, less cattle removed as reactors at in-
contact Tb testing, are sold to slaughter. When cattle are sold to slaughter the producer 
receives only a salvage value for stock identified as infected. Cattle that are sold or 
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removed from the herd as reactors within a period must be replaced. The producer 
decides on the average purchase price paid for cattle (APPt) and, because of an assumed 
relationship between price and Tb infection, trades off a lower price with an increase in 
the apparent risk of infection. 
The variable cost of holding cattle (Vet> was comprised of two components. 
The first cost represented by VI is the average direct expenditure incurred in managing a 
catth~ beast for a period. The second cost V2 is the cost of fattening a cattle beast to a 
carcass weight suitable for slaughter. This cost is only applied to marketing cattle 
retained for sale to slaughter. Total variable cost is expressed in Equation 3.8 as a 
function of the starting number of cattle in the herd each period. 
VCI = (vI(SI + II) + v 2(1- B)(S/(1- \111: 1)(1- (F, + MC/(1- F,)z(P')'t I )) + 
/ /(1- \111: 2 )(1- (F, + MC/(1- F,)z(P')1: 2 )))) 
(3.8) 
Possum control is undertaken to reduce the opportunity for transmission of Tb 
into . the herd from the local possum population. Possum harvest cost (PHt) was 
assumed to be a function of the size of the possum population on the farm (Pt) and the-
number of possums harvested each period (Ht). 
3.3.2 Equations of Motion 
The objective function (Equation 3.1) is constrained by equations of motion for 
the three state variables. These are the equations in the model which describe the 
evolution of the state variables, St. It. and Pt. Two of the equations relate to the 
populations of the susceptible cattle (Equation 3.9) and infected cattle (Equation 3.1 0) 
in the herd. Because the total herd size was assumed to be constant, activities specific to 
either the breeding or marketing components of the herd are captured in each equation 
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using the terms B and (l-B) as restrictions on the proportion of the susceptible and 
infected cattle populations affected . 
. 
S = -SI(S,,!,) - S2(S"P,) - (1- B)(F,(1- MC,'t I ) + 
(1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'tI»)S,(l- \jJ't I ) - pBS, + (K1- «S, + 1,)-
(1- B)«F; (1- MC, 't l ) + (1- (F; + MC, (1- F, )z(F,)'t1 »)S,(l- \jJ't I ) + 
(F,(l- MC,'t2) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F;)'t2»)I,(1- \jJ't 2» - (3.9) 
pB(S, + I,) - MC,«l- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('t IS,(1- \jJ't I ) + 
't2I, (1- \jJ't2» - \II ( 'tIS, + 't 2I,) + gl (S,) + g2(1,»)(wl (APP,)(1- MC, 't l» + 
gl(S,) - \jJS,'t1 - MC,«l- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F,» + Bz(F,»S,(1- \jJ'tI)'t1 
. 
1= SI(S,,!,) + S2(S"P,) - (1- B)(F,(1- MC,'t2) + 
(1- (F, + MC,(1- F;)z(F,)'t2»)I,(1- \jJ't 2 ) - pBI, + (K1- «S, + 1,)-
(1- B)«F, (1- Me, 't l ) + (1- (F, + MC, (1- F, )z(F, )'t l »)S, (1- \II't I ) + 
(F,(l- MC,'t2) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'t2»)I,(1- \jJ't 2»-
pB(S, + 1,)- MC,«(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('t IS,(1- \jJ't I ) + 
't2I,(1- \jJ't2» - \II('tIS, + 't2I,) + gl(S,) + g2(1,»)(w2 (APP,)(1- MC,'tJ) + 
g2(1,) - \jJI, 't 2 - MC,«(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»I,(1- \jJ't 2 )'t2 
(3.10) 
The functions sl(St,It) and S2(St,Pt) capture the periodic transmission of Tb from 
infectious cattle and infectious possums to susceptible cattle within the herd, 
respectively. The spread of Tb infection in a cattle population has been modeled. 
elsewhere as a flux term in which the spread of Tb in the herd is specified as a function 
of the density of the susceptible cattle population and an infected animal population 
(Stoneham and Johnston, 1986; Kean, 1993; Bicknell, 1995). It is therefore assumed 
that the spread of Tb infection from cattle is a function of the density of susceptible and 
infected cattle, while the spread of infection from possums is a function of the density 
of susceptible cattle and possums. Support for this specification is found in the 
epidemiological literature which suggested that the risk that M bovis will be 
transmitted from infectious cattle increases with the concentration of cattle in a herd 
(Neill et. al., 1989; Radostits et al., 1994). 
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The model reflects implicit assumptions concerning the movement of cattle into 
each of the susceptible and infected cattle populations. Replacement cattle for the 
breeding component were assumed to come from annual calving and, when required, 
wearlers purchased. It was further assumed that cattle entering the marketing 
component comprised surplus weaners from the breeding component and weaner cattle 
purchased. 
The risk of interuterine transmission is considered to be very low (Morris et al., 
1994). However, it was assumed that infected cows will transmit Tb to their offspring 
sometime prior to weaning because calves normally remain with their mothers for 
between seven and nine months (Coop, 1987). The annual increase in the susceptible 
cattle population (gl(St») and infected cattle population (g2(It», arising from calves each 
period, is dependent on the number of breeding cows remaining after the whole herd Tb 
test because testing was assumed to occur prior to calving. 
The proportion of cattle purchased that are susceptible and infected are 
determined by the market price paid. The relationship between the market price for 
store cattle purchased (APPt) and the level of Tb infection in the group purchased are 
given by the functions wl(APPt) and w2(APPD for susceptible and infected cattle, 
respectively. 
Cattle are removed from the susceptible and infected populations through the 
culling of breeding cattle, the sale to store or slaughter of marketing cattle, and the 
removal of true and false positive reactors at Tb testing events. The Tb testing events, 
which reduce the transmission of Tb infection in the herd, influence each population 
depending on the particular herd component affected. Surveillance testing through 
compulsory whole herd Tb testing is administered to both breeding and marketing 
cattle. The number of true and false positive reactor cattle removed at whole herd Tb 
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testing is given by the terms \lfI(t2 and \lfSt'tI, respectively. Pre-movement Tb testing is 
administered only to marketing cattle that are selected for sale as stores. The number of 
cattle removed as true positive reactors at pre-movement Tb testing is determined by 
the equation MCt(1-B)Ft(St(1-\II'tI)'tI). Correspondingly, the number of false positive 
cattle removed is determined by MCt(1-B)Ft(lt(1-\lf't2)'t2). If reactors are detected at pre-
movement Tb testing then cattle in both the breeding and marketing components are 
subject to "in-contact" Tb testing. The number of cattle removed as false and true 
positive reactors at "in-contact" testing are expressed mathematically by the equations 
't2)'t2), respectively. Only cattle which are purchased undergo post-movement Tb 
testing. The expression 1-MCt't~ determines the proportion of infected cattle purchased 
that are removed as true positive reactors at post-movement Tb testing. The proportion 
of false positive reactors identified and removed from susceptible cattle purchased is 
similarly determined by the expression 1-MCt'tl. 
Mycobacterium bovis can infect a wide range of New Zealand wildlife species. 
Epidemiological research, however, suggests that the brushtail possum (Trichosurus 
vulpecula) plays a major role in wildlife vector transmission ofTb to cattle (Morris and 
Pfeiffer, 1995). To allow for Tb infection due to wildlife vectors, the model includes an 
equation of motion for a Tb infected possum population (Equation 3.11). The state of 
the possum population was assumed to be dependent on its natural biological growth 
(g3(Pt)) and the number of possums killed through vector control operations (Ht). A 
logistic growth function was used to represent the density dependent population 
dynamics. 
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(3.11) 
The objective function is also constrained by initial conditions for the state 
variables (Equation 3.12), non-negativity constraints on the state variables (Equation 
3.13) and boundary constraints on the control variables (Equation 3.14). 
So = S(O), 10 = 1(0), Po = P(O). (3.12) 
(3.13) 
(3.14) 
3.4 First Order Necessary Conditions 
The first order necessary conditions for optimal solutions to control problems 
are obtained by formulating the problem in terms of a Hamiltonian functional and 
ensuring the maximum principle is satisfied (Chiang, 1992). The current value 
Hamiltonian for the control problem above (Equation 3.15) was generated by pre-
multiplying each equation of motion with a costate variable and then adding the 
equations to the objective function. The current value costate variables m! to m3 are 
interpreted as the shadow prices (marginal values) of the state variables St, It, and Pt, 
respectively. The current value Hamiltonian therefore represents for each period the 
value of net revenue and the change in value of each state variable as given by its size 
and shadow price. The shadow price of susceptible cattle is expected to be positive as 
additional units positively contribute to net revenue. However, the shadow prices of 
infected cattle and possums are expected to be negative reflecting the contribution each 
of these populations make towards the spread of disease within the herd and the 
consequent reduction in net revenue. 
53 
.. ,~" --
,- -- -~. - .. 
Hcv = {(P3 -/)(1- B)(St(l- \j!'t1)(1- (F; + MCt(1- F;)z(F;)'t 1)) + 
~t(l- \j!'t2 )(1- (F; + MCt(1- F;)z(F;)'t 2))) + (P4 -/)pB(St(1- \j!'t 1) + ~t(1- \j!'t 2 )) + 
r(DJF;(1- B)((1- MCt't 1)St(1- \j!'t 1) + (1- MCt't 2)lt(l- \j!'t 2))-
(APP, - MCt (WI (APP')'t1((PI -/)y 1 - a) + w2(APP')'t 2((PI -I)y 2 - a))) * 
(Kl- ((St + It) - (1- B)((1'; (1- MCt't\) + (1- (F; + MCt (1- 1'; )z(F; )'t\ )))St (1- \j!'t\) + 
(F;(1- MCt't 2) + (1- (F; + MCt(l- F;)z(F;)'t 2)))lt(l- \j!'t 2 )) - pB(St + 1t )-
MCt((1- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F;)) + Bz(F;))('t1St(l- \j!'t\) + 't21t(1- \j!'t 2 )) - \j!('t\St + 't21t) + 
g\(St) + g2UJ)) + MCt((I- B)(1'; + (1- F;)z(1';))(((P2 -I)y\'t\ - a)St(1- \j!'t1) + 
((P2 -/)Y 2't2 -a)lt(1-\j!'t 2)) + Bz(F;)(((P4 -/)Y\'t1-a)St(I-\j!'t1)+((P4 -/)Y 2't2 -a)* 
1t(I-\j!'t 2)))+\j!(B(St((P4 -/)Y\'t1 -a) + It ((P4 -/)Y2't2 -a))+ 
(1- B)(St((P2 -I)y 1't1 - a) + It ((P2 -/)y 2 't 2 - a))) - (VI (St + It) + v 2(1- B)(St(1- \j!'t\) * 
(1- (F; + MCt(1- F;)z(1';)'t 1)) + 1t(1- \j!'t 2 )(1- (F; + MCt(l- F;)z(F;)'t2)))) 
- PH(P"H,)} + 
Tn. {- Sl(St,It) - s2(Sn P,) - (1- B)(F;(1- MCt't\) +(1- (F; + MCt(l- F;)z(F;)'t 1 ))) * 
St(1- \j!'t 1) - pBSt + (Kl- ((St + It) - (1- B)((F;(1- MCt't 1) + 
(1- (F; + MCt(1- F;)z(1';)'t1)))St(1 ~ \j!'t1) + (F,(I- MCt't2)+ 
(1- eF, + MCt(1 ~ F,)z(1';)'ti)))lt(l- \j!'t 2 )) - pB(St + I) - MCt((I- B)(F; + (1- F,)z(F;)) 
+ Bz(F,))('t1St(1- \j!'t 1) + 't21t(l- \j!'t 2 )) - \j!('t1St + 'tJt) + gl(St) + g2Ut))) * 
(w1(APP,)(1- MCt't 1)) + gl(S) - \j!St't l - MCt((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(1';)) + 
Bz(F;))St(1- \j!'t1)'t 1} + 
1Y1z {SI(St ,It) + S2(Sp P') - (1- B)(F,(1- MCt't 2) +(1- (F, + MCt(l- 1';)z(F, )'t2))) * 
1t(l- \j!'t 2) - pB1t + (Kl- ((St + I) - (1- B)((F,(1- MCt't\) + 
(1- (F, + MCt(l- F,)z(F,)'t 1)))St(1- \j!'t\) + (F,(1- MCt't 2) + 
(1- (F; + MCt(l- F;)z(1';)'t 2)))lt(1- \j!'t 2)) - pB(St + I) - MCt((1- B)(F; + (1- F,)z(F,)) 
+ Bz(F,))('t1St(1- \j!'t\) + 't 21t(1- \j!'t2)) - \j!('t.St + 't21t ) + g\(St) + g2U))) * 
(w2(APP,)(1- MCt't2)) + g2(lt ) - \j!lt't2 - MCt((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F;)) + 
BZ(1';))lt(1- \j!'t2)'t2} + 
(3.15) 
The maximum principle requires that three conditions are satisfied. Firstly, the 
value of Hev must be maximised over all time periods for the control variables. 
Maximisation is achieved by differentiating the current value Hamiltonian with respect 
to each of the control variables. Secondly, a Hamiltonian system must be obtained by 
differentiating the current value Hamiltonian with respect to each of the state variables 
54 
'- '-" .'-- ~ . 
--', •• < ~ • -.- •• 
~-~-J-/:.;>o~~~_;~ 
','- "'-,",",-
. .;.".--,','"--
and current value costate variables, respectively. The Hamiltonian system comprises 
equations which specify the way control decisions impact on the state variables and the 
evolution of the costate variables over time. The third condition states that the problem 
must have the appropriate transversality conditions. 
Equation 3.15 is linear with respect to the control variable for the average 
purchase price of cattle so the broader maximisation requirement, Max Hcv, was 
invoked (Chiang, 1992). The optimal solution for a control variable that enters the 
Hamiltonian linearly will be some combination of "bang-bang" and singular controls 
which are determined by the switching function associated with the control variable 
(Clark, 1990). The switching function for the average purchase price of cattle is 
presented in Equatiori 3.17. 
8Hc~ _ 0' - {- (1- MC (~'"' «p -l)y - a) + aw2 '"' «p -l)y - a») * 8APp, - APP - , 8APp, I I I 8APp, 2 I 2 
(Kl- «S, + I) - (1- B)«F,(1- MC,'"'I) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'"'I»)S,(I- \11'"'1) + 
(F,(I- MC/t2) + (1- (F, + MC,(I- F,)z(F,)'t2»)I,(1- \II'( 2 » - pB(S, + 1,)-
MC,«(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('tIS,(1- \II't I) + 't 2I,(I- \II'( 2» - \II('tIS, + 't2I,) 
+ gl(S) + g2(l))} + 
~ {(Kl- «S, + I,) - (1- B)«F,(1- MC,'"'I) + (1- (F, + MC,(I- F,)Z(F,)'tI»)S,(1- \II't I) 
+ (F,(I- MC,'"'2) + (1- (F, + MC,(I- F,)z(F,)'"'2»)I,(I- \11'"'2» - pB(S, + 1,)-
MC,«(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('"'IS,(1- \II't I) + 't 2I,(1- \II'( 2 » - \II('tIS, + '"'21,) 
+ gl(S,) + g2(l,»)~(1- MC,'t I)} + 8APp, 
m2 {(Kl- (S, + I,) - (1- B)«F,(1- MC,'t I) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'tI»)S,(I- \II't I) + 
. (F,(1"- MC,'(2)+(I-(F, + MC,(1-F,)z(F,)'t2»)I,(I-\II'tJ)-pB(S, +1,)-
MC, «1- B)(F; + (1- F, )z(F;» + Bz(F;»)( 'tIS, (1- \II't I) + 't2I, (1- \II'( 2» - \II ( 'tIS, + 't2I) + 
gl(S,) + g2(l,») aw2 (1- MC,'tJ} 8APp, 
(3.16) 
The control conditions for the average purchase price are, 
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{APPMin if 0' APP(O 
AP~ = AP~· if 0' APP = 0 
PI if 0' APP )0 
(3.17) 
The switching conditions relate to the price interval bounded by the clear herd price and 
the fully discounted price for store cattle. The first term in brackets in Equation 3.16 
shows that there is an inverse relationship between the average purchase price of 
weaners and net revenue each period. The magnitude of the impact on net revenue 
depends, however, on the cost ofweaners purchased and the revenue received from any 
reactors that may be detected at post-movement Tb testing less the cost of testing all 
weaners purchased. The second and third terms describe the marginal changes to the ' . 
implied future contributions to net revenue by susceptible and infected cattle, 
respectively, resulting from a marginal change in the average purchase price. Equations 
3.16 and 3.17 suggest that the producer will pay the minimum purchase price for cattle 
if the current net cost of purchasing and post-movement testing cattle is greater than the 
change in the herd's future earnings potential. Because the minimum purchase price 
corresponds to purchasing cattle from herds with high apparent prevalence levels, the 
producer trades-off the short run benefit of a higher 'net revenue against the long run ,-":-:--- --~~-. ~--- 7:"-' 
costs of infected cattle entering the herd. The decision to purchase cattle from herds 
with high apparent infection levels therefore depends on whether the maximum price 
discount provides producers with an economic incentive to trade-off short run benefits 
with long run costs. 
The Hamiltonian is non-linear with respect to the control variables for sales of 
store cattle, movement control Tb testing and possum harvest. The strong maximising 
condition Max Hcv was applied to the non-linear control variables to accommodate the . -.,; -. - ~ .: '--
possibility of boundary solutions. To derive the appropriate control conditions for a 
. -~, ,. 
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maximum Kuhn-Tucker conditions were formulated. Following the normal procedure 
for obtaining Kuhn-Tucker conditions, multiplier equations for the control constraints 
were added to the current value Hamiltonian which was in tum differentiated with 
respect to the control variable and set to zero (Kamien and Schwartz, 1981). 
Boundary solutions must be expected for control decisions concerning store 
cattle sales. As shown in Figure 3.1 the trade-off between selling cattle as stores or to 
slaughter is based on each marketing option's contribution to current net revenue. It is 
reasonable to expect that the net revenue associated with store sales in a period may 
either favour selling all marketable cattle as stores or none. The necessary conditions 
for the maximisation of the current value Hamiltonian with respect to sales of store 
cattle are given by Equations 3.18-3.20. 
BHcv = {- (P3 -/)(1- B)(S/(l- \j!'tJ)(l + MC,((1- F,) Bz(F,) 'tJ - Z(F,)'tJ)J + 
BF, BF, 
f'l, (1-1jFt,{ 1 + MC,( (1- F,) ~~) t, - Z(F,)t,) J) + 
r(D,)(1- B)«(1- MC/'t1)S/(1- \j!'t l ) + (1- MC/'t2 )I,(1- \j!'t 2»-
(APP, - MC/(w1(APP')'t1«PI -l)y 1 - a) + w2 (APP,)'t 2 «PI -1)y 2 - a») * 
«1-m(((1- MC,t,) -( 1 + MC,((1- F,) ~~) t, -Z(F,)t,)J)s,(I-IjFt,) + 
((1- MC,t,) + + MC, ((1- F,) ~~) t, - Z(F,)t,) J}, (I-lJIt,») + 
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+ MC.((1- B)(I +((1- F,) a~~) -Z(F,»)}«P, -I)y,<, -<»S,(I- ,!,<,) + 
((P2 -1)y2't2 - a)1,(1- \I''t 2» + B(aZ(F;)] (((P4 -l)y )'t) -a)S,(1- \I''t\) + aF, 
((P4 -:-1)y2't2 -a)1,(1-\I''t2»)+ 
v,(I- B)(s,(I- ,!,<,{I + MC,((I- F,) ~~) <, -Z(F,)<,)) + 
I,(I-IJI<,{I + MC,((I- F,) ~~) <, -Z(F,)<,)))}-
m,{(1-B{(I- MC,<,)-(I+ Mc,({I-F,)!, <, -Z(F,)<,)))S,{I-'!'<,)-
«1- B)(({I- MC,<,) -(1+ MC,((1- F,) :; <, -Z(F,)<,)))s,{I- ,!,<,) + 
[(1- MC,t,)-(I+ MC,({I- F,)!, <, -Z(F,)<,))},{I- '!'<,)]-
MC,((1- B{I +(0 -F,) :; -Z(F,»)) + B(!,)}<,S,(1- ,!,<,) + 
't2 1,(1- \I''t2»)(w)(APP')(1- MC,'t)) + 
MC,((I- B{ 1 + ((1- F,) !, -Z(F,»)) + B(!,) )S,(1- '!'<,)<,}-
m,{(1- B{(1- MC,<,)-(I+ MC,((I- F,) :; <, -Z(F,)<,))},(1-IJI<,)-
«1- B)(({I- MC,<,)-(I + MC,((1-F,)!, <, -Z(F,)<,)))S,{I- ,!,<,) + 
({I-MC,<,) - (1 + MC,({I- F,) :; <, - Z(F,)<,)) },(1- '!'<,)] -
MC,({I- B{I +((I-F,) :; -Z(F,»)) + B(:;) }<,S,{I-'!'<,) + 
't 21,(1- \I''t2»)(w2(APP')(1- MC,'t2» + 
MC,(I- B)(I +(0- F,) :; -Z(F,»)) + B(!,) },(1- '!'<,)<,} -ro, +ro, ~ 0, 
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(3.19) 
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Equation 3.18 mathematically describes the marginal benefits and costs of 
selling cattle as stores. The marginal benefit of store sales comprises the current 
revenue received for cattle sold, the net revenue received for any cattle reacting at 
movement control Tb testing, and the avoidance of additional grazing costs. The 
marginal cost includes the opportunity cost of not sending cattle to slaughter, and the 
reduction in the future earnings potential of the herd brought about through the removal 
of cattle not being offset by purchases due to the post-movement test. Another factor 
contributing to the herd' sfuture earning potential relates to changes in the level of Tb 
infection in the herd._ Changes in the size of each cattle population occur because the 
producer has some control over the disease status of cattle purchased through the price 
paid and therefore the status of purchased animals may not necessarily match those sold 
or removed at pre-movement and in-contact Tb testing. Given the expectation that ml 
and m2 will be positive and negative, respectively, net decreases in the stock of 
susceptible cattle will adversely affect future earnings while net decreases in the stock . 
of infected cattle will be beneficial for future earnings. 
The control conditions for sales of store cattle suggest that the producer will not 
sell any marketable cattle as stores if the marginal impact on net revenue and the 
implied future contribution of the herd are negative. This may be shown by setting p,* 
to zero which implies that WI in (3.19) is zero and 002 in (3.20) is positive. The results of 
(3.19) and (3.20) will only satisfy the maximising condition of (3.18) providing both 
the marginal value for current net revenue and the herd's implied future value are 
negative. Alternatively, if both marginal values are positive then all marketable cattle 
will be sold as stores (F/ = 1, 001~0, 002=0). If neither of these two conditions are 
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satisfied (001=002=0), then the producer will select a level of sales that ensures that the 
marginal change in net revenue equals the marginal change in future earnings brought 
about by changes in numbers and proportions of susceptible and infected cattle. 
It is also reasonable to expect that when movement control Tb testing is a 
control variable the producer may decide to either undertaking testing consistent with 
the NPMS or undertaking none. Equations 3.21-3.23 provide the necessary conditions 
for the maximisation of the current value Hamiltonian with respect to movement 
control Tb testing. 
::~ = a Me = {- (P3 - /)(1 ~ B)( SI (1- \jJ't I )(1- F, )z( F,)'t I + 
I 
J.IlI(1- \jJ't2)(1- F, )z(F, )'t2) - r(D,)F, (1- B)( 'tISI (1- \jJ't I) + 't21, (1- \jJ't2» + 
(wl(AP~)'tI«pl -/)y 1- a) + w2(AP~)'t2«PI -/)y 2 - a»)(KI- «SI + 1/)-
(1- B)«F,(l- MC,'t I) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'t I»)SI(1- \jJ't I) + (F,(1- MCI't2) + 
(1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'t2»)/I(1- \jJ'tJ) - pB(S, + 1/)-
MC,«l- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('t IS,(l- \jJ't I) + 't211(1- \jJ't2»-
\jJ('tISI + 't211) + gl(SI) + g2(l1») + (AP~ - MC,(wl(AP~)'tI«pl -/)y I - a) + 
w2 (AP~)'t2«PI -/)y 2 - a»)«(1- B)«F,'t1 + (1- F,)z(F,)'tI)SI (1- \jJ't I) + 
(F,'t2 + (1- F,)z(F,)'t2)11(1- \jJ't2» - «(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,» * 
('tIS, (1- \jJ't I ) + 't211 (1- \jJ't2 ») + «(1- B)(F, + (1- F, )z(F, »«(P2 -/)y l't l - a) * 
SI (1- \jJ't I) + «P2 -/)y 2 't2 - a) II (1- \jJ't2» + Bz(F, )«(P4 -/)y l't l - a)S, (1- \jJ't I) + 
«P4 ~ /)y 2 't2 - a)11 (1- \I''t2») + V2 (1- B)(S, (1- \I''t I)(1- F, )z(F, )'t l + 
11(1- \I''t 2)(1- F,)z(F,)'t 2)} + 
ml {(1- B)(F,'t1 + (1- F,)z(F,)'t I)S,(l- \I''t l ) -«1- B)«F,'t1 + (1- F,)z(F,)'t I) * 
SI (1- \I''t l ) + (F,'t2 + (1- F,)z(F,)'t2 )11 (1- \I''t2» - «(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,» * 
('tIS,(l- \I''tl ) + 't211(1- \I''t2»)(wl(AP~)(1- MC,'t I» - (K1- «SI + 1/)-
(1- B)«F,(l- MC,'t I) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'t I»)S,(l- \I''t l) + 
(F,(1- MC,'tJ + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(F,)'t2»)11(1- \I''t2» - pB(S, + 1/)-
MC,«l- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + Bz(F,»('t IS,(l- \I''t l ) + 't211(1- \I''t2»-
\I'('tISI + 'til) + gl(S,) + g2(l,»)(WI(AP~)'tI) - «(1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F,» + 
Bz(F,»S,(1- \I''tl)'t l } + 
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~ {(1- B)(F,'t2 + (1- F, )Z(F, )'t2 )11 (1- \II't2) -((1- B)((F,'t] + (1- F, )z(F, )'t]) * 
SI (1- \II't]) + (F,'t2 + (1- F, )z(F, )'t2 )1, (1- \II't2» -((1- B)(F, + (1- F, )z(F,» + Bz(F,» 
* ('t]S,(1- \II't]) + 't/I(1- \II't2»)(w2(APP,)(1- MCI't 2» - (K1- ((SI + 11)-
(1- B)((F,(1- MCI 't]) + (1- (F, + MCI (1- F, )z(F,)'tJ»SI (1- \II't]) + (F, (1- MCI't2) 
+ (1- (F, + MCI(l- F,)z(F,)'t2»)II(1- \II't2» - pB(SI + II) - MCI((l- B)(F, + (1- F,) * 
z(F,» + Bz(F;»('t]SI(1- \II't]) + 't2I I(1- \II't2» - \II('t]SI + 't2I,) + g](SI) + g2(11») * 
(w2(APP,)'t2) - ((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)z(F;» + Bz(F,»I,(1- \II't2)'t2} - (03 + (04 = 0 
(3.21) 
(3.22) 
(3.23) 
The impact on current revenue from movement control testing stems from 
several factors. Aside from the ,direct cost of testing, revenue is foregone from reactor 
cattle removed at pre-movement and in-contact Tb testing because these animals are not 
available for marketing as stores or to slaughter. Offsetting the opportunity cost of 
movement control Tb testing is the revenue received from reactor cattle detected and 
subsequently slaughtered. The reactor cattle removed at pre-movement and in-contact 
Tb testing increase purchase costs as additional cattle have to be purchased to replace 
them. The adverse impact on net revenue from purchasing additional animals is reduced 
to the extent that compensation from post-movement testing outweighs the costs of 
testing all purchased cattle. With respect to the future earnings potential of the herd, 
movement control Tb testing reduces the herd size because post-movement testing 
removes reactors from the group of cattle purchased but these animals are not replaced 
within the current period. The future earnings potential is also affected by changes to 
the susceptible and infected cattle populations as a result of purchase decisions. 
Equations 3.21-3.23 disclose that movement control Tb testing will not be 
undertaken by the producer if the current and future marginal contributions to net 
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revenue are negative ( Me; = 0, C03 = 0, C04 C: 0). The producer will, however, undertake 
.';->"'~'-.~"<'. ::.:.:.:~::::::;::.:; 
movement control Tb testing consistent with the NPMS if both current and future 
marginal contributions are positive (Me; = 1, C03 = 0, C04 C: 0). If neither of these 
situations apply then an interior solution is optimal. The net revenue maximising level 
of movement control Tb testing will therefore occur where the marginal benefit from 
reduced infection levels in the future equals the marginal adverse impact on current 
revenue. 
With respect to possum harvest, Equations 3.24-3.26 provide the necessary 
conditions for maximisation of Hcv. If the difference between the current marginal 
harvest cost and the marginal benefit of reducing Tb transmission into the herd is 
negative then no harvest will be undertaken (~. = 0, COs = 0, C06 C: 0). Conversely, the 
entir~ possum population will be harvested if the combined net marginal impact of 
harvest is positive (H; = Pt, COs = 0, C06 C: 0). When boundary solutions are not optimal 
the producer maximises net revenue by harvesting possums to a level IF, where the 
marginal cost of harvesting equals the marginal benefits of reducing Tb transmission· 
into the herd. 
8Hcv 8PH --=---m -00 +00 =0 
8H 8H 3 5 6 
I I 
(3.24) 
(3.25) 
(3.26) 
The conditions imposed by the costate equations of motion on the Hamiltonian 
system ensure that the marginal change in the shadow price of each state variable equals 
each state variable's marginal contribution to current and future profits (Chiang, 1992). 
Rearranging the costate equations allowed these relationships to be expressed in terms 
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of the opportunity cost of a state variable at a particular time. Equations 3.27-3.29 ~-:"::,, . .:~-~~"~::: 
t~~{:;:~~:~· 
describe mathematically the conditions associated with the optimal evolution of the 
three costate variables. The interpretation ascribed to each equation is that if the costate 
variable is on its optimal path, then the opportunity cost of the associated state variable 
should equal the change in the states contribution to current and future net revenue plus 
the depreciation or appreciation in its shadow price. 
" Equations 3.27 and 3.28 relate to the susceptible and infected cattle populations, 
respectively. Both cattle populations contribute to current and future earnings of the 
cattle enterprise. Contributions to current revenue come from store cattle sales, cattle 
slaughtered, and reactor cattle detected at Tb testing when compensation is paid. 
Although the average" store cattle price received and reactor compensation are the same 
for both susceptible and infected cattle, slaughter revenue is higher for susceptible 
cattle because infected cattle are detected at slaughter. With respect to future earnings, 
because it was assumed that the herd size remains constant, changes to earnings arise 
from changes in the relative proportion of the herd in each population. Biological 
reproduction adds to each population at the same rate each period. The significant 
factors that influence the size of the susceptible and infected cattle populations are 
purchase decisions and the spread of infection into the herd from either the possum 
population or within the herd through infected cattle. The infection level in the herd -.'. -.," ~- '- -4 -~ ,--
affects the apparent infection level which in tum impacts on the average price received 
for store cattle. 
';~_-:"'1~': 
".< 
-~ -~ -, -. -- _." 
63 
O~ = aHcv + ~ = {(P3 -l)(1- BX1- \lftIXl- (F, + MC;(1- F,)z(F,)'tl» + . as, 
(P4 -l)pB(1- \lftl) + r(D,)F,(I- BX1- MC;tl)(1- \lftl) + 
(APP' - MC;(wl(APP,)tl(P1 -l)Y1 -a,) + wz(APP')tZ(P1 -l)yz -0,»((1- (1- BXF,(1- MC;tl) 
+ (1- (F, + MC;(I- F,)z(F,)tl»Xl- \lft1) - pB - MC;((1- BXF, + (1- F,)z(F,» + 
Bz(F,»t1(1-\lftI)- \lft1 + a
gl » + MC;((I-BXF, + (1-F,)z(F,)X(Pz -l)Yltl -a,) + as, 
BZ(F,X(P4 -l)Yltl -0,»+ 'II(B(P4 -l)Yltl -a,) + (1-B)(Pz -l)Yltl -0,»-
(VI + vz(1- BX1- \lftIXl- (F, + MC;(1- F,)z(F,)t l)))} + 
{~ (- !i -!i -(1- B)(F; (1- MC, tJ + (1- (F; + MC, (1- F; )z(F, )t1 »)(1- 'IIt l) -, , 
pB - ((1- (1- B)(F;(1- MC,t1) + (1- (F; + MC,(1- F;)z(F;)t l»)(1- 'IItl) - pB-
MC,((I- B)(F, + (1- F;)z(F;» + Bz(F;»t1(1- 'IItl) - 'IItl + agl »(wl(APP,) * as, 
a 
(1- MC,t l » + ~ - 'IItl- MC,((I- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F;» + Bz(F;»t l(1- 'IIt l»} + as, 
Tnz(_1 + _._z - ((1- (1- B)(F;(1- MC,t l) + (1- (F; + MC,(1- F;)z(F;)t l »)(1- 'IIt1) {
as as .- . 
as, as, 
- pB - MC,((I- B)(F, + (1- F;)z(F;» + Bz(F;»t l(1- 'lit) - 'IItl + a
g l » * 
as, 
(wz(APP,)(1- MC,tz)))} + ~ 
OTnz = aHcv + ~ = {(P3 -/)(1- B)I!(1- 'IIt z)(l- (F; + MC,(I- F;)z(F;)tz» + aI, 
(P4 -/)P!!B(1- 'IIt z) + r(D,)F;(1- B)(I- MC,tz)(1- 'IIt z) + 
(APP, - MC,(wl(APP,)t l ((p1 -/)y I - 0,) + wz(APP,)t 2 ((PI -/)y z - 0,» * 
{(1- (1- B)(F;(1- MC,tz) + (1- (F; + MC,(1- F;)z(F;)tz)))(1- 'IIt 2) - pB-
MC,((1- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F;» + Bz(F;»tz(1- 'IItJ - 'IIt2 + a
gZ» + aI, 
MC,((1-B)(F; +(I-F,)z(F;»((pz -l)Yztz -0,)+ Bz(F;)((P4 -/)yztz -0,»+ 
'II(B((P4 -/)y z t z - 0,) + (1- B)((pz -/)y z t z - 0,» - (VI + v2(1- B) * 
(1- 'IItz )(1- (F; + MC, (1- F; )z( F; )tz)))} + 
{~ (- aSI _ ((1- (1- B)(F; (1- MC, t z) + (1- (F; + MC, (1- F; )z(F; )tz))) * aI, 
(3.27) 
(1- 'IIt z) - pB - MC,((1- B)(F; + (1- F;)z(F;» + Bz(F;»tz(1- 'IItz) - 'IItz + a
gZ » * aI, 
(wl(APP')(1- MC,t l»} + 
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- (1- B)(F,(l- MC,'t2) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)z(P,)'t2)))(1- \II't 2)-aI, 
pB - «1- (1- B)(F;(1- MC,'t 2) + (1- (F; + MC,(l- F;)z(F;)'t 2)))(1- \II't 2)-
pB - MC,«l- B)(F; + (1- F,)z(F;)) + Bz(F;))'t2(1- \II't 2 ) - \II't2 + a
g2)) * aI, 
(w2(AP~)(1- MC,'t2)) + ag2 - \II't2 - MC,«l- B)(F, + (1- F;)z(F;)) + Bz(F;))'t2 * aI, 
(1- \II't 2 ))} + ml 
(3.28) 
Changes in the possum population impact on the cost of harvesting possums and 
therefore affect current net revenue (Equation 3.29). The marginal change in possum 
harvest costs is indeterminate until the precise formulation of the harvest function is 
known. Possums spread irifection into the herd and therefore the contribution to future 
earnings brought about through changes in possum numbers will be negative when ml 
is positive and m2 is negative. The possum population's marginal contribution to future 
earnings is expected to be negative, given the expected sign associated with its shadow 
pnce. 
(3.29) 
The control problem has a fixed endpoint T but the terminal values of the state 
variables are not specified. The transversality conditions appropriate to this formulation 
are given in Equation 3.30. These conditions state that the shadow price of each state 
variable should follow a path that ensures it is zero at the termination of the problem. 
i = 1,2,3. (3.30) 
3.5 Hypothesised Relationships 
The specification of the model and the interpretations of the first order 
necessary conditions provide insight into how the hypothetical producer may respond to 
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cattle marketing and purchase decisions. Whether cattle are marketed to sale as stores 
or to slaughter depends on the market prices associated with each alternative, the 
apparent and actual levels of Tb infection in the herd which determine the average price 
received for cattle under each option, the additional cost of carrying cattle through to 
slaughter condition, and the reduction in revenue arising from cattle reacting as false 
and true positives at pre-movement and in-contact Tb testing and the Tb testing costs. 
The difference between the average net revenue obtained from store cattle and slaughter 
sales is expected to favour the producer marketing cattle as stores at low infection 
levels. As illustrated in Figure 3.1, when herd infection levels increase and apparent 
infection increases the impact of the discount on the store cattle price will act as a 
;-~'-.'>;->.< ... ~ 
~::i::~:::.::~::':::: 
disincentive to selliIlgcattle as stores and the producer will prefer to incur the c.,c, 
additional cost of carrying cattle through to slaughter condition. 
With respect to purchasing replacement cattle, it is anticipated that the risk 
neutral producer has an incentive to pay the minimum price for cattle if movement 
control testing is undertaken. The minimum price maximises the difference between 
current purchase cost and potential net revenue. Although the minimum price implies 
cattle are from high apparent infection herds, pre-movement Tb testing by the seller and 
post-movement Tb testing by the purchaser reduces the actual number of infected cattle 
entering the herd. As a consequence the negative impact of infected cattle on future 
earnings is expected to be very low. 
,'---
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Chapter 4: An Empirical Model of Bovine Tuberculosis Control •• -:-':;;:',-',..:,--~,-< . ~~t~~~~~~:; 
4.1 Introduction 
In the following sections the theoretical model described in the Chapter 3 is 
specified as a discrete time optimal control model to undertake the empirical analysis of 
movement control policy in New Zealand. This chapter provides an empirical context 
for the problem of store cattle production in a Tb vector risk area. The generalised 
functional relationships outlined in the theoretical model are specified and the selection 
of parameter values detailed. The chapter concludes with the presentation of 
preliminary results for the empidcal model. 
4.2 The Empirical Problem 
Bovine Tb has been a long term problem for many farmers in the 
Clarence/Waiau Tb vector risk area of North Canterbury. The area contains several 
different cattle production systems which are common elsewhere in New Zealand. 
These systems include hill country breeding and all store finishing, hill country 
breeding and limited finishing, hill country and downlands breeding and finishing, and 
trading. 
Relevant parameter values for a representative store cattle production system in 
the Clarence/Waiau were obtained from secondary data relating to beef cattle 
production in North Canterbury. The New Zealand Meat and Wool Board Economic 
Service (NZMWBES) produces average yearly production data for various classes of 
'.- .:.~-.., .... ~.~- .'~' 
-~'.-~-t... ,-'<-' ~"_~.,--\; 
New Zealand farms from their annual farm surveys. The NZMWBES data for "South 
Island Hill Country" farms was most representative of cattle production in the study 
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area (NZMWBES, 1992-1996). Supplementary data was obtained from Lincoln 
' .... :~ ':'-',':---.'.-, 
:::.,:..~~::j ~~!:,:: .. 
University's Financial Budget Manual (FBM) which collates commodity price and 
input cost information relating to most types of primary production in New Zealand 
(Burtt and Fleming, 1992 & 1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; 
Burtt, 1996). Variations in production data due to commodity prices and climatic 
,1.:" 1_: ~_~~ 
conditions were smoothed out using five year averages from 1990/91 to 1994/95. 
Where necessary production characteristics not available from the NZMWBES and 
FBM data were obtained from Dunham's (1995) study of bovine tuberculosis control 
on six types of cattle farm in North Canterbury which relied on farmer interviews. All 
financial data was expressed in 1995 dollars using either Statistics New Zealand 
producers price index for agricultural output or the consumers price index. Averages ~ ",- .. '- . _.' . 
obtained from the beef production data revealed that over the period from 1990/91 to 
1994/95 a representative South Island Hill Country farm had an effective area of 1567 
hectares on which 237 cattle were run with primarily sheep and other livestock such as 
deer and goats at a stocking rate of3.6 stock units per hectare. 
4.3 The Empirical Model 
The continuous time theoretical model developed in Chapter 3 (Equations 3.1-
3.14) was formulated as a discrete time optimal control model (Equations 4.1-4.7). The ,,' 
- - - -- ~ - - . -. 
time step in the discrete time model represents one year of production. The cattle 
producer chooses the appropriate levels for store cattle sales (Ft), the price paid for 
purchases (APPt), the level of movement control testing if regulations are not imposed 
(MCt), and numbers of possums harvested (Ht) in order to maximise the net present 
value of production over the period (Equation 4.1). Values and definitions for 
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parameters and variables are shown in Table 4.1. The model is run over T periods to 
obtain average/steady state solution values. 
Maximisen = ± 1 I {(P3 - /)(1- B)( SI (1 - \jJ't 1)(1 - (F, + MC, (1 - F, )(1- e -crF, )'t I)) 
M"F, ,APP, ,Me, ,H, 1=0 (1- 8) 
+ J.Il,(I- \jJ't2)(1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)(1- e-
crF, )'t2))) + (P4 -/)pB(S,(1- \jJ't I) + 
f1/,(I- "",» + (( P, - P~~I- ro»)( (( "'(;:'++/~;I,») - t,)/<I- (t, + (1-<,)))) + p,J · 
F,(1- B)((I- MC,'t I)S,(I- \jJ'tJ + (1- MC,'t2)I,(1- \jJ't2))-
( APP, -M~ (1- (APP, -P,)j<P, - P~~I- ro» )(1- ~t,»)«P' - T)y ,t, - a) + 
((APP, - PI)/(PI - P~7 - (0)))(1_ fl't 2)((PI -/)y 2't2 - a)))(Kl- ((SI + 11 )-
(1- B)((F,(1- MC,'t I) + (1 ~ (F, + MC,(1- F,)(1- e-crF, )'t I)))SI(1- \jJ't I) + 
(F,(l- MCI't2) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)(1- e-
crF, )'t2)))I, (1- \jJ't2)) - pB(S, + I) -
MC,((I- B)(F, + (1- F,)(1- e-crF,)) + B(1- e-crF, ))('t ISI(1- \jJ't I) + 
MC,((I- B)(F,+ (1- F,)(I- e-crF,)) + B(I- e-crF, ))('t IS,(I- \jJ't I) + 't 2I ,(I- \jJ't2))-
\jJ('tISI + 't2I ,) + gl(S) + g2(1))) + MC,((I- B)(F, + (1- F,)(1- e-crF,)) * 
(((P2 -/)y l't l - a)S, (1- \jJ't\) + ((P2 -/)y 2 't2 - a)I, (1- \jJ't2)) + B(1- e-crF, ) * 
(((P4 -/)y l't l - a)S, (1- \jJ't\) + ((P4 -/)y 2 't2 - a)I,(1- \jJ't 2))) + 
\jJ(B(SI((P4 -/)YI't1 -a) + ItC(p4 -/)Y2't2 -a))+(1-B)(SI((P2 -/)YI't1 -a)+ 
I,((P2 -/)y 2 't2 - a))) - (vI(SI + II) + v2(1- B)(S,(1- \jJ't I)(I- (F, + MC,(I- F,) * 
(1- e-oF, )t,» + 1,(1- "",)(1- (F, + MC,(I- F,)' (1- e-oF, )t,»» - (~)( -;J} 
Subject to: 
SI+\ = SI -13IS/, -132S,P, - (1- B)(F,(1- MC,'t\) + (1- (F, + MC,(1- F,)(1- e-crF, )'t\))) 
* S,(I- \jJ't\) - pBS, + (Kl- ((SI + 11) - (1- B)((F,(I- MC,'t I) + 
(1- (F, + MC,(I- F,)(I- e-crF, )'t I)))SI(1- \jJ't\) + (F,(I- MC,'t I) + 
(1- (F, + MC, (1- F, )(1- e-crF, )'t2)))I, (1- \jJ't2)) - pB(S, + I) -
MC,((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)(1- e-crF,)) + B(1- e-crF, ))('t IS,(I- \jJ't I) + 't2I ,(I- \jJ't2))-
\jJ( 'tISI + 't2I) + ~B(S, (1- \jJ't I) + II (1- \jJ't2 )))) * 
(1- ((APP, - p\)/ (PI - P~ ~1- (0 )))(1- fl't 2)] (1- MC, 't l)) + ~BS, (1- \jJ't I) - \jJSI't1 
- MC,((1- B)(F, + (1- F,)(I- e-crF,)) + B(1- e-crF, ))S,(I- \jJ't\)'t\ 
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11+1 = II + I3IS,11 + 132SIP' - (1- B)(F,(l- MC/'t2) + (1- (F, + MC/(1- F,)(1- e-crF, )'t2 ))) 
* 11(1- \I''t 2 ) - pBII + (K1- ((SI + II) - (1- B)((1';(1- MC/'t I ) + 
(1- (1'; + MC/(l- 1';)(1- e-crF, )'t I )))S/(l- \I''tJ + (F,(1- MC/'t I ) + 
(1- (1'; + MC/(1- F,)(1- e-crF, )'t2 )))II(1- \I''t2 )) - pB(SI + 11)-
MC/((1- B)(F, + (1- 1';)(1- e-
crF
,)) + B(l- e-crF, ))('tIS/(l- \I''t l ) + 't 2I I(1- \I''t2))-
\I'('tISI + 't 2I I) + $B(S/(1- \I''tl) + 11(1- \I''t2 )))) * 
( .! (PI - PI(1- 0) ))) (APP, - PI); _ i (1-11't2)(1- MC/'t 2 ) + $BII(1- \I''t 2 ) - \l'II't2 -
MC/((l-B)(F, + (1- F,)(1- e-crF,)) + B(1- e-crF, ))11(1- \I''t2)'t2 
P'+I = P, + ap,( 1- :~) - ~ 
HI ~.95p' 
St, It, and P, ~ 0 
o ~ F,~I, 0 ~APPt ~ P3, 0 ~ Me, ~ 1, 0 ~ Ht < .95*Pt. 
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(4.4) 
(4.5) 
(4.6) 
(4.7) 
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Table 4.1 Variable Definitions and Parameter Values 
Variable/ Definition 
Parameter 
S, Density of susceptible cattle (state variable) 
I, Density of infected cattle (state variable) 
P, Density of possums (state variable) 
F, Cattle sold to other producers (control variable) 
APP, Average price paid for cattle purchased (control variable) 
Me, Movement control testing frequency 
H, Possums harvested (control variable) 
<5 Annual discount rate (%) 
PI Average price for clear herd weaners purchased ($/hd) 
P2 Average price for clear herd R2 store cattle ($/hd) 
P3 Average price for non-infected R2 cattle slaughtered ($/hd) 
P4 Average price for non-infected cull cows ($/hd) 
I Slaughter levy ($/hd) 
Jl Average proportion of infected cattle salvaged (%) 
p Proportion of breeding herd culled (%) 
. If/' Annual whole herd testing frequency 
1] Pre-movement test parameter for cattle purchased 
(j "In-contact" testing parameter 
'£1 False positive reactor cattle (I-test specificity) (%) 
'£2 True positive reactor cattle (test sensitivity) (%) 
a Cost oftesting cattle ($/hd) 
YI Compensation for non-Iesioned cattle (%) 
Y2 Compensation for lesioned cattle (%) 
PI Cattle to cattle Tb transmission parameter 
P2 Possum to cattle Tb transmission parameter 
(j) Maximum store cattle price discount (%) 
i Maximum apparent true infection level for store cattle (%) 
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Value 
hd/ha 
hd/ha 
hd/ha 
% 
$/hd 
1 
hd/ha 
8.7 
349 
482 
516 
327 
8.71 
35 
16 
1 
1 
250 
1 
75 
3.53 
65 
65 
3 
.003 
10 
4.99 
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Table 4. 1 (Continued) 
Kl Profit maximising stocking rate (hdlha) 0.15134 
rjJ Percentage of breeding herd that are productive (%) 67 
VI Variable cost of cattle ($/hd) 13.48 
V2 Grazing costs ofR2 cattle sent to slaughter ($lhd) 52.00 
B Proportion ofthe herd that are breeding cattle (%) 65 
K2 Carrying capacity of possum population (hdlha) 3 
h Cost oftime hunting possums ($lhunt) 94.26 
a Intrinsic rate of growth for possum population (%) 30 
·z Possum-harvest parameter 6.449 
4.3.1 Objective Function 
4.3.1.1 Annual Discount Rate 
Cash flows were discounted at an annual real rate of 8.7%. The rate was derived 
from the average base rate and margin charged for secured working capital for a 
farming business by the major farm lenders (Burtt and Fleming, 1992 & 1994; Fleming 
and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 1996). 
4.3.1.2 Cattle Prices 
Average cattle prices were obtained for mature cows culled, marketing cattle 
-. -,'; 
sold as stores, marketing cattle sold to slaughter, and weaners purchased. The price for 
cull cows (P4) was set at the slaughter price for M grade cows which was $349 (Burtt 
and Fleming, 1992 & 1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 
1996). Reproductive and breeding herd replacement assumptions, which are discussed 
below, implied a sex composition for the marketing herd of approximately one third 
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heifers and two thirds steers. It was assumed that all marketing cattle are sold each 
period as rising two year olds and that purchase decisions ensure the sex composition 
remains constant over time. These assumptions permitted price data for one to one and 
a half year old steers and heifers sold in Marlborough and Canterbury to be weighted 
and combined into an average store cattle price (P2) of $482 (Burtt and Fleming, 1992 
& 1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 1996). The price of 
clear herd weaner cattle purchased (P2) was similarly derived producing a value of 
$349. 
The average prices for store cattle purchased and sold are either chosen by the 
producer (APPt) or determined by the market discount regime as introduced in Chapter 
3, re~pectively; ProdUcers currently obtain information relating to a herd's Tb status and 
history from MAF Quality Management. The model assumes producers use the whole 
herd testing information to determine the apparent Tb prevalence (Dt) for herds from 
which they purchase cattle. Apparent Tb prevalence is defined as the percentage of 
cattle identified as being infected at whole herd testing (Equation 4.8). 
(4.8) 
. Problems arise in developing a relationship between apparent Tb prevalence as 
formulated in Equation 4.8 and risk of infection. Due to the lack of sensitivity and 
specificity of the Tb test, apparent Tb prevalence does not reflect the actual level of 
disease in the herd. At the levels of Tb prevalence for which cattle are permitted to be 
sold as stores whole herd testing information will overstate the herd infection level due 
to the lack of specificity of the test. Adopting a measure of apparent prevalence which 
takes into account information obtained from reactor cattle slaughtered is also 
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problematic. All cattle reacting at a Tb test, that are not presented for an ancillary Tb 
test, must be subsequently slaughtered and subjected to further inspection at slaughter 
to assist in clarifying their disease status. Given the assumption that the Tb infection 
status of cattle is identifiable at slaughter, using whole herd testing information together 
with diagnostic results from reactors subsequently slaughtered will understate herd 
infection levels due to the lack of sensitivity of the test. The epidemiology literature 
does, however, offer a solution to finding an appropriate measure of disease risk based 
on apparent prevalence. When the sensitivity and specificity of the test are known, 
apparent prevalence may be converted into apparent true prevalence (ATPt), using 
Equation 4.9, which in turn will provide an estimate of the actual prevalence of disease 
in the herd of origin (M8rtin et'al., 1987). To overcome the problems mentioned above 
apparent true prevalence was used in the model as a proxy for disease risk. This 
approach assumes that producers use all available information to estimate the herd 
infection level. Direct comparisons are therefore permitted between a producer 
marketing cattle to sale as stores and slaughter without assuming an information bias 
associated with either marketing option. 
Actual Level OfDisease~ ATP' = (1- ('t\ + (1- 't
2
))) (4.9) 
The relationship between the average price for store cattle and the apparent 
true Tb prevalence in the herd was assumed to be a linear function (Equation 4.10). The 
price of store cattle is discounted according to the cattle herd's apparent true Tb 
prevalence (Equation 4.10). Herds with an apparent true Tb prevalence of zero would 
attract a market price equal to the maximum average price available for cattle of their 
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(4.10) 
The price-infection parameter (~) was obtained by manipulating Equation 4.10 and 
substituting in the minimum average price for rt and maximum. apparent true Tb 
prevalence (i) for ATPt to give, 
(4.11) 
The NPMS makes it increasingly difficult for cattle from herds with a high Tb 
incidence to move other than to slaughter. High risk herds are initially classified as 
those with an annual Tb incidence of 5% or greater. It was assumed that cattle from a 
herd with an apparent infection level of greater than i would only be permitted to be 
marketed to slaughter. As a consequence, the highest apparent true Tb prevalence 
associated with cattle sent to sale as stores (i) was set at 4.99%. At this level of herd 
infection the sale price (rMin) would equal the maximum discounted average price 
available for the relevant class of cattle from infected herds. To reflect the price-
infection risk response in the store cattle market the model includes an equation for the 
average price of cattle sold as stores (Equation 4.12) based on Equation 4.10. 
'. "j ---:-~ -'--
(4.12) 
The amount by which store cattle from movement controlled herds in the study 
area "have been discounted at sale range between zero and $100 per head (Dunham, 
1995; Nicol, personal communication). Information on maximum discounts in recent 
.. - .:-:-
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years suggest a base run level for ro of 10% of the clear herd sale price or approximately 
$47. 
Although the cattle production system does not have a comparative advantage in 
fattening cattle it was assumed that cattle can be sold to slaughter. To avoid many 
additional assumptions, and to overcome difficulties in obtaining a consistent data set 
for the price of low weight cattle slaughtered, the price of prime cattle sold at the 
regional sale yards was used as a proxy for slaughter price. Combining information on 
the lowest price per kilogram for prime cattle sold at Addington with appropriate cattle 
live weight profiles and dressing out ratios resulted in an average price per head for 
cattle slaughtered (P3) of $516 (New Zealand Farmer, 1995-1996; Beef New Zealand, 
1997). 
4.3.1.3 Slaughter Levy 
A levy of $8.71 is charged on all adult cattle slaughtered to recover the beef 
cattle sector's share of Tb disease control costs. The slaughter levy (1) was set at this 
level. 
4.3.1.4 Salvage Value 
The carcass of an infected cattle beast sold to slaughter may either be entirely 
.;.-', 
condemned, for which the producer is paid nothing, or partially condemned and the 
producer receives payment for the portion of the carcass graded as manufacturing beef. 
In previous studies, the average value to the producer of an infected carcass has ranged 
from 35% (Scott and Forbes, 1988) to 37.5% of market value (Dunham, 1995). Given 
that Scott and Forbes used survey data, a salvage value of35% was selected. 
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4.3.1.5 Variable Costs 
Variable cost data was obtained from the Financial Budget Manual. Gross 
margin analysis for the Canterbury area indicated a direct expenditure of $2.73 per 
stock unit for a cattle breeding system that carried marketing stock through to rising 
two year olds (Burtt and Fleming, 1992 & 1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and 
Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 1996). Applying stock unit equivalents used in the gross margin 
analysis to the hypothetical production system resulted in an average cattle beast being 
approximately 4.9 stock units. Because the herd size and proportions of different cattle 
classes were assumed to be constant in the model the variable cost of cattle (VI) was set 
at $13.48. 
The model inCludes an additional component to variable costs to reflect the cost 
of fattening marketing cattle to a condition required for slaughter (V2). Grazing charges 
were assumed to represent the opportunity cost of fattening cattle. The cost per week 
for grazing steers in Canterbury was calculated at $3.25 (Burtt and Fleming, 1992 & 
1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 1996). The grazing cost 
per week was multiplied over 16 weeks, the assumed additional fattening period, to 
give a total grazing cost for marketable cattle slaughtered of $52.00 per head. 
4.3.1.6 Tb Testing Costs and Compensation 
Two types of Tb testing are distinguished in the model; whole herd testing and 
movement control testing. The Tb testing programme for cattle from infected herds 
requires the interval between whole herd tests to be greater than two months but not 
exceed twelve months. The model assumes a whole herd test interval of twelve months 
and accordingly'll is set at 1. With respect to movement control Tb testing, the base-run 
reflects a policy environment where testing is mandatory and therefore the control 
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variable MCt and the pre-movement test parameter for cattle purchased (,,) were 
initially set at 1. Consequently, when MCt and " are set at 1 all eligible cattle in the 
herd are subjected to movement control Tb testing events and all cattle purchased are 
treated as having undergone pre-movement Tb testing prior to being sold. 
The direct costs of Tb testing are currently funded by the cattle slaughter levy. 
There is, however, the opportunity cost of time involved in moving cattle to and from 
the yards for an injection of tuberculin and then returning at a later date for the injection 
site to be interpreted. A survey of representative cattle production systems in North 
Canterbury suggested a Tb testing cost of$3.53 per animal for a farm of approximately 
1500 hectares when the opportunity cost of time is valued at $10 per hour (Dunham, 
1995). The cost ofTb testing (d.) was therefore set at $3.53. 
Compensation is paid for reactor cattle at 65% of the fair market value for all 
test positive animals slaughtered. The rate at which susceptible and infected cattle react 
to the tuberculin test ('tl and't2) is determined by the test's specificity and sensitivity, 
respectively. Recent field estimates of the sensitivity of a single intra-dermal caudal 
fold tuberculin test ranged from 75% to 85% while the test's specificity was estimated 
to be greater than 99.6% (Pharo and Livingstone, 1997).3 Animal health specialists 
familiar with the study region suggest, however, a more conservative range for test 
sensitivity of between 70% and 80% and specificity of 95% to 99% (Crews, personal 
communication). Based on these estimates, the values for true and false positive reactor 
cattle ('tl and 't2) were set at 75% and 1%, respectively. 
3 Earlier estimates from field trials suggested that the single intra-dermal caudal fold tuberculin test had a sensitivity 
of 66% and a specificity of98% (Ryan, de Lisle and Wood, 1991). A more recent study into the within herd spread 
of Tb by Kean (1993) adopted a higher value for test specificity of 99.7% as suggested by Livingstone and Davidson 
(1993). 
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4.3.1. 7 Possum Control Cost 
Tb vector risk areas may be comprised of several vector control zones. The 
possible zones are vector buffer zones, endemic zones, vector control zones, and vector 
eradication zones. The application and form of coordinated vector control operations 
varies according to the zone. Notwithstanding the possibility of coordinated vector 
control, the NPMS places responsibility for on farm vector control primarily with the 
cattle producer. The control of on farm possum populations using shooting, poisoning 
and trapping is a common activity amongst cattle producers in North Canterbury 
(Dunham, 1995). 
The objective function includes a cost function for possum harvest, Equation 
4.13, which was speCified and- estimated in an earlier study by Bicknell (1995). The 
specification was based on a general harvest function and parameter estimates used data 
on possums killed, harvest effort and initial possum density relating to ground control 
activities in New Zealand. The harvest function describes an inverse relationship 
between the density of possums and the cost of harvest. An additional constraint has 
been added to the model (Equation 4.5) to prevent the entire possum population being 
harvested in a single period. This constraint is not considered unduly restrictive as 
eradicating the possum population would be prohibitively expensive. 
( )
2 
PH =_h_ H, 
I 6.449 P, 
(4.13) 
An estimate of the average cost of time hunting possums (h) was obtained from 
Dunham's (1995) study. Results from farmer interviews showed that for a 1500 hectare 
hill country farm total annual labour and material costs for Tb vector control were 
$9,895 and $2,301, respectively. Using hourly labour costs of $10 for farm labour and 
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$15 for contract labour the average hourly labour cost for vector control was $12.75. 
Averaging annual material costs over the number of hours spent on vector control 
produced a material cost per hour of $2.96. Assuming an average control session of 6 
hours duration h was set at $94.26. 
4.3.2 Equations of Motion 
A year of cattle production is assumed to commence at the beginning of July 
and run through to the end of June. The periodic events leading to changes in the herd 
are described mathematically by the equations of motion and illustrated in Figure 4.1. 
Not all the events portrayed in Figure 4.1 are relevant to both breeding and marketing 
components of the herd. For instance "calves weaned" entering the herd relates solely to 
marketing cattle while "calves weaned" leaving the herd relates to the breeding group. 
Figure 4.1 Sequencing of Production and Tb Testing Events 
Whole-Herd 
Testing 
Pre-Movement 
& In-contact 
Testing 
Post-Movement 
Testing 
~--------"------~-------------------4~~H .. e.rd.~.l~ I 
Store Sales to Calves 
Calving Sales Slaughter Weaned Purchases 
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4.3.2.1 Herd Composition and Natural Growth 
Cattle are assumed to be managed in a single herd in which the breeding and 
marketing components are distinguished as fixed proportions. Decomposition of similar 
representative cattle systems used in gross margin analysis indicated that 65% of cattle 
were in the breeding component and 35% were in the marketable component (Burtt and 
Fleming, 1992 & 1994; Fleming and Burtt, 1993; Oliver and Burtt, 1995; Burtt, 1996). 
The value of B was therefore set at 65%. 
The natural reproductive growth of breeding cattle depends on the percentage of 
the "breeding cattle" which are productive and their corresponding calving rate 
(Equation 4.14). Survey data indicated breeding herd replacement rates of 
approximately 16% and death' rates due to natural mortality of 3% for adult cattle 
(NZMWBES, 1992-1996). On properties in North Canterbury it is not uncommon for 
breeding herd replacement heifers to be mated in their second year and calve in their 
third year (Dunham, 1995). A percentage for the breeding herd which are potentially 
productive of 81 % was obtained by deducting from the breeding component the 19% 
replaced in the previous period. The percentage of the breeding cattle which are actually 
productive (~) was calculated as 67% using a calving percentage of 83% (NZMWBES, 
1992-1996). It was further assumed that 50% of calves would be heifers. 
(4.14) 
4.3.2.2 Tb Transmission 
The flux terms PIStIt and P2StPt are used in the model to capture the 
transmission of Tb from infectious cattle and infectious possums to susceptible cattle 
within the herd, respectively. Following Bicknell (1995) the study used a parameter for 
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cattle to cattle transmission (p 1) of 3 and a possum to cattle transmission parameter (P2) 
of 0.003.4 
4.3.2.3 Cattle Purchases 
Survey data indicated that the average stocking rate for cattle on a South Island 
hill country farm was 0.15134 head per hectare (NZMWBES, 1992-1996). It was 
assumed that this stocking rate represented the profit maximising level for this class of 
farm. To avoid the need for another control variable in the model the producer was 
assumed to purchase each period the number of cattle required to maintain the herd at 
its profit maximising stocking rate (K1). This assumption also ensures that the breeding 
and marketable proportions of the herd remain constant over time. 
As identified previously, cattle from herds classified as "infected" may be sold 
to producers with "infected" herds in vector risk areas providing apparent infection is 
less than 5%. The relationship between herd infection levels and cattle price posited in 
Chapter 3 and in Section 4.3.1.2 is used in the mathematical representations of the 
proportions of cattle purchased that are susceptible (Equation 4.15) and infected 
(Equation 4.16). 
(4.15) 
(4.16) 
Assuming the same relationships between maximum and minimum store cattle 
prices and apparent true herd infection levels for sales and purchases of cattle, the 
4 In Bicknell's (1995) study PI was based on modelling results from Kean (1993) and P2 was calibrated to match 
observed prevalence levels given a lack of empirical research which would support a more precise measure. 
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equations for susceptible and infected cattle purchased were derived from Equations ., ~ ~~~~,. :~-~,~ ~ ~~~~~~;:~iL;: 
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4.10 and 4.11. The market price paid for weaner cattle (APPt) is substituted for the store 
cattle price received (rt) and the price of clear herd store weaners (PI) is substituted for 
the price of clear herd rising two year olds (P2) (Equation 4.17). Rearrangement of 
Equation 4.17 permits the apparent true prevalence in the herd from which cattle are 
purchased to be obtained (Equation 4.18) using the relationship expressed in Equation 
4.19. The term PI(1-ro) is the fully discounted market price of weaner cattle and 
replaces rMin in Equation 4.11. 
APp, = PI + (,ATP' (4.17) 
ATP = APp,-'-PI' (4.18) 
~ .. 
I ~ 
where, 
~= PI - PI (1- ro ) (4.19) -i 
The factor 1-11't2 in Equations 4.15 and 4.16 acknowledges that if cattle purchased have 
been subjected to a pre-movement test then the proportion of diseased animals, as 
indicated by the apparent true prevalence, will be reduced by the percentage of true 
positive reactors. 
It was assumed that apparent true infection corresponds to actual infection 
levels for cattle purchased. Therefore while the actual true prevalence adjusted for pre-
" .. .:;,., 
movement testing gives the proportion of infected cattle purchased the remaining 
proportion relates to susceptible cattle entering the herd. Modeling cattle purchases in 
this manner provided a direct relationship between the purchase price chosen by the 
producer and the proportions of infected and susceptible cattle entering the herd. The 
:'-·r. 
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producer's decision to purchase discounted cattle was therefore presented as the 
decision to "buy-in" infection. 
4.3.2.4 In-Contact Testing 
. In-contact testing was incorporated into the model using Equation 4.20 which 
describes the relationship between the percentage of the herd presented for in-contact 
testing and the percentage of marketable cattle selected for sale as stores. It was 
assumed that a positive relationship existed between these two mobs of cattle. Equation 
4.20 provides a general specification of the relationship between store sales and cattle 
in-contact tested while allowing testing to switch off when there are no stores sold. If 
no cattle are marketed (Ft = 0) then z = 0 which implies that no in-contact Tb testing is 
undertaken. The implication for herd Tb prevalence arising from producers separating 
cattle into smaller groups is explored by adjusting the value of the in-contact test 
parameter «J). As (J increases from zero the percentage of the herd not being sold as 
stores that are in-contact tested increases. For large values of (J the percentage of the 
herd tested approaches 100%. An in-contact test parameter of 250 was selected for the 
base-run to ensure that the simplest scenario of all cattle in one herd. 
(4.20) 
4.3.2.5 Possum Population Growth 
Following previous studies on the impact of control and harvest on possum 
populations, Equation 4.21 was used to describe the growth of the possum population 
(~lout and Barlow, 1982; Barlow and Clout, 1983; Hickling and Pekelharing, 1989). 
The parameters a, K2, and 8 provide values for the intrinsic growth rate of the 
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the impact of resource constraints, respectively. 
(4.21) 
Clout and Barlow (1982) estimated a value for a of 0.3 and for K2 of 3. These 
values were adopted in the model. With respect to the value of the impact of resource 
constraints Barlow and Clout (1983) suggested that for New Zealand possum 
populations e is likely to be greater than one, and therefore more control effort is 
required to maintain a low popUlation density than indicated by symmetric logistic 
models. Preliminary modelling. indicated that a symmetric logistic function could be i' -
i· .-
I 
used without materially affecting results and thereby reduce non-linearity. Clark (1990) 
and Hone (1994) state that analyses of the control and harvesting of vertebrate species 
often employ a symmetric logistic function in which e is equal to one. Consequently e 
was set equal to 1. 
4.4 Solution Technique 
The empirical problem was specified in a non-linear programming format 
whereby control and state variables were represented as activities and non-linear 
equations of motion were represented as constraints linking activities in subsequent 
periods. The empirical model represented by Equations 4.1-4.7 was solved numerically 
over a 70 year period (T=70) using GAMS/MINOS (Brooke et al., 1988 and 1996) 
software on an IBM-PC clone. 
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4.5 Preliminary Results 
The preliminary results for the empirical model are displayed in Table 4.2. The 
simulation assumes a Tb policy environment in which movement control Tb testing is 
mandatory. It is also assumed that the herd is currently classified as Tb infected with an 
initial actual Tb prevalence of 2%. 
Total herd size at the beginning of each period averages 237 cattle which 
implies that the number of cattle in the breeding and marketing components is 154 and 
83, respectively. Marketing decisions follow a "bang-bang" control approach with on 
average 80.37 marketing cattle sold as stores and none marketed to slaughter. When 
cull cows are added to sales,a total of 104.5 cattle are sold each period. NZMWBES 
survey data for the period 1990/91 to 1994/95 show that an average of 87 cattle were 
sold with annual sale numbers ranging from 84 to 91 (NZMWBES, 1992-1996). The 
slightly higher sales in the base run is due to the assumption that all marketable cattle 
are sold in their second year. The average price received for store cattle is $470.56, 
which is $11.44 lower than the maximum average price for this class of cattle, 
reflecting an average apparent true Tb prevalence for the total herd of 1.18%. 
. An average of 11.27 weaner cattle are purchased each period as a result of 
surplus stocking capacity due to sales of marketable and cull cattle and reactors 
detected at whole herd, pre-movement and in-contact testing. The NZMWBES five year 
average for cattle purchases is 12 with a range of 7 to 17 (NZMWBES, 1992-1996). 
The purchase price of $314.10 also corresponds to a "bang-bang" control at the 
maximum discounted price for weaner cattle. The fully discounted market price of store 
cattle applies to cattle from herds with the highest permissible level of infection. This 
purchase price implies therefore that the producer has chosen to allow the maximum 
possible amount of infection into the herd through store cattle purchased. Possum 
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numbers average 1.97 per hectare with 10.25% of the possum population harvested 
annually through control activities. As a result of all the cattle production activities 
average net revenue is $24.66 per hectare which corresponds to $38,643 per year for the 
cattle enterprise. 
Table 4.2 Preliminary Results 
Variable Steady State 
Values 
Herd Size 237 
PossumslHectare 1.97 
Possum Harvest Rate 10.25% 
Marketable_ Cattle Slaughtered 0 
I' 
Susceptible Cattle Sold as Stores 80.31 
I--
I 
Infected Cattle Sold as Stores 0.06 I , -
: 
Susceptible Cattle Purchased 11.13 
Infected Cattle Purchased 0.14 
Average Store Cattle Sale Price $470.56 
Average Weaner Purchase Price $314.10 
Annual Net Revenue $38,643 
Actual Herd Tb Prevalence 1.18% 
Apparent True Herd Tb Prevalence 1.18% 
Apparent Herd Tb Prevalence at WHT 1.88% 
Reactors at Whole Herd Test 4.45 
Reactors at Pre-Movement Test 1.00 
Reactors at In-Contact Test 1.85 
Reactors at Post-Movement Test 0.22 
Marginal Value of Susceptible Cattle $484.83 
Marginal Value of Infected Cattle -$562.33 
Marginal Value of Possums -$1.65 
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The marginal values in Table 4.2 represent the average marginal change to 
current and future net revenue from a marginal change in each of the state variables. 
The marginal values for susceptible and infected cattle are influenced by the current 
level of herd prevalence, the rate at which infection is spread within the herd, the 
average store cattle price, the number of reactors removed at testing events, and the 
reproductive growth in the herd. The marginal value for susceptible cattle is $484.83, 
which is slightly higher than the price for clear herd store cattle, while the marginal 
value for infected cattle is - $562.33. 
The marginal value for susceptible cattle reflects the positive contribution 
susceptible cattle make to the value of the herd through reproduction and a higher 
average store cattle price arising from the reduction in the apparent true infection level. 
The increased value of the herd is offset to an extent by the negative contribution 
susceptible cattle make to the future spread of infection through the herd by increasing 
density and the reduced value arising from false positive reactors at Tb testing. 
The large negative marginal value for infected cattle is due to an additional 
infected animal increasing apparent Tb prevalence both currently and in the future by 
increasing the spread ofTb through the herd. The higher apparent prevalence negatively 
affects the store cattle price for all cattle sold. Both susceptible and infected cattle incur 
reductions in value when they react at a Tb testing event because compensation is only 
65% of fair market value and therefore less than the average store cattle price. Although 
1.1-. 
the compensation for false and true positive reactors is the same, the sensitivity and 
specificity of the Tb test results in an infected animal impacting more on the value of 
the herd because it has a greater chance of reacting than a susceptible. The greater 
reduction in value caused by a true positive reactor is offset to a degree by a reduction 
in the spread of infection in the herd. The net revenue from cows culled is also affected 
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because infected cull cows only return their salvage value while susceptible culls return 
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their full value. As with susceptible cattle, an additional infected cattle beast contributes 
to the natural growth of its population. However, because the whole herd test is 
assumed to occur prior to calving and the reactor rate for infected cattle is greater than 
that for susceptible cattle, infected cows which are in-calf react and are removed form 
the herd at a relatively greater rate than is the case for susceptible cows. Although the 
loss of the cow is compensated for no compensation is received for the calf. As a 
consequence of these factors the marginal value of infected cattle is substantially 
negative. 
The possum population has a marginal value of -$1.65. This reflects the positive 
relationship between -the number of possums and both the cost of possum control 
, 
activities together with their contribution to reduced cattle values as a result of Tb " 
transmission into the herd. An additional possum only has a small effect on the spread 
of infection into the cattle herd because the rate of Tb transmission from possums is 
very low. Consequently, the marginal value of possums is slightly negative in line with 
the low level of costs arising from increased infection in the herd and the producer's 
response in the form of increased harvesting effort. 
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Chapter 5: The Economics of Bovine Tuberculosis Movement Control 
Policy 
5.1 Introduction 
Preliminary results from the empirical model showed that herd Tb prevalence 
was reduced from initial levels of 2% through the Tb testing requirements imposed on 
the producer by the NPMS, together with the decision by the producer to undertake 
possum control. This chapter considers the behavioural responses of a cattle producer 
who is constrained by movement control restrictions and the implications, if any, for 
bovine Tbcontrol policy objectives. The factors influencing cattle production and Tb 
control that are considered include; the level of infected herd price discounting in the 
store cattle market, the producer's response to "in-contact" testing, the impact of the 
"High Risk" infected herd threshold level, and the role of reactor compensation. An 
attempt is also made to estimate the costs of complying with movement control 
restrictions. The policy simulations are followed by an exploratory analysis into the . 
association between price discounting and herd infection levels in an environment 
where movement control Tb testing is voluntary. The chapter concludes with sensitivity 
analysis of the key parameters. 
5.2 Store Cattle Price Discounting 
As discussed in Chapter 3, cattle sold as stores are often discounted ifthe cattle 
have come from an infected herd. Economic theory suggests that the discount on the 
price of cattle from infected herds should equal the expected cost of bringing disease 
into the herd. The expected cost of disease includes the reduced value of infected cattle 
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purchased when they are either identified at testing or at slaughter, and the cost arising 
from susceptible cattle in the herd becoming infected. 
Following observed behaviour the empirical model assumes that a risk neutral 
producer would discount the average price of a group of cattle purchased by a 
maximum of 10% if the corresponding herd had an apparent prevalence of 4.99%. The 
preliminary results indicated that· when the maximum market discount is 10% the 
producer sends all marketed cattle to sale as stores, thereby incurring some discount on 
the price, and avoiding the additional grazing costs that would be incurred if the cattle 
were fattened for sale to slaughter. Given that the price of cattle from infected herds has 
been discounted to varying extents on occasions, the assumption of a 10% discount is 
relaxed and replaced by maximum discounts to the store cattle price of 5%, 15%, 20%, 
25% and 30%. 
Figure 5.1 Store Cattle Price Discount-Infection Relationship 
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F or each of the percentage discounts mentioned above, the appropriate 
maximum discount parameter (ro) is entered in the model. The effect of these changes 
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on the price-infection relationship for the 5% and 30% discount regimes is illustrated in 
Figure 5.1. Increasing the discount increases the slope of the price-infection line. 
Therefore, for any given level of apparent herd Tb prevalence, a higher discount will 
result in a lower average store cattle price. 
Table 5.1 Steady State Values for Store Cattle Price Discount Regimes 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 
PossumslHectare 2.21 1.97 1.76 
Possum Harvest Rate 7.89% 10.25% 12.43% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 
Cattle Sold as Stores 80.27 80.37 80.47 
Cattle Purchased 11.57 11.27 11.00 
Average Store Cattle $475.63 $470.56 $466.67 
Sale Pricel 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.65 
Cattle Purchase Price2 
Net RevenuelHectare $24.80 $24.66 $24.56 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.32% 1.18% 1.06% 
Marginal Value $503.07 $484.83 $467.13 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$277.64 -$562.33 -$849.27 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.13 -$1.65 -$2.25 
Possums 
The average pnce the producer receives If cattle are sold as stores. 
2 Always purchased at the maximum discounted price. 
20% 25% 
1.56 2.51 
14.41% 4.93% 
0 80.91 
80.56 0 
10.74 10.85 
$463.76 $435.26 
$279.20 $261.75 
$24.49 $24.77 
0.94% 1.94% 
$449.86 $430.91 
-$1138.14 -$43.53 
-$2.94 -$0.62 
30% 
2.54 
4.61% 
80.90 
0 
10.90 
$425.23 
$244.30 
$24.89 
1.96% 
$413.99 
-$28.45 
-$0.57 
Table 5.1 displays results for the different levels of discount. The producer 
markets all marketable cattle to sale as stores for all discount regimes up to and 
including 20%. With respect to cattle purchases, the producer has an incentive to 
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purchase cattle at the maximum discounted pnce and therefore chooses to allow 
infected animals to enter the herd. 
When cattle are sold as stores, the actual Tb prevalence in the herd is inversely 
related to the level of store cattle price discount. As highlighted in Table 5.1, increases 
in the price discount lowers the average price received for any given level of herd Tb 
prevalence. Under a 10% discount regime, when the herd's actual prevalence is 1.18%, 
the producer receives an average price of $470.56 per head of store cattle. When the 
price discount is 20% infection in the herd becomes more costly and therefore greater 
effort is taken to control it. Although actual prevalence is lowered to 0.94% the average 
price received for store cattle is reduced to $463.76. Figure 5.2 illustrates that it is in the 
producer' sbest -interest to continue to purchase cattle at the maximum discount and I \ ,.. ,,~~. , 
1"," 
reduce herd Tb prevalence as the maximum price discount increases. The lower 
purchase price ofweaner cattle from Tb infected herd's, and the higher store cattle sale 
price arising from reducing Tb infection in the herd, provide an increasing margin 
between the sale and purchase price of store cattle as the price discount increases. 
Figure 5.2 Margin Between Store Cattle Price and Weaner Purchase Price 
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The lower average price associated with a higher store cattle price discount 
regime is reflected in the increasingly negative marginal value of an infected cattle " . ".-,-.'-.-.-. 
beast (Table 5.1). Although the producer has an incentive to purchase cattle at the 
maximum price discount, it is the higher cost of infection that arises as the store cattle 
price discount increases that motivates the producer to reduce the herd's Tb prevalence. 
Reductions in the transmission of infection into the herd can be achieved either through 
purchasing mobs of weaner cattle with lower infection risk at a higher price or by 
undertaking greater levels of possum control. Results suggest that the opportunity cost 
- .: " 
of not purchasing weaner cattle at their maximum discount is too large and therefore the 
producer reduces transmission of infection into the herd by increasing the possum 
harvest rate. Figure 5.3 illustrates the steady state impact of the store cattle price 
.~; . 
discount regime on annual net revenue and herd Tb prevalence. 
In response to the lower average prices that would be received if cattle were 
sold as stores under the 25% and 30% discount regimes the producer chooses to incur 
the additional grazing costs and send cattle to slaughter. Taking into account grazing 
costs the average price received for slaughtered cattle is $401.29 when the maximum' 
discount is 25% and $401.33 under the 30% discount regime. When cattle are marketed 
to slaughter the herd's Tb infection level does not impact on net revenue to the extent it 
does when cattle are sold as stores. Susceptible cattle return their full market value to 
the producer while infected cattle return only a salvage value. The value of a 
cattle. The producer therefore trades-off the benefits of sending less infected cattle to 
slaughter, the difference between salvage value and full slaughter value, with the costs 
of achieving lower herd infection levels. Results show that when marketing cattle are 
sent to slaughter the steady state herd Tb prevalence is higher. The increase in Tb 
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prevalence is due to a greater number of possums arising from a reduction in the 
possum harvest rate, and the removal of fewer infected cattle because fewer Tb testing 
events are undertaken. 
Figure 5.3 Steady State Net Revenue and Herd Tb Prevalence Under Maximum Store 
Cattle Price Discount Regimes 
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The marginal values relating to the cattle and possum populations also disclose 
interesting information when the different discount regimes are compared. The 
marginal values for susceptible and infected cattle decline as the store cattle price 
discount increases, when cattle are sold as stores. Recall that the marginal values relate 
to each cattle population's contribution to current and future earnings of the cattle 
enterprise. The inverse relationship between the marginal values of susceptible and 
infected cattle, and the magnitude of the store cattle price discount is due to the impact 
of an additional cattle beast on the average price received for store cattle 
Susceptible and infected cattle affect the current level of Tb prevalence within 
the herd and therefore impact on current net revenue. An additional susceptible cattle 
beast reduces the current level of herd Tb prevalence and thereby increases the average 
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price received for store cattle (Figure 5.1). The marginal increase in the average store 
price resulting from a reduction in herd Tb prevalence becomes larger as the store cattle 
'" ~ -.-:~ -
price discount increases. However, ceteris paribus the average store cattle price 
decreases as the maximum price discount increases if the herd has an apparent Tb 
infection level greater than zero. As a consequence of the change in, and the actual level 
of, the store cattle price the marginal contribution of a susceptible cattle beast to current 
revenue is positive but declines as the maximum store cattle price discount increases. 
Conversely, an additional infected cattle beast increases the current level of Tb 
prevalence in the herd. The higher herd Tb prevalence reduces the average store cattle 
price received. The average store cattle price is also adversely impacted by increases in 
the maximum price discount. As a result, the negative marginal value of infected cattle 
increases, when cattle are sold as stores, as the store cattle price discount becomes 
larger. 
The marginal values of susceptible and infected cattle are their lowest and 
highest, respectively, under the 30% discount regime. An additional infected animal has 
relatively less impact on the marketing proceeds when cattle are sent to slaughter 
compared to when cattle are sold as stores. Unlike the situation when cattle are sold as 
stores, the adverse impact on herd Tb prevalence does not affect the price received for 
all other marketing cattle sold to slaughter. Correspondingly, an additional susceptible 
cattle beast will not bring about the same degree of change to the average marketing 
revenue, through a lower herd prevalence, as would be achieved if cattle were sold as 
stores. 
In addition to the marginal impacts on current revenue, both susceptible and 
'-<" ~ .. , ; • : . 
infected cattle contribute to the future spread of Tb within the herd and therefore 
adversely impact on future net revenue. The extent of the impact on future revenue 
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from additional susceptible and infected cattle increases as the maximum level of price 
discount increases. 
The marginal value of the possum population is negative under all discount 
regimes reflecting the role possums have in spreading Tb into the herd. The marginal 
value of a possum is related to the transmission of infection into the herd. As the price 
discount on store cattle increases the cost of an extra possum becomes greater if cattle 
are sold as stores. The producer therefore increases the harvest rate to reduce the 
transmission of infection and lower herd Tb prevalence. The marginal value (or 
economic cost) of possums is lowest when cattle are marketed to slaughter because an 
infected cattle beast does not impact on the price of all cattle marketed. It is under the 
30% pricediscount regime that the possum population reaches its greatest number. The 
producer trades-off the high level of price discount on cattle purchased and reduction in 
possum control costs against the costs incurred through higher herd Tb prevalence 
levels. 
5.3 Splitting the Herd 
It has been suggested that cattle producers may respond to in-contact testing 
requirements by dividing herds further and thereby reducing the proportion of the herd 
exposed to a testing event (Crews, personal communication). The most extreme case of 
herd splitting is when the cattle to be marketed in each period are kept separate from the 
remainder of the herd. This situation is modeled by setting the value of the "in-contact" 
test parameter (0-) to zero.5 Steady state values are presented in Table A.I. 
5 Other potential management costs such as those resulting from increased mustering effort and sub-optimal grazing 
regimes which may result from maintaining an in-farm quarantine system are ignored. 
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Numerical results disclose there is an economic incentive for the producer to 
avoid the in-contact test (Figure 5.4). Higher revenues than those occurring under the 
base scenarios arise from reductions in the cattle management costs associated with 
testing cattle in the herd that are not being sold, the value of false positive cattle that 
would have been removed and slaughtered at the "in-contact" test, and the purchase 
cost of cattle to replace them. Elimination of the in-contact test, however, provides a 
greater opportunity for an infected animal to persist in the herd and hence Tb 
prevalence is greater when cattle destined for store sale remain separated from the rest 
of the herd. This observation highlights a conflict between the social and private 
objectives of Tb control. Producers can increase their revenue (private benefit) by 
avoiding Tb testing even though'herd infection levels increase (social cost). 
Figure 5.4 Steady State Net Revenue: No Herd Splitting vs Herd Splitting 
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5.4 A Lower "High Risk" Herd Infection Threshold ,;:.>.:~-:~ ." .. 
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A major implication for the producer of having a herd classified as "High Risk" 
is that it may be not possible to market cattle as stores, or if it is possible, additional 
herd testing conditions must be satisfied. The NPMS states that the "High Risk" herd 
infection threshold level may be adjusted over the term of the strategy (AHB, 1995). To 
determine the consequences of a lower threshold level for the producer, the maximum 
apparent infection level parameter was reduced from 4.99% to 1.99%. At this level, the 
hypothetical herd would be classified as "High Risk" at the beginning of each 
simulation given an initial value for Tb prevalence of 2%. With respect to the store 
cattle price-infection relationship illustrated in Figure 5.1, lowering the "High Risk" 
herd infection threshold to 1.99% increases the slope of the price-infection line and 
thereby increases the extent to which the price discount impacts on the average store 
cattle price for a given level of herd Tb prevalence. 
The steady state values obtained from numerical results are detailed in Table 
A.2. The increased impact of the price discount on the average store cattle price results 
in the decision to switch from marketing cattle as stores to marketing to slaughter being 
made at a lower price discount than that in the base scenario. Figure 5.5 shows the 
impact of lowering the threshold on herd Tb prevalence. 
In response to the greater marginal effect of infection on the store cattle price, 
the producer ceases to market cattle as stores when the price discount regime is 10% or 
greater. When cattle are sold as stores, under a 5% discount, the producer is motivated 
to reduce herd Tb prevalence to 1.08%, which is below the base scenario's steady state 
level of 1.32%, in order to avoid too large a reduction in the average sale price 
($468.88). Under the lower threshold scenario the producer still chooses to reduce herd 
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Tb prevalence by controlling possums rather than through the purchase of mobs of 
cattle with lower infection status. 
Figure 5.5 Steady State Herd Tb Prevalence: Base Run vs Lower "High Risk" Threshold 
2.00 
1.75 
- 1.50 ~ 
GI 1.25 
'" c 
GI 1.00 iii 
> 
I!! 0.75 
Il. 
,Q 0.50 I-
0.25 
0.00 
5% 10% 15% 
Maximum Store Cattle Price Discount 
[ IE Base D Lower Threshold [ 
20% 
. The cost of reducing herd Tb prevalence to levels which would make marketing 
cattle to sale as stores attractive becomes too great when price discount levels are 10% 
and above. By adopting the strategy of sending cattle to slaughter the producer can off-
set the additional grazing costs with lower possum harvest costs and a higher value for 
susceptible cattle not removed as false positive reactors at pre-movement and "in-
contact" Tb testing. 
5.5 No Reactor Cattle Compensation 
The Animal Health Board has stated that reactor cattle compensation will be 
reviewed annually after the first two years of the NPMS (AHB, 1995). Several options 
for alternative reactor compensation schemes were considered by the Animal Health 
Board during the formulation of the current NPMS. These options ranged from the 
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payment of a fixed percentage of fair market value plus cartage for all reactor cattle 
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slaughtered, through to producers receiving only the carcass value of reactors 
slaughtered and paying their own cartage (Livingstone, 1995). 
To examine the impact of a change to reactor compensation policy on the 
production environment a "no compensation" scenario is simulated. Under the no 
compensation scenario it is assumed that the actual disease state of reactor cattle is 
identified at slaughter and therefore the producer either receives the full value of the 
animal's carcass if it is non-infected or its salvage value if it is infected. It is further 
assumed that under the no compensation option the producer will not have to pay for 
cartage of any reactor cattle sent to slaughter because the specificity of the tuberculin 
test will result in some non-infected cattle being sent. 
To reflect the change in basis from fair market value to carcass value, the live 
weight of a generic marketable cattle beast at the time of Tb testing is calculated and 
converted into a carcass value. The carcass value calculations used live weight and 
carcass weight data for a 12-14 month cattle beast (Beef New Zealand, 1997). The 
conversion uses the same price per kilogram as applied to marketing cattle that are 
slaughtered (New Zealand Farmer, 1995-1996; Beef New Zealand, 1997). Rather than 
create additional compensation parameters, the values for false positives and true 
positives (Yt and Y2) are changed from 65% and based on the percentage of the clear 
herd store cattle price (P2) that would correspond to a full payment of the carcass value 
or the salvage value, respectively. The salvage value of a carcass was assumed to be 
.. _ ..... _._ ... -.: 
35% of the carcass value (Scott and Forbes, 1988). Assuming the relationship between 
the carcass proceeds and the store cattle price is fixed, the carcass proceeds for weaner 
cattle are determined similarly. Consequently, the compensation parameter values under 
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the no compensation scenario are set at 0.77 for false positive reactors and 0.27 for true 
positive reactors. 
Table A.3 provides details of the steady state results obtained. The absence of 
compensation does not change the optimal marketing activities or purchasing strategies 
for any of the discount regimes analysed. Under a no compensation policy, the values of 
false and true positive reactor cattle increase by 18.46% and decline by 58.46%, 
respectively. The reduced value of a true positive reactor motivates the producer to 
lower actual Tb prevalence in the herd from levels in the base scenarios for all price 
discount regimes by increasing the possum harvest rate (Figure 5.6). 
Figure 5.6 . Steady State Herd l'b Prevalence: Reactor Compensation vs. No Reactor 
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Figure 5.7 shows net revenue is slightly less for all discount regimes, apart from 
the 20% price discount, when no compensation is paid. Although the average store 
cattle price is higher when compensation is absent it is not enough to offset increased 
possum harvest costs and the reduced value of infected cattle detected at testing. With 
respect to the 25% and 30% discount regimes, a significant cause of the lower net 
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revenue is the higher cost arising from a 47% and 51 % increase in possums harvested 
annually at the steady state, respectively. 
Figure 5.7 Steady State Net Revenue: Reactor Compensation vs. No Reactor 
Compensation 
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5.6 The Economic Impact of Movement Control Regulations 
30% 
Under the NPMS producers with infected herds incur a number of costs. Some 
costs are the result of either restrictions placed on the movement of cattle, as discussed· 
in Chapter 2, or the extent of the market discount imposed on the price of store cattle. 
There are also costs associated with undertaking the required Tb testing activities; pre-
movement, in-contact and post-movement testing. The simplifying assumptions 
employed in the model concerning the age and sex structure of the herd, and the 
homogeneity of the cattle sold, do not permit the non-testing costs to be fully captured. 
The model does, however, allow insight to be gained into the direct and indirect 
compliance costs of movement control Tb testing. 
The analysis of movement control testing compliance costs is undertaken by 
removing the restriction which imposes movement control testing on the system and 
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permitting it to become a choice variable (MCt) in the model. The difference between 
the net revenue obtained under mandatory and voluntary movement control testing 
regimes provides an estimate of compliance costs that captures the direct and some of 
the indirect costs. Because the relationship between price and apparent infection used in 
the model assumes cattle purchased have been pre-movement tested, this assumption is 
extended to the voluntary movement control testing regime. However, to capture the 
value to the producer of the pre-movement test on cattle purchased (pre-movement 
testing benefit), two voluntary movement control testing scenarios are compared. The 
first assumes the cattle purchased have undergone a pre-movement test and the second 
assumes they have not. These scenarios are represented in the model by setting the 
movement control parameter (11) to one and zero, respectively. Comparative results for 
movement control compliance costs and pre-movement testing benefits for the different 
price discount simulations are shown in Figure 5.8 and presented in Table AA. 
Figure 5.8 Annual Movement Control Compliance Costs and Pre-movement Testing 
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Numerical results suggest that the cost imposed on the producer from 
mandatory movement control testing is negatively correlated with the level of price 
discount when cattle are sold as stores. This relationship arises because under the 
discount regimes in which cattle are sold as stores, Tb prevalence declines as the price 
discount increases. When prevalence is high more cattle react at Tb testing events and 
are subsequently slaughtered due to changes in the composition of false and true 
positive reactors. Because the value of a cattle beast sold as a store is greater than the 
amount of reactor compensation received, the total opportunity cost of reactor cattle at 
high prevalence levels is greater than at lower prevalence levels. If movement control 
testing is voluntary, results indicate that the producer will not choose to undertake the 
full range of tests that are required under mandatory movement control testing (Table 
A5). Given the assumption employed in the model that either all movement control 
tests are performed or none, this decision amounts to no movement control testing 
being undertaken. Consequently, cattle that would have been removed under mandatory 
movement control testing generate a higher return to the producer from being sold as 
stores. 
The value to the producer of the pre-movement test on cattle purchased is 
disclosed by the pre-movement testing benefit in Figure 5.8. The value of the pre-
movement test on cattle purchased is positively related to the level of discount when 
cattle are sold as stores. If a pre-movement test is not undertaken the actual level of 
infection that is brought into the herd is higher if cattle are purchased at the maximum 
discount. When purchased cattle are not pre-movement tested the producer cannot 
trade-off the costs arising from infected cattle entering the herd with the benefits of the 
maximum discounted price and therefore buys mostly clear herd cattle at the full price 
(Table A.7). The trade-off between the discounted price and infection is, however, 
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worthwhile when purchased cattle are pre-movement tested. The benefit obtained by 
the producer from the price discount therefore increases with the magnitude of the 
discount and as a result the value of the pre-movement test increases as the discount 
increases. 
At higher discounts, when cattle are sold to slaughter, there is a negative 
relationship between the value of the pre-movement test and the price discount regime 
(Figure 5.8). Because the level of herd Tb prevalence does not impact on the average 
slaughter price to the extent it does on the average store price the producer is motivated 
to purchase cattle at the maximum discounted price and undertake post-movement 
testing to reduce infection levels. As the price discount increases, the correspondingly 
lower purchase price of weaner cattle reduces purchase costs. The lower purchase cost 
helps reduce the adverse impact on net revenue arising from a higher level of infection 
entering the herd. 
5.7 Price Discounting and Herd Infection Levels 
The Animal Health Board anticipates that the information provided by the new 
herd Tb classification system will establish economic incentives that influence producer 
decisions regarding cattle purchases and management, and vector control, that may 
reduce the reliance on movement control regulations in the future (AHB, 1995). The 
economic incentives referred to relate to the livestock market valuing store cattle 
according to their disease risk. An interesting issue requiring exploratory analysis 
concerns the likely behavioural responses of producers and the implications for Tb 
prevalence when movement control testing is voluntary. Simulations are undertaken for 
voluntary movement control testing under reactor compensation and no compensation 
policies. The latter policy is included to provide a scenario in which producers incur 
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more fully the true cost of Tb infection in their herds. Steady state results are displayed 
in Tables A.5 and A.6. 
As was observed in Section 5.6, when compensation is paid, the producer 
increases net revenue by not undertaking movement control testing and thereby 
avoiding the opportunity cost of true and false positive reactor cattle. In response to an 
increase in Tb prevalence arising from a reduction in infected cattle removed from the 
herd as true positive reactors, possum harvest rates are increased from base run 
scenarios when cattle are marketed as stores. The increase in the possum harvest is not 
enough, however, to prevent herd Tb prevalence increasing relative to the mandatory 
. movement control testing scenario. 
Figure 5.9 Steady State Net Revenue for Voluntary Movement Control Testing: Reactor 
Compensation vs. No Reactor Compensation 
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Steady state results for voluntary movement control testing under a policy of no 
compensation for reactor cattle show that marketing and purchasing strategies remain 
the same as under a policy of reactor compensation. The significant difference between 
the two compensation policies is that herd Tb prevalence is lowered for all price 
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discounts analysed when no compensation is paid (Figure 5.10). However, Tb 
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prevalence is still higher than under a policy of mandatory testing. A comparison of the 
marginal value of infected cattle under the 5% to 30% discount regimes reveals large 
increases in the cost of an infected cattle beast when only a salvage value is returned to 
the producer. The producer's response to the higher cost of infection is to increase the 
possum harvest rate for all store cattle price discount regimes. No attempt is made to 
trade-off the cost ofweaners purchased with lower levels of infection. 
Figure 5.10 Steady State Herd Tb Prevalence for Voluntary Movement Control Testing: 
Reactor Compensation vs. No Reactor Compensation 
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Numerical results indicate that when movement control testing is voluntary and 
cattle are sold as stores, the benefits obtained by the producer from not undertaking a 
complete movement control testing program outweigh the benefits of maintaining lower 
herd infection levels. This observation suggests that under a voluntary movement 
control testing regime, producers are unlikely to pre-movement test cattle marketed as 
stores. Exploratory analysis into purchased cattle not being pre-movement tested (,,=0), 
reveals that when purchased cattle intended for subsequent sale as stores are not pre-
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movement tested, the costs arising from infected cattle entering the herd cannot be 
traded-off against the benefits of the maximum discounted price (Table A.7). Under 
these conditions the producer responds by purchasing clear herd cattle at the full price 
to prevent higher levels of Tb prevalence. This behavioural change may, however, be 
the result of the assumption that either all movement control testing is undertaken or 
none. 
Table 5.2 Producer's Behavioural Responses Under Voluntary Movement Control 
Testing 
Purchased Cattle Pre-movement Purchased Cattle Not Pre-
Tested movement Tested 
. Cattle Sold as Cattle Sold to Cattle Sold as Cattle Sold to 
Stores . Slaughter Stores Slaughter 
Infection Status of Highest Risk Highest Risk Clear Herd Highest Risk 
Cattle Purchased Pennissible Pennissible Pennissible 
Movement Control None None None Post-movement 
Testing 
Table 5.2 discloses how the purchasing and movement control testing strategies 
adopted by the producer under a voluntary movement control testing regime depend on . 
whether cattle are pre-movement tested and where they are eventually marketed. It is 
important to note that when pre-movement testing is not undertaken by the seller there 
is an incentive to purchase untested cattle from high risk herds and post-movement test 
if cattle are to be sold to slaughter. If the producer chooses to post-movement test cattle 
purchased then the specification of the model assumes that the producer will also 
choose to pre-movement test cattle sold as stores and in-contact test the remainder of 
the herd The costs of a complete movement control testing program when cattle are 
sold as stores are therefore likely to outweigh the benefits from obtaining a discounted 
price. 
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Numerical results imply that it is possible that producers marketing cattle as 
stores would continue to purchase cattle from infected herds and take advantage of the 
price discount if only post-movement testing could be performed. Results in Table A. 7 
disclose that there is an incentive for producers marketing cattle to slaughter to 
purchase and post-movement test cattle from herds with the highest permissible 
infection. Given that the gains to the producer from reducing infection in the herd are 
higher when cattle are marketed as stores, the incentive to purchase cattle at the 
maximum price discount and post-movement test is expected to be larger. It is therefore 
unlikely that producers would refrain from purchasing discounted infected herd cattle 
under voluntary movement control testing even if the cattle were not pre-movement 
tested. 
5.8 Sensitivity Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is conducted on the key parameters in the model to identify 
their material impact on steady-state/average results. The value of each parameter is 
changed while holding the values of all other parameters at the 10% price discount base 
run levels. The parameters examined are the disease transmission coefficients, the 
sensitivity and specificity of the tuberculin test, and possum harvest costs. 
5.8.1 Disease Transmission Coefficients 
Cattle to Cattle Disease Transmission 
The cattle to cattle disease transmission coefficient (~1) was set at values from 
zero to five. An increase in the rate at which Tb spreads between cattle lowers net 
revenue and increases herd Tb prevalence at the steady state (Figure 5.11). The 
reduction in net revenue arises from an increase in the possum harvest rate undertaken 
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to reduce the adverse impact on herd prevalence, and a lower average store cattle price. 
There is no change to the replacement cattle purchasing strategy and all cattle are 
bought at their fully discounted price. 
Figure 5.11 The Impact of Cattle to Cattle Transmission on Net Revenue and Herd Tb 
Prevalence 
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Figure 5.12 illustrates the sensitivity of net revenue and herd Tb prevalence to 
changes in the possum to cattle disease transmission coefficient (P2)' The relationship 
between the value of P2, and net revenue and Tb prevalence is complex. Changes to the 
magnitude of the possum to cattle disease transmission coefficient have a significant 
influence on herd Tb prevalence and consequently the marketing strategy adopted by 
the producer. Temporal results highlight that as P2 is increased the producer changes 
marketing strategies in response to higher levels of herd prevalence. For values of P2 of 
0.015 and greater, the producer switches between marketing options. For most of the 
values analysed, cattle are marketed to slaughter in early periods and then sold as stores 
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for the remaining periods. The switching strategy at high values of ~2 allows the 
producer to tradeoff lower current net revenue in some periods, from a low average 
store price, with the future benefits of lower prevalence obtained through removing 
infected cattle reacting at in-contact testing. The pattern of switching is not uniform for 
all values analysed. When of ~2 is set at 0.03 and 0.045 switching between slaughter 
and store sales becomes more frequent. Although the possum harvest rate increased 
substantially over the range of values analysed, weaner cattle were always purchased at 
their fully discounted price. 
Figure 5.12 The Impact of Possum to Cattle Transmission on Net Revenue and Herd Tb 
Prevalence 
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5.8.2 Sensitivity and Specificity of the Tuberculin Test 
Sensitivity 
Figure 5.13 shows that increasing the sensitivity of the Tb test from 65% to 85% 
reduces herd prevalence by 0.32%. As sensitivity is raised, a greater percentage of 
infected cattle are identified at testing events and as a result, the average store cattle 
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price increases. The higher marketing revenue combined with a decline in the possum 
harvest rate slightly increases annual net revenue by 1.02% over the values of 't2 
analysed. 
Figure 5.13 The Impact of Tb Test Sensitivity on Net Revenue and Herd Tb Prevalence 
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False positive reactor rates ranging from .05% to 4% were analysed. Increasing 
the rate at which susceptible cattle react to the test produces only minor changes to 
prevalence, possum harvest rate and average store cattle price. However, results 
displayed in Figure 5.14 show a substantial reduction in net revenue arising from more 
susceptible cattle reacting at Tb testing events for which only 65% of fair market value 
is received. The adverse impact on net revenue from a reduction in the specificity of the 
test is not large enough to motivate the producer to market cattle to slaughter and 
thereby avoid false positive reactors at pre-movement and in-contact Tb testing. 
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The relationship between the specificity of the Tb test and net revenue 
highlights another important tradeoff between private and public objectives. The 
producer benefits from a reduction in the cost of false positive reactors arising from an 
increase in the specificity of the test. 
Figure 5.14 The Impact ofTb Test Specificity on Net Revenue and Herd Tb Prevalence 
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5.8.3 Cost of Time Harvesting Possums, 
The cost of time harvesting possums is analysed for values between $75 and 
$145. Results disclose that this parameter has only a minimal affect on net revenue and 
increases herd Tb prevalence by 0.30% over the range (Figure 5.15). In response to the 
higher cost of hunting time the possum harvest rate declines. 
There are no changes to the producer's base run cattle marketing and purchasing 
strategies. An important observation gained from this series of simulations is that 
possum control has a relatively minor impact on the level of Tb infection in the herd 
when there is the opportunity to purchase cattle from infected herds. 
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Figure 5.15 The Impact of Possum Harvest Costs on Net Revenue and Herd Tb Prevalence 
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The numerical results presented in this chapter provide insights into the 
producer's response to controlling herd Tb prevalence under policies of mandatory and 
voluntary movement control testing. Tb testing costs, vector control costs, and the 
prevailing level of price discount in the store cattle market all have an important 
influence on how actively the producer will control the disease. The analysis indicates 
that movement control compliance costs are not high and that the level of price 
discount in the store cattle market has a substantial impact on the producer's decisions 
concerning marketing and purchasing cattle, and possum control. 
At low levels of price discount, the producer is motivated to sell cattle as stores 
and the discount acts as an incentive to reduce herd Tb prevalence. When the discount 
on the store cattle price is high, the impact of the discount creates a disincentive to 
marketing cattle as stores, and a strategy of holding cattle and selling directly to 
slaughter is adopted. By marketing cattle directly to slaughter, the producer can avoid 
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the price discount as a penalty and yet still receive the benefit of a reduced purchase 
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price for cattle from infected herds. The price discount therefore provides the producer 
with an economic incentive to purchase cattle from herds with the highest permissible 
Tb prevalence. 
116 
Chapter 6: General Discussion and Conclusions 
6.1 Introduction 
Research into bovine Tb in New Zealand acknowledges the significant role that 
cattle producer behaviour plays in efforts to control the disease{~ common source of 
Tb infection in cattle is the introduction of infectious cattle from other herdil The 
policy response to the movement of infectious cattle between herds has been the 
implementation of tighter regulations on the movement of cattle. 
Economic analysis of bovine Tb policy has generally focused on the national 
level, using static assumptions regarding the disease and producer behaviour. Livestock 
disease and its control is often, however, a dynamic process involving interactions 
between the state of disease and the producer's response through disease control. It is 
important therefore to understand how cattle producers are likely to react over time to 
changes in Tb control policy. As has been shown in previous chapters, economic 
methodology using dynamic optimisation can highlight the important temporal 
tradeoffs associated with cattle production and Tb control in either a policy constrained 
or unconstrained environment. 
This chapter discusses the results of the empirical model in terms of answering 
the research questions posited in Chapter 1. General conclusions are then presented 
regarding the results and their implications for movement control policy. The chapter 
concludes by stating the study's limitations and areas for further research. 
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6.2 Answers to the Research Questions 
What are the likely producer behavioural responses to movement control under the 
NP MS at various levels of store cattle price discount, in terms of decisions regarding 
the purchase and sale of cattle, and vector control, for a representative cattle 
production system? 
The analysis demonstrates that the cattle producer's response to current 
movement control policy is heavily influenced by the cost of controlling Tb infection 
levels in the herd and the prevailing level of price discount in the store cattle market. 
The producer affects the level of Tb prevalence in the herd through the amount of 
possum control undertaken and the infection risk of cattle purchased. As the price 
discount in the store cattle market increases a marginal change in apparent herd 
prevalence has a larger adverse affect on the average price received for store cattle. The 
inverse relationship between the average store cattle price and apparent herd 
prevalence, and the greater marginal impact of a higher discount regime, results in the 
producer responding to higher price discount regimes by lowering herd Tb prevalence if 
cattle are marketed as stores. 
When cattle are marketed as stores actual herd prevalence is lowered 
successively through increased possum control as the discount increases. No attempt is 
made to reduce the amount of infection brought into the herd through cattle purchases 
and therefore all cattle are purchased at the maximum discount. As the price discount 
becomes larger the marginal cost of preventing a decline in the average store cattle 
price by reducing Tb prevalence in the herd is high. The producer responds by fattening 
cattle to a condition suitable for sale directly to slaughter. Undertaking this strategy 
permits a trade-off between the additional grazing costs incurred and reductions in both 
possum harvest costs and the opportunity cost of false positive reactors identified at 
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pre-movement and in-contact testing. As a consequence of the producer's change in 
behaviour, and because cattle are still purchased at the maximum discount, there is only 
a small reduction in herd Tb prevalence from its initial level. Results highlight that if 
the marginal change in the store cattle price with respect to a change in Tb risk is too 
large then the discount can switch from an incentive to a disincentive for the producer 
to lower herd Tb prevalence. The change in marketing preferences is facilitated by the 
producer being able to sell cattle directly to slaughter. In this situation, the discount 
does not act as a penalty on sales of cattle from Tb risk herds but does provide the 
_',_l 
producer with an opportunity to reduce cattle purchase costs. 
Exploratory analysis suggests that if the producer can not sell cattle to slaughter 
then increases in the price discount reduce levels of herd Tb prevalence through higher . -.-- -'.-'-
possum harvest but do not result in the eradication of the disease from the herd because 
of the greater incentive to purchase infected cattle. An issue arising from this 
behaviour, but unable to be clarified by the model, is whether the opportunity cost of 
producing cattle relative to other land uses would become too large to make cattle 
production sustainable. 
There are several other important insights into producer behaviour gained from 
the analysis. The compensation received for reactor cattle at Tb testing is a significant 
influence on the producer's decision making. When compensation is not paid for 
reactor cattle, the lower opportunity cost of false positive reactors and absence of 
financial benefit for true positive reactors results in higher levels of possum control and 
lower levels of herd Tb prevalence under all discount regimes analysed. This finding is 
consistent with Bicknell's (1995) closed herd study which also identified that a policy 
of no compensation for reactor cattle resulted in lower levels of herd prevalence. The 
incentive for the producer to increase expenditure and lower Tb prevalence arises from 
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a substantial decrease in the value of infected cattle under a policy of no reactor 
compensation. 
The effect of movement control Tb testing on net revenue also impacts on the 
producer's decisions. If movement control testing is reduced each period by the 
producer managing cattle to avoid the in-contact test when cattle are sold as stores, then 
net revenue is increased. Higher net revenue is obtained from reductions in the annual 
cost of presenting cattle for movement control testing and its subsequent interpretation 
and fewer false positive reactors slaughtered. Although extra possum control is 
undertaken it does not offset the increase in herd Tb prevalence resulting from 
removing fewer infected cattle each period at testing and consequently the average store 
cattle price is lower; -The producer responds to the higher herd Tb prevalence by 
sending cattle to slaughter at a lower store cattle price discount. Imposing more Tb 
testing events on the producer lowers herd Tb prevalence, but in doing so increases the 
level at which the price discount prevents the sale of infected stock to other producers. 
The preceding observations highlight that the producer's response to movement 
control depends on the costs imposed on cattle from infected herds by Tb control 
policy, the cost in terms of the market discount on store cattle, and the producer's 
ability to avoid these costs. The level of discount on the price of store cattle from 
infected herds determines whether cattle are marketed as stores or sold to slaughter. The 
opportunity to sell cattle directly to slaughter allows the producer to switch marketing 
strategies and avoid the adverse impact on sales revenue when the discount on store 
cattle becomes large. With respect to cattle purchases, the price discount provides an 
economic incentive for cattle to be purchased from herds with the highest permissible 
levels of infection. The significant benefit obtained from the lower store cattle purchase 
cost provided by the price discount results in the producer managing herd Tb 
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prevalence levels through possum control rather than buying cattle from less infected 
herds. These observations imply that the producers most affected by movement control 
testing and price discounting are those, who due to constraints on their production 
system, can not fatten cattle for direct sale to slaughter. 
What is the economic impact of movement control under the NP MS, in terms of the 
difference in discounted net revenue, for a representative cattle production system? 
Under current Tb control policy, almost all Tb testing of cattle is funded by the 
cattle slaughter levy. The cost of administering and interpreting the Tb test is therefore ~. :'-.-."- .. 
not directly incurred by the producer. The costs which are incurred by the producer 
relate to presenting the cattle for the test and its subsequent interpretation, and a 
reduction in the expected proceeds of false positive reactors. There are also benefits 
derived from Tb testing cattle. The producer receives compensation at 65% of fair 
market value for infected cattle that react at the test and the removal of infected cattle 
lowers the spread of infection within the herd. 
Comparison of net revenue per hectare between mandatory and voluntary 
movement control testing policy regimes suggests that compliance costs, in terms of the 
impact on net revenue, are low when Tb surveillance testing is mandatory. For the store 
cattle price discounts analysed, annual movement control testing compliance costs 
range from 1.63% to 2.28% of net revenue when cattle are sold as stores and cattle 
purchased are pre-movement tested. Compliance costs decline as the price discount 
increases because the opportunity cost of reactor cattle at movement control testing 
events becomes less as the discount increases. Decomposition of the compliance costs 
indicates that the annual benefit received by the producer if purchased cattle have been 
pre-movement tested ranges from 0.10% to 1.31 % of net revenue as the price discounts 
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adopted in the study were increased. The positive correlation between the value of the 
pre-movement test and the price discount is due to the difference between the cost of 
purchasing mobs of cattle with relatively low infection levels and the benefit of a lower 
purchase price becoming greater as the discount increases. 
Given the tighter movement control restrictions and use of market signals employed 
under the NPMS, what is the likely impact on Tb infection levels for a representative 
cattle herd? 
The objectives set out in the NPMS require the number of infected herds in Tb : .. ~ -~: ;::.:--:.;.::-: 
vector risk areas to decline and cattle producers in general to take measures to reduce 
both the risk and actUal levels of Tb infection in their herds. The model suggests that 
when the maximum price discount in the store cattle market is 10% herd prevalence 
will decline from 2% to a steady state of 1.18%. The reduction in Tb prevalence is 
achieved by movement control and surveillance Tb testing events identifying and 
removing infected cattle. Tb infected cattle are not eradicated from the herd because 
cattle are purchased from herds with the highest permissible risk of infection and the . 
steady state harvest rate of possums is not high enough to prevent the spread of 
infection from the possum population. 
. Figure 6.1 illustrates that under all of the store cattle discount regimes analysed, 
Tb testing has a large impact initially on reducing Tb prevalence and that the producer's 
optimal level of herd Tb infection is greater than zero. For the discount regimes in 
which cattle are sold as stores there is an inverse relationship between the magnitude of 
the price discount and the herd's Tb prevalence. This relationship arises because as the 
price discount increases the marginal value of an infected cattle beast becomes more 
negative and provides the producer with an incentive to reduce prevalence levels. The 
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producer chooses to reduce Tb prevalence by increasing levels of possum harvest rather 
incurring higher purchase costs for cattle from herds with lower infection levels. 
Figure 6.1 
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At higher levels of store cattle price discount there is an initial reduction in Tb 
prevalence because in the first period cattle are marketed as stores and the balance of 
the herd not marketed are "in-contact" Tb tested. The increase in herd prevalence back 
to levels close to 2% in the steady state occurs because after the initial period, cattle are 
marketed to slaughter. This highlights the impact on herd prevalence of not exposing 
cattle to the in-contact test and reductions in the possum harvest rate. 
The analysis suggests that Tb testing requirements imposed by movement 
control regulations will reduce herd infection levels in Tb vector risk areas providing 
the maximum price discount does not motivate producers to send cattle to slaughter. An 
important implication of these findings is that if producers have the opportunity to 
purchase cattle from infected herds then under mandatory movement control testing 
discounting the price of store cattle is not likely to lead to the elimination of Tb 
123 
~:. . -:: ~:;::--;­
:.< :-::.::~~:--." 
:'':';;'£.1:!;,:;:.:-:.~ 
. .. , _. 
" -.-.,--<-
"-' ',- --," 
,-,'-".,--_.,-.. 
infection from herds. The analysis also discloses that the extent to which Tb prevalence 
is reduced in the herd depends on the actual cost incurred by the producer for having 
infected cattle. 
6.3 General Conclusions and Implications for Movement Control Policy 
The methodology used in this study has permitted not only the specific research 
questions to be answered but has also allowed exploratory analysis to be undertaken on 
the likely producer responses to an environment where movement control testing is 
unregulated. The Animal Health Board has endeavoured to provide cattle producers 
with improved information on herd Tb infection. Their objective in doing so is to 
generate a market in which there is an incentive for cattle producers to more actively .... 
control disease. 
Numerical results demonstrate that it may be rational for a risk neutral producer 
to behave in a manner under mandatory movement control testing that prevents the 
eradication of Tb from their herd when cattle from infected herds sell at a discount. The 
level at which Tb prevalence in the herd prevails is dependent on the magnitude of the . 
price discount on store cattle. When movement control testing is voluntary the 
association between Tb prevalence and the store cattle price discount regime remains 
unchanged. At levels of discount that permit cattle to be sold as stores increases in the 
store cattle price discount reduce herd Tb prevalence. When the store cattle price 
discount results in cattle being marketed to slaughter, increasing the discount results in 
higher levels of Tb prevalence. Tb prevalence is, however, relatively higher than under 
mandatory movement control testing for all price discount regimes. The reason for the 
higher Tb prevalence is that fewer infected cattle are removed from the herd at annual 
testing events because movement control testing is not undertaken. 
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Of the two voluntary movement control testing scenarios explored, herd Tb 
prevalence is lower when reactor compensation is not paid. Because infected reactor 
cattle only return to the producer a salvage value, under a no compensation policy the 
implicit value of infected cattle declines substantially. The lower value of infected 
cattle provides the producer with an incentive to reduce herd Tb prevalence. In both 
voluntary scenarios, when cattle are sold as stores, increases in the store cattle price 
discount result in greater possum harvest rates to lower herd Tb prevalence. 
The analysis indicated an interesting behavioural change when cattle purchased 
had not been pre-movement tested. The producer was motivated to purchase cattle from 
cleat herds when the optimal marketing strategy was selling cattle as stores. This 
observed change in producer behaviour from the other scenarios may have been 
influenced by the assumption that when testing was voluntary the producer had to either 
undertake all movement control testing events (pre-movement, in-contact and post-
movement) or none. Under the current formulation of the model it is not possible for 
the producer to undertake only one testing event. The model does not therefore permit 
firm conclusions to be drawn on how the producer would respond under a voluntary 
movement control testing regime if cattle purchased had not been subjected to a pre-
movement test. The model does, however, permit some insights into whether cattle are 
likely to be pre-movement tested by the seller and the likely response of the purchaser if 
they are not. 
The incentives and disincentives that exist for the seller to pre-movement test 
and the purchaser to post-movement test are presented in Table 6.1. Both the seller and 
the purchaser are faced with the same disincentives in the form of direct and indirect Tb 
testing costs. With respect to the incentives to post-movement test, the purchaser 
benefits from fewer diseased cattle entering the herd and therefore a lower probability 
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of spread of infection. The economic benefits of fewer infected cattle entering the herd 
include the avoidance of reduced revenue from; a lower average store cattle price due to 
higher herd prevalence, the need for increased possum control to reduce herd 
prevalence, and a higher number of reactors removed at testing events if herd 
prevalence is not reduced. The incentive for the seller to pre-movement test depends on 
whether the market continues to accept cattle from infected herds if they have not been 
pre-movement tested which in turn depends on whether the purchaser is prepared to 
post-movement test. The exploratory analysis indicated that purchasers of store cattle 
would still be prepared to buy cattle at the maximum discounted price even if pre-
. movement testing had not be undertaken, providing they could conduct a post-
movementTb test onthe cattle without engaging in other movement control Tb testing. 
'-->,".r 
Table 6.1 Voluntary Movement Control Testing Incentives & Disincentives 
Incentives Disincentives 
Purchaser Post- • Lower the risk of Tb transmission • Opportunity cost of true positive 
movement Tests into the herd and thereby reduce and false positive reactors 
the adverse impact on future net identified and removed at post-
revenue arising from higher herd movement testing. 
infection levels. • Testing costs. 
Seller Pre- • Cattle may not be able to be sold as • Opportunity cost of true positive 
movement Tests stores if they are not pre-movement and false positive reactors 
tested and therefore current net identified and removed at pre-
revenue may be adversely affected. movement testing. 
• Testing costs. 
Based on the assumptions of the voluntary movement control testing analysis, 
the provision of accurate information concerning herd infection status is not likely to be 
a sufficient requirement to prevent the inter-herd transmission of Tb infection. This 
conclusion questions the probable success of a policy relying on market prices and 
indicates that a regulatory response may be required to assist the market in achieving Tb 
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control policy outcomes. Justification for a regulatory response is found when the costs 
of Tb infection discussed in Chapter 1 are reconsidered. The economic impact for the 
producer of having infected cattle is the lower values of: false positive reactors 
slaughtered, cattle sold to store that are discounted and infected cattle slaughtered that 
only return a salvage value. The price discount on cattle purchased reduces the 
economic impact of these costs on the producer. Under the voluntary movement control 
testing scenarios considered, the producer does not have to bear any of the external 
costs relating to threats to New Zealand's meat trade and the adverse implications for 
public health which arise as Tb prevalence levels increase. Some regulatory 
intervention may therefore be.required in order to reduce herd Tb prevalence. 
The analysislindertaken in this study highlights that policies which lower the 
implicit value of infected cattle provide the producer with an incentive to lower herd Tb 
prevalence levels. A possible policy response consistent with this finding is the 
imposition of a disease tax on infected cattle. Under a disease tax producers would be 
fined for any infected cattle identified. To achieve the desired reduction in herd 
infection levels the fine would be set at an amount that reflected more accurately the" 
marginal social cost of Tb infection. The producer would therefore be confronted with a 
more realistic cost of an infected animal. Previous research suggests that producers may 
respond to higher costs of infected animals by taking non-compliant action with respect 
to Tb control (Bicknell, 1995). Establishing the appropriate amount of the fine would 
require considering the strategic behaviour that would likely be adopted by producers to 
avoid the penalty imposed by a fine. 
Another interesting issue concerns the development of the price discount within 
the store cattle market. Under the assumption of risk neutrality the price discount 
provides an incentive for producers to purchase cattle from infected herds. Such 
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strategic behaviour, if adopted by a large proportion of store cattle buyers, would 
increase the market demand for cattle from infected herds and consequently reduce the 
amount of the discount on store cattle by increasing the price. Numerical results reveal 
that because it is optimal for producers to purchase cattle at the highest level of 
discount it is likely that the market price of cattle would be bid up to a level that 
reflected the expected cost of purchasing infected cattle. It should be noted that the 
analysis has focused on cattle being purchased and sold between movement controlled 
herds only. In markets dominated by producers with different herd types and Tb status, 
the expected cost of purchasing infected cattle will vary and therefore the level at which 
the store cattle price discount would persist would also vary. 
A reason why the discount has been observed in store cattle markets is probably 
--,--'-.. •• _--> 
due to many producers being risk averse towards Tb infection entering their herds. 
Nevertheless as suggested previously the factors that will lead to higher levels of 
discount that are sustainable in a deregulated market remain unclear. The analysis 
indicates that to assist the market in creating and transforming the discount into a 
disi~centive for those producers who are not risk averse some form of regulatory 
response, beyond the provision of information, is required. 
6.4 Study Limitations and Opportunities for Further Research 
This study has followed Bicknell's (1995) approach to the economic analysis of 
livestock disease control by representing the producer's response to cattle production 
and Tb control in a Tb vector risk area as an optimal control problem. The optimal 
control formulation has permitted numerical results to be obtained which provide 
insight into how risk neutral producers respond in different cattle price discounting 
regimes and policy environments. The use of non-linear programming to solve the 
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optimal control problem has required several simplifying assumptions to reduce the 
complexity of the model and facilitate a numerical solution. 
. The hypothetical cattle production system is highly abstracted. Age and sex 
structures within the herd have been ignored and the herd size has been kept constant. 
Although these abstractions have simplified the mathematical representation of herd 
management and marketing options, they permit the analysis to focus on movement 
control. 
With respect to the average price of store cattle sold, it is assumed that the 
price-infection relationship is linear. No empirical data was found that suggested the 
actual functional form of the relationship between price and infection except that it is 
inverse. The advantage of assuming linearity is that it reduces the amount of non-
linearity in the control problem and hence assists in obtaining a solution. Empirical 
research is required to provide more accurate information on the impact of Tb risk on 
store cattle prices. 
The results and conclusions presented in this study relate to a risk neutral 
producer. This assumption was considered the necessary starting point for a study into· 
cattle producer behaviour. It is evident from anecdotal reports on the responses of cattle 
producers to Tb testing and store cattle purchasing decisions that a full spectrum of risk 
profiles exists. A useful role for future research is to gain empirical insight into how 
cattle producers respond to the risk of allowing Tb infection into their herds. Results 
obtained could then be used to construct behavioural models based on different risk :.-:-;,--
profiles. 
The final assumption is that the average price received for store cattle is a 
function of the apparent Tb infection in the herd only. The model does not allow for the 
determination of average price via interaction of supply and demand in the store cattle 
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market. Further research into the dynamics of the store cattle market could provide 
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insight into the optimal magnitudes of store cattle price discounts and whether they are 
likely to persist. 
The sensitivity analysis in Chapter 5 identifies that changes to several key 
parameter values . materially influence results. These observations highlight the 
importance of further empirical research into the rate of Tb transmission between cattle 
and from wildlife vectors, the sensitivity of Tb tests, and wildlife vector control costs. 
The methodology applied in this study is not a substitute for empirical research into 
bovine tuberculosis control but rather a complement to it. The optimal control model 
. increases understanding of important economic issues concerning Tb control at a time 
when high quality empirical data is scarce. As the quality of parameter values are 
improved the model can be updated, new solutions obtained, and the relationships 
between cattle production and disease control that are identified in this research can be 
further clarified. 
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Appendix 1: GAMS Input File for Base Run (10%, Maximum Store 
Cattle Price Discount) 
$OFFSYMLIST 
$OFFSYMXREF 
OPTION LIMROW = 0 ; 
OPTION LIMCOL = 0 ; 
OPTION ITERLIM = 10000 ; 
*ModeIAGT2 
SETS 
T time period /0*70/ 
SCALARS 
INITS initial susceptible cattle 
INITI initial infected cattle 
INITPOS initialpossum population 
DELTA annual discount rate 
PI price for weaners purchased 
P2 price for clear herd store R2 cattle 
P3 price for R2 cattle slaughtered 
P4 price for cull cows 
L slaughter levy 
MU salvage value 
RHO breeding component culled 
GAMMA1 compensation non-Iesioned 
GAMMA2 compensation lesioned 
PSI annual whole herd test frequency 
ETA MC parameter for cattle purchases 
OMEGA maximum price discount 
IOTA maximum herd infection level for stores 
SIGMA in-contact testing parameter 
NUl variable cost of cattle 
NU2 additional grazing costs R2 slaughtered 
ALPHA testing cost 
BETA 1 cattle-cattle disease transmission 
BETA2 possum-cattle disease transmission 
TAU 1 false positives 
TAU2 true positives 
Kl profit maximising stocking rate 
PHI breeding herd calving percentage 
B percentage of herd breeding cattle 
K2 possum population carrying capacity 
W cost of time hunting possums 
Z possum harvest parameter 
A possum growth rate 
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/0.148313/ 
/0.003027/ 
/1.33/ 
/0.087/ 
/3.49/ 
/4.82/ 
/5.16/ 
/3.27/ 
/0.0871/ 
/.35/ 
/.16/ 
/.65/ 
/.65/ 
/1/ 
/1/ 
/0.10/ 
/0.0499/ 
/250/ 
/0.1348/ 
/0.52/ 
/0.0353/ 
/3/ 
/0.003/ 
/.01/ 
/.75/ 
/.15134/ 
/.67/ 
/.65/ 
/3/ 
/0.9426/ 
/6.449/ 
/.30/ 
PARAMETERS 
STRT(T) ; 
STRT(T) = 1 ; 
STRT("O") = 0 ; 
Display 
STRT; 
VARIABLES 
S(T) 
I(T) 
F(T) 
MC(T) 
APP(T) 
POS(T) 
H(T) 
NREV 
PARAMETER 
DIS(T) 
susceptible cattle 
infected cattle 
proportion of marketable R2 cattle sold as stores 
movement control testing 
price paid for weaner cattle purchased 
possum population 
possums harvested 
net revenue 
annual discount factor; 
DIS(T) = (lI(l+DELTA»**(ORD(T)-l); 
EQUATIONS 
NETREV total discounted net revenue 
SUSCEP(T) equation of motion for susceptible R2 cattle 
INFECT(T) equation of motion for infected R2 cattle 
POSSUMS(T) equation of motion for possums 
POSCON(T) possum harvest constraint; 
NETREV.. SUM(T$STRT(T), DIS(T)*«P3-L)*(l-B)*(S(T)*(l-PSI*TAU1)* 
(1-(F(T)+MC(T)*(l-F(T»*(1-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T»)*TAU1»+MU*I(T)*(l-
PSI*TAU2)*(1-(F(T)+MC(T)*(1-F(T»*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T»)*TAU2»)+ 
(P4-L )*RHO*B*(S(T)*(l-PSI*TAU1 )+MU*I(T)*(1-PSI*TAU2»+ 
«(P2-P2*(l-OMEGA»/(O-IOTA»*««PSI*(TAU1 *S(T)+TAU2*I(T»)/(S(T)+I(T»)-
TAU 1 )/(1-(TAU1 +(1-TAU2»»+P2)* 
F(T)*(l-B)*«1-MC(T)*TAU1)*S(T)*(1-PSI*TAU1)+(l-MC(T)*TAU2)*I(T)* 
(1-PSI*TAU2»- (APP(T)-MC(T)*«l-«APP(T)-Pl )/«PI-P1 *(1-0MEGA»/(O-
IOTA») * 
(l-ET A *TAU2»*«P1-L)*GAMMA1 *TAU1-ALPHA)+ 
«APP(T)-P1)/«P1-P1 *(l-OMEGA»/(O-IOTA»)*(l-ETA*TAU2)* 
«P1-L)*GAMMA2*TAU2-ALPHA»)*(K1-«S(T)+I(T»-(1-B)*«F(T)*(1-
MC(T)*TAU1)+ 
(1-(F(T)+MC(T)*(1-F(T»*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T»)*TAU1»)*S(T)*(l-PSI*TAU1)+ 
(F(T)*(l-MC(T)*TAU2)+(l-(F(T)+MC(T)*(l-F(T»* 
142 
(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T)))*TAU2)))*I(T)*(l-PSI*TAU2))-RHO*B*(S(T)+I(T))-
MC(T)*((l-B)*(F(T)+(l-F(T))*(l-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T))))+B*(l-EXP(-
SIGMA *F(T))))* 
(TAUI *S(T)*(l-PSI*TAUl)+TAU2*I(T)*(l-PSI*TAU2))-
PSI*(TAUI *S(T)+TAU2*I(T))+PHI*B*(S(T)*(1-PSI*TAUl)+I(T)*(1-
PSI*TAU2))))+ 
MC(T)*((l-B)*(F(T)+(l-F(T))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T))))* 
(((P2-L)* GAMMA 1 *TAUl-ALPHA)*S(T)*(l-PSI*TAUl)+ 
((P2-L)*GAMMA2*TAU2-ALPHA)*I(T)*(1-PSI*TAU2))+ 
B*(l-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T)))*(((P4-L)* GAMMA 1 *TAUl-ALPHA)*S(T)*(l-
PSI*TAUI )+((P4-L )*GAMMA2*TAU2-ALPHA)*I(T)*(1-PSI*TAU2)))+ 
PSI* (B* (S(T)* ((P4-L) * GAMMA 1 *TAUl-ALPHA)+I(T)*((P4-L)*GAMMA2*TAU2-
ALPHA))+(l-B)*(S(T)*((P2-L)*GAMMAl *TAUl-ALPHA)+I(T)* 
((P2-L)*GAMMA2* TAU2-ALPHA)))-(NU1 *(S(T)+I(T))+NU2*(l-B)* 
(S(T)*(l-PSI*TAUl)*(l-(F(T)+MC(T)*(I-F(T))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T)))*TAUl))+ 
I(T)*(1-PSI*TAU2)*(I-(F(T)+MC(T)*(l-F(T))*(1-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T)))*TAU2))))-
(W/Z)*((H(T)/POS(T))**2))) =E= NREV ; 
SUSCEP(T)$STRT(T) .. S(T)=E= S(T-l)-BETAI *S(T-l)*I(T-l)-
BETA2*S(T-l)*POS(T-l)-(l-B)*(F(T-l)*(l-MC(T-l)*TAUl)+ 
(l-(F(T-l)+MC(T-l)*(1-F(T-l))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l)))*TAUI)))* 
S(T-l )*(l-PSI*TAUI )-RHO*B*S(T -1 )+(Kl-((S(T -1 )+I(T -1 ))-(l-B)*((F(T -1)* 
(I-MC(T -1 )*TAUI )+(l-(F(T -1 )+MC(T -1 )*(I-F(T -1 ))* 
(l-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T-l)))*TAUl )))*S(T -l)*(l-PSI*TAUl)+ 
(F(T -1 )*(I-MC(T -1 )*TAU2)+(I-(F(T -1 )+MC(T -1 )*(l-F(T -1 ))* 
(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l)))*TAU2)))*I(T-l)*(I-PSI*TAU2))-
MC(T -1 )*((1-B)*(F(T -1 )+(I-F(T -1 ))*(l-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T -1 ))))+ 
B*(I-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))*(TAUI *S(T-l)*(l-PSI*TAUl)+TAU2*I(T-l)* 
(1-PSI*TAU2))-RHO*B*(S(T-l)+I(T-l))-PSI*(TAUl *S(T-l)+TAU2* 
I(T -1 ))+PHI*B*(S(T -1 )*(l-PSI*TAUI )+I(T -1 )*(I-PSI*TAU2))))* 
(l-((APP(T -l)-Pl)/((PI-PI *(l-OMEGA))/(O-IOTA)))*(l-ETA *TAU2))* 
(l-MC(T-l)*TAUl)+PHI*B*S(T-l)*(l-PSI*TAUI)-PSI*S(T-I)*TAUl-
MC(T-l)*((l-B)*(F(T-l)+(l-F(T-l))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))+ 
B*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))*S(T-l)*(I-PSI*TAUl)*TAUI ; 
INFECT(T)$STRT(T) .. I(T) =E= I(T-l)+BETAI *S(T-l)*I(T-l)+ 
BETA2*S(T-l)*POS(T-l)-(l-B)*(F(T-l)*(1-MC(T-l)*TAU2)+ 
(l-(F(T-l)+MC(T-l)*(I-F(T-l))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l)))*TAU2)))* 
I(T -1 )*(l-PSI*TAU2)-RHO*B*I(T -1 )+(Kl-((S(T -1 )+I(T -1 ))-(l-B)*((F(T -1)* 
(l-MC(T-l)*TAUl)+(l-(F(T-l)+MC(T-l)*(l-F(T-l))* 
(l-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T-l)))*TAUl)))*S(T-l )*(l-PSI*TAUl)+ 
(F(T -1 )*(l-MC(T -1 )*TAU2)+(1-(F(T -1 )+MC(T -1 )*(I-F(T -1 ))* 
(I-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T -1)))*TAU2)))*I(T -1)*(1-PSI*TAU2))-
MC(T-l)*((l-B)*(F(T-l)+(l-F(T-l))*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))+ 
B*(l-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))*(TAUl *S(T-l)*(I-PSI*TAUl)+TAU2*I(T-l)* 
(1-PSI*TAU2))-RHO*B*(S(T-l)+I(T-l))-PSI*(TAUI *S(T-l)+TAU2* 
I(T -1 ))+PHI*B*(S(T -1 )*(l-PSI*TAUI )+I(T -1 )*(1-PSI*TAU2))))* 
((APP(T-l)-Pl)/((Pl-PI *(l-OMEGA))/(O-IOTA)))*(l-ETA*TAU2)* 
(l-MC(T -1 )*TAU2)+PHI*B*I(T -1 )*(l-PSI*TAU2)-PSI*I(T -1 )*TAU2-
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MC(T -1 )*((I-B)*(F(T -1 )+(I-F(T -1 ))*(I-EXP( -SIGMA *F(T -1 ))))+ 
B*(1-EXP(-SIGMA*F(T-l))))*I(T-l)*(I-PSI*TAU2)*TAU2 ; 
POSSUMS(T)$STRT(T) .. POS(T) =E= POS(T -1 )+A *POS(T -1 )*(1-(POS(T -1 )1K2))-
H(T-l) ; 
POSCON(T)$STRT(T) .. H(T) =L= .95*POS(T) ; 
* BOUNDS FOR VARIABLES 
S.LO(T) = 0.0001 ; 
I.LO(T) = 0; 
POS.LO(T) = 0.0 ; 
F.tO(T) = 0 ; 
MC.LO(T) = 1 ; 
APP.LO(T) = PI *(1-0MEGA); 
H.LO(T) =0; 
S.UP(T) = .15134 ; 
I.UP(T) = .15134 ; 
POS.UP(T) = 3 ; 
F.UP(T)= 1 ; 
MC.UP(T) = 1 ; 
APP.UP(T) = PI ; 
H.UP(T) = 3.0 ; 
* FIXED INITIAL VALUES 
S.FX("O") = INITS ; 
I.FX("O") = INITI ; 
POS.FX("O") = INITPOS ; 
F.FX("O") = 1 ; 
MC.FX("O") = 1 ; 
APP.FX("O") = PI *(1-0MEGA); 
H.FX("O") = .2 ; 
* STARTING INITIAL VALUES 
S.L(T) = INITS ; 
I.L(T) = INITI ; 
POS.L(T) = .8*INITPOS ; 
F.L(T) = .5 ; 
Me.L(T) = 1; 
APP.L(T) = PI *(1-(.8*OMEGA)) ; 
H.L(T) =.2; 
MODEL AGT2 / ALL! ; 
SOLVE AGT2 USING NLP MAXIMISING NREV ; 
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Appendix 2: Steady State Results for Policy Scenarios and Discount 
Regimes 
Table A.I Steady State Values for Herd Splitting Simulation (0' = 0) 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
PossumslHectare 2.07 1.79 1.54 2.47 2.51 2.54 
Possum Harvest Rate 9.30% 12.11 % 14.61% 5.25% 4.93% 4.61% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 80.93 80.91 80.90 
Cattle Sold as Stores 80.06 80.21 80.36 0 0 0 
Cattle Purchased 10.23 9.82 9.46 10.80 10.86 10.90 
Average Store Cattle 
Sale Price l 
$474.21 $468.44 $464.37 $445.05 $435.26 $425.23 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.85 $279.20 $261.75 $244.30 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenueIHectare $25.08 $24.89 $24.76 $24.65 $24.77 $24.89 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.61% 1.40% 1.22% 1.91% 1.94% 1.96% 
Marginal Value $504.01 $485.57 $467.96 $447.84 $430.91 $413.99 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$436.39 -$793.57 -$1155.37 -$58.64 -$43.53 -$28.45 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.43 -$2.15 -$3.02 -$0.67 -$0.62 -$0.57 
Possums 
IThe average price the producer recei~es if cattle are sold as stores. 
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Table A.2 Steady State Values for Lowering the "High Risk" Threshold (i = 0.0199). 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
PossumslHectare 1.83 2.41 2.45 2.48 2.51 2.54 
Possum Harvest Rate 11.71% 5.84% 5.53% 5.22% 4.90% 4.59% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 80.98 80.98 80.96 80.95 80.93 
Cattle Sold as Stores 80.48 0 0 0 0 0 
.-
Cattle Purchased 10.99 10.62 10.66 10.71 10.75 10.79 
Average Store Cattle $468.88 $437.23 $414.02 $390.26 $365.93 $341.03 
Sale Price l 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.65 $279.20 $261.75 $244.30 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenueIHectare $24.45 $24.44 $24.55 $24.67 $24.78 $24.90 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.08% 1.85% 1.87% 1.89% 1.92% 1.94% 
Marginal Value $498.24 $479.64 $462.83 $446.02 $429.23 $412.44 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$725.55 -$87.33 -$72.28 -$57.25 -$42.25 -$27.28 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$2.03 -$0.77 -$0.72 -$0.67 -$0.62 -$0.57 
Possums 
IThe average price the producer receives if cattle are sold as stores. 
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Table A.3 Steady State Values for No Reactor Cattle Compensation 
(Y1 = 77, Y2 = 0.27) 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 
PossumslHectare 1.99 1.77 1.57 1.40 2.27 
Possum Harvest Rate 10.07% 12.26% 14.25% 16.03% 7.26% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 0 81.02 
-. 
Cattle Sold as Stores 80.37 80.47 80.55 80.63 0 
Cattle Purchased 11.30 11.02 10.76 10.53 10.51 
Average Store Cattle 
Sale Pricel 
$476.23 $471.68 $468.19 $465.57 $439.40 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.65 $279.20 $261.75 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenueIHectare $24.71 $24.61 $24.54 $24.50 $24.56 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.19% 1.07% 0.95% 0.85% 1.76% 
Marginal Value $503.74 $485.99 $468.69 $451.74 $430.15 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$522.68 -$808.80 -$1096.92 -$1386.67 -$286.24 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.61 -$2.20 -$2.88 -$3.65 -$1.01 
Possums 
IThe average price the producer receives if cattle are sold as stores. 
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30% 
2.30 
6.96% 
81.01 
0 
10.56 
$430.23 
$244.30 
$24.67 
1.79% 
$413.15 
-$270.96 
-$0.96 
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Table A.4 Movement Control Compliance Costs for Store Cattle Production 
Steady State Annual Net Revenue Steady State Annual Costs & 
Benefits 
Store Cattle Mandatory Voluntary Voluntary MC Testing. Voluntary Pre-
Price Discount MC Testing MCTesting MC Testing Compliance Movement 
Regime (1) (2) Cost Testing Benefit 
.5% $38,864 $39,752 $39,711 $887.16 $40.29 
10% $38,643 $39,402 $39,255 $759.03 $146.83 
15% $38,483 $39,153 $38,913 $670.04 $240.04 
20% . $38,379 . $39,003 $38,499 $624.03 $503.14 
25% $38,812 $38,839 $38,692 $27.11 $147.13 
30% $37,997 $39,025 $38,885 $27.42 $139.11 
(1) Cattle purchased have been pre-movement tested by the seller. 
(2) Cattle purchased have not been pre-movement tested by the seller. 
-.. ----.... -- ....... 
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Table A.S Steady State Values for Voluntary Movement Control Testing: Reactor 
Compensation· 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
PossumslHectare 2.09 1.79 1.54 1.33 2.51 2.54 
Possum Harvest Rate 9.13% 12.04% 14.63% 16.49% 4.87% 4.55% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 0 80.91 80.90 
Cattle Sold as Stores 81.11 81.24 81.36 81.47 0 0 
Cattle Purchased 10.26 9.83 9.46 9.14 10.87 10.91 
Movement Control No No No No No No 
Testing 
Average Store Cattle $473.65 $467.43 $463.00 $459.83 $432.55 $421.97 
Sale Pricel 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.65 $279.20 $261.75 $244.30 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenueIHectare $25.37 $25.14 $24.99 $24.92 $24.79 $24.90 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.73% 1.51% 1.31% 1.15% 2.05% 2.07% 
Marginal Value $505.28 $489.87 $475.39 $460.11 $427.97 $411.09 
SusceJ!tible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$416.28 -$781.02 -$1150.17 -$1403.27 -$40.72 -$25.69 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.39 -$2.13 -$3.03 -$3.33 -$0.61 -$0.57 
Possums 
'Reactor compensation is paid at 65% of Fair Market Value. 
IThe average price the producer receives if cattle are sold as stores. 
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Table A.6 Steady State Values for Voluntary Movement Control Testing: No Reactor 
Compensation' 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 
PossumslHectare 1.87 1.61 1.37 1.18 2.28 2.31 
Possum Harvest Rate 11.24% 13.92% 16.24% 18.21% 7.23% 6.92% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 0 81.02 81.01 
Cattle Sold as Stores 81.21 81.33 81.45 81.54 0 0 
Cattle Purchased 9.95 9.56 9.22 8.94 to.53 to.57 
Movement Control No No No No No No 
Testing 
Average Store Cattle $474.42 $468.81 $464.79 $461.97 $436.80 $427.11 
Sale Price1 
Average Weaner $331.55 $314.10 $296.65 $279.20 $261.75 $244.30 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenuelHectare $25.22 $25.04 $24.92 $24.85 $24.56 $24.68 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.57% 1.37% 1.19% 1.04% 1.87% 1.89% 
Marginal Value $506.74 $492.00 $478.01 $464.56 $428.34 $411.38 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$663.52 -$1030.66 -$1401.58 -$1775.25 -$284.35 -$269.11 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.91 -$2.75 -$3.75 -$4.91 -$1.01 -$0.95 
Possums 
'No reactor compensation is paid: false positives return their full carcass value, true positives return a salvage value. 
lThe av~rage price the producer receives if cattle are sold as stores. 
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Table A.7 Steady State Values for Voluntary Movement Control Testing: Reactor 
Compensation and No Pre-Movement Test for Cattle Purchased· 
Store Cattle Price Discount (Maximum) 
Variable 5% 10% 15% 
PossumslHectare 2.07 1.76 1.49 
Possum Harvest Rate 9.28% 12.39% 15.09% 
Cattle Slaughtered 0 0 0 
Cattle Sold as Stores 81.20 81.34 81.47 
Cattle Purchased 9.98 9.54 9.15 
Movement Control No No No 
Testin2 
Average Store Cattle $474.36 $468.94 $465.34 
Sale Price! 
Average Weaner $349.00 $349.00 $349.00 
Cattle Purchase Price 
Net RevenueIHectare $25.34 $25.05 $24.83 
Actual Tb Prevalence 1.58% 1.35% 1.15% 
Marginal Value $512.36 $510.11 $508.79 
Susceptible Cattle 
Marginal Value -$424.95 -$803.25 -$1186.16 
Infected Cattle 
Marginal Value -$1.43 -$2.23 -$3.22 
Possums 
·Reactor compensation is paid at 65% of Fair Market Value; 11 equals O. 
IThe average price the producer receives if cattle are sold as stores. 
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20% 25% 
2.46 2.49 
5.40% 5.07% 
80.76 80.74 
0 0 
11.29 11.35 
Yes Yes 
$443.16 $432.86 
$279.20 $261.75 
$24.57 $24.69 
2.01% 2.03% 
$457.35 $439.72 
-$65.83 -$50.15 
-$0.70 -$0.65 
30% 
2.52 
4.74% 
80.73 
0 
11.40 
Yes 
$422.32 
$244.30 
$24.82 
2.06% 
$422.09 
-$34.52 
-$0.60 
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